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ABSTRACT

The Metahistory of the American West
by
Don Franklin Shepherd
Dr. Vernon Mattson, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of History
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
In 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner published his famous thesis, “The Significance of
the Frontier in American History.” The thesis, as well as his subsequent writings,
established the groundwork for the dialogue on the American West That groundwork
essentially captured western history as the relationship between seen and unseen forces.
Implicit in Turner’s work was a structural model for how visible and invisible worlds
interacted with one another. When one examines the work of later scholars like Henry
Nash Smith who shifted away from Turner’s synthesis, it becomes apparent that there
was more underpinning Smith’s dissent than simply a disagreement regarding historical
facts. What had actually changed was the structural model for how the two worlds
intermingled. This paradigm shift for the dialectic between seen and unseen forces was at
the root of the move away from Turner. The new paradigm was entirely incompatible
with Turner’s model. In time, the new paradigm was adapted as the structural model for
what eventually emerged as the New Western history. But in the same way that Henry
Nash Smith represented the bridge between two historical era, so too did New Western
iii
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history. In fact, it signified an ending as well as a beginning. While its adherents still
relied on the ironic emphasis in Smith’s structural model, they also, step by step, shifted
back into a metaphorical mode of explanation that came more and more to resemble
Turner’s discarded paradigm. With metaphor and irony embroiled in an acute struggle for
intellectual dominance, it was only a matter of time before a full-blown neo-Tumerian
revolution would be well underway.

IV
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
In our classes, we are forever assuring our students that historical
interpretation is a fresh and spirited adventure of the mind, a message
quite wonderfully mocked by the textbooks we have assigned.'
With the publication o f Virgin Land in 1950 by the western historian Henry Nash
Smith, the study of “cultural meaning” was brought to the forefront of the historical
profession.^ The study o f “cultural meaning” was essentially a study of the distinctions
between “image and action” and between “consciousness and actual conditions.”^ It
represented an assessment not only o f what Americans “actually had done” but also what
they “thought they were doing. '* With his “myth and symbol” school. Smith succeeded
in “capturing the imagination of a generation of scholars” including those who had little
or nothing to do with the American W est/ What Smith had done was legitimize
discussion within an historically acceptable sociological framework for how thought, an
intangible human activity, shaped or was in turn shaped by tangible, physical action.
With Subsequent scholars building on Smith’s dichotomy between thought and physical
action, it became a standard tool in historical explanation. The term “culture” became
synonymous with the interrelationship between these two components.
In looking back to assess the past fifty years of historical writing, the problem
becomes clear that historians have adopted the dualism of image-making and physical
action without acknowledging what that acceptance implies. What that acceptance
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implies is that historians have been embedding a relationship between an invisible world
and a visible world into their texts. As part of this invisible world, thought was endowed
with the capacity to impact and be impacted by the physical world. With this dichotomy
rooted in much of the writing on the American West, contemporary historical narrative
indeed became a story about two worlds colliding—only it was not necessarily the
Indians and the Cowboys this time around. Rather, it was about how the invisible world
interacted with the visible one to produce certain outward effects. It was about how an
unseen force, or thought, caused physical events.
There may be those scholars who strongly disagree with associating thought with an
invisible world and labeling it as an unseen force. Two responses can be given to
demonstrate that there are legitimate reasons for disagreeing with their objections. First,
the present work is concerned with understanding how historians themselves have
encoded the concept of thought into their texts. I will show that historians themselves
have made thought into a vague, amorphous abstraction possessed of a life of its own
separate from the physical world. When carefully analyzed, historians have linguistically
expressed thought as an unknown reality which somehow persists, and somehow exists,
over time and across space. Whether or not historians believe in a merely physicalchemical aspect to thought, they have not written about it that way. Historians have
turned thought into an unseen force but, as a community of scholars, they have failed to
examine seriously what they have done. Therefore, the historical profession has
continued to talk about “cultural meaning" and image-making as though it were a downto-earth, clearly defined process when in fact it is the same kind o f mystical rhetoric
which they otherwise proceed to rqect. Second, historians have not defined thought
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objectively. This is only natural; there is no scientific consensus for a definition o f
thought. At professional conferences, the very real possibility that thought is something
outside the chemical reactions of the brain has been continually raised and debated. The
present work does not pretend to solve the riddle o f the mind except to say that thought is
clearly a force possessed of a tremendous power to shape the surrounding environment.
Historians have treated thought as an amorphous abstraction and it does not seem too far
out of line to reference thought as an unseen force. Such a term meets both criteria of
logic and consistency.
While decoding Henry Nash Smith’s concept of thought, later coined by him under
the term “imaginative constructions,” may provide an important clue for demonstrating
how American West history has been composed, it cannot be insulated from the larger
context for how western historians have written an unseen force into their narratives.^
Included in this larger context alongside Smith’s “imaginative constructions ” is the work
of other historians who have employed a similar dualism in their historical narratives. O f
special importance are Frederick Jackson Turner’s concept o f “vital forces” and Richard
White’s theme of “energy.” Turner, the founder of American West history, and White,
one of the leading contemporary revisionists, both produced historical interpretations
guided by their view for how unseen forces interacted with the physical surroundings.
Their terms, “vital forces” and “energy,” represented alternative ways in which historical
interpretation could be circumscribed by the limits o f their world view for how this
interaction occurred. Examining these three terms in context of one another and in
context of their respective adherents provides the larger context yields the following
conclusion. The major shifts in writing about the American West were largely
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due to fundamental revisions in how historians captured the relationship between unseen
forces and the visible world.
Undoubtedly, many scholars will ask for a tighter definition of what constitutes an
unseen force than what has been presented thus 6r. Whereas other historians have left
“vital forces,” “imaginative constructions,” and “energy” as protean terms that could just
about mean anything, I will try to be as clear as possible. Quite simply, an unseen force
refers to a linguistic device used by a historian when he shifts into an explanation form
that establishes a causal factor which is well outside of the physical senses to be the
originating source of a physical effect. The main point of the work at hand is not to prove
that “vital forces,” “imaginative constructions,” and “energy” exist in fact as their
respective authors would have them, but rather to suggest that the historian shifts into
using one of these terms, or the fundamental concept represented by the term, at that
moment when he attributes causation to a non-physical property. An unseen force, as
encoded in the writing of western historians, is a causative, non-physical agent. Another
way to express this would be to use the words phenomenal and non-phenomenal. A
phenomenon is that which is sensory; it can be perceived by one of the five senses.
Something that is non-phenomenal would refer to that which is non-sensory, not sensed
by sight, sound, touch, taste, or smell. Such an unseen force would be non-phenomenal.
But it has already been stated that an unseen force denotes connotations of causation.
Therefore, since the word non-phenomenal does not implicitly share those connotations,
it is not quite an exact substitute unless one endows it with causative agency. But it is a
close enough match and I will considered it endowed with causative agency as used
from this point on in the text. The word that is an exact substitute is noumenon; it implies
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both a non-sensory agent as well as a causal agent Thus, the relationship of “vital
forces,” “imaginative constructions,” and “energy” to the physical world is one of
noumenon to phenomenon. It is one of the oldest philosophical and metaphysical
relationships in recorded history.
If art imitates life, then history, as art, expresses the same relation; history imitates
what is actually out there within the totality o f existence. What is clear is that historians
have never been able to eradicate completely an unseen world from the way they write
history. Today, most historians feel comfortable discussing western history in terms of
geographical places and layers of memory, but it remains to be seen just how they will
react to pushing the envelope one step further by insisting that those terms be reviewed
within the larger context of noumenal and phenomenal relationships. Irregardless,
I follow the courageous lead of Frederick Jackson Tumer’s declaration in his “Talk on
Sectionalism,” “I am one o f those who believes in breaking line fences, even at the risk
of arrest for trespass, or disclosure of being an amateur, or something worse, breaking
into the professionals’ game

How Historians Can Talk About Unseen Forces
The question that has to be addressed is how can historians talk about unseen forces
when they have no idea what they are. It seems that the only thing that could make this
possible is that historians adopted specific linguistic frameworks that harmonized with
their own broader world view. There were those historians who tried to avoid a dualism
between phenomenal and non-phenomenal by fully immersing themselves into a
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materialistic view of reality. But even then they could not completely obscure the
essential division between the seen and the unseen from their language. In subtle ways,
their dialogues repeated the dualism which they condenmed. Few historians have pursued
the training to develop their own framework for elaborating the interaction between
noumenon and phenomenon. As Hayden White pointed out in his 1966 ‘The Burden of
History,” historical training has consisted of little more than ‘journeyman” exercises and
the most “general experience o f human affairs.”^ If White’s insight was correct, then
what right have historians to be engaged in such dualistic discourse? And, if White was
correct that historians never sufficiently developed a formal framework for resolving the
deeper philosophical issues involved in historical explanation, can one hypothesize that
the individual historian and perhaps society-at-large merely adopted poetic forms when
speaking of this otherworldly interaction?^ What is meant by poetic form is Georg
Friedrich Hegel’s vision for the “separation of consciousness from its object and the need
(and attempt) to affect a union with it once more.”'® Poetry, such as Henry Wadsworth
Longfellow’s “Slave’s Dream” or Edgar Allen Poe’s “The Raven, ”was the byproduct of
metaphorical suppositions where the lines dividing the phenomenal from the nonphenomenal became intermittently distinct and then blurred." If historical writing is
indeed poetic in form as a result of similar metaphorical suppositions for how the unseen
intermingles with and separates from material reality, that would force it to conform in
some degree to Hegel’s vision o f poetry. It is poetic form that embeds unseen forces into
historical dialogue even when the historians are unaware of the form itself.
In Hayden White’s groundbreaking work, Metahistorv: The Historical Imagination in
Nineteenth-Century Europe (1973), he labeled poetic form under the term
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“metahistory.”'^ Poetic form was the deeper structure that White envisioned lay beneath
peculiar forms of historical consciousness It infused into the text a particular type of
content that would be accepted or rejected depending on whether it conformed to the
world view of the scholar and the spirit of the age.'^ For White, poetic form could be
configured using any one of the four tropes. A trope was a figure of speech that conveyed
the historian’s idea along an easily identifiable pattern. In Metahistorv. White posited the
four tropes of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. In doing so, he drew heavily
on an earlier essay by Kenneth Burke entitled "Four Master Tropes” and included in
Burke’s own masterpiece, A Grammar of Motives (1945).'^ Burke’s work was focused
on uncovering linguistic technicalities involved in any historical, philosophical, or
dramatic explanation o f human action. What one notices about the first three tropes is
that they are fundamentally figures o f speech endowed with the function of tying things
together or pulling them apart. That makes them ideal for understanding how historians
either embed or disentangle unseen forces from their physical objects. In fact, it even
makes one wonder whether historians are induced to embed unseen forces into their work
precisely because they have adopted one or more of the tropes. Tropal forms appear to
lead in that direction. A trope inherently contains a specific way for expressing the
relationship between noumenon and phenomenon. Depending on the trope employed, the
expression changes. The trope is the metahistorical element—the poetic form beyond a
simple chronology—giving history its interpretive mechanism.
To understand how each trope changes the expression of the historian and embeds a
unique relationship between noumenon and phenomenon into the text, a brief review of
the four tropes is required. In the same way that Hayden White dealt loosely with the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

tropes in his own book, I follow suit. For the scholar who wishes to scrutinize terms
according to strictly traditional standards, this work, like White’s, is inappropriate. To
begin with, metaphor is the mode of reasoning by which the internal qualities of an object
can be substituted for the physical object itself. The physical representation recedes into
the background and allows the internal qualities to define the object. The bodily organism
o f a man and his spectrum o f values become the same when seen in terms of metaphor.
Under metaphor, the bodily actions of the organism become significantly less important
for defining the man as an object than the overarching ideals and spiritual notions which
he carries with him while fulfilling those actions. The physical man is merged with his
internal qualities; the seen and unseen coalesce into one representation. Hence, metaphor
is essentially unifying. On the other hand, metonymy breaks up that unity by allowing for
a cause-effect relationship to separate things into dual components. That is, any object or
outward quality is presumed to have causal agents existing behind it. Objects are no
longer defined in terms of their inner qualities but rather are seen as expressions of such
inner qualities. In the case of the physical man and his values, the two become distinct as
the values are endowed with causative agency. The set of values causes the physical man
to act along a certain trend. Therefore, the physical man and the values are distinct. From
this perspective, metonymy is essentially divisive. In comparison, synecdoche reunifies
that division by integrating the metonymy back into metaphor or a complete whole
Metonymy may create thirty sets of divisions, but those divisions can only embody
dualistic equations. In metaphor, A=B, A=C, A=D, and A=E. Metonymy differs in that it
establishes that A>B, A>C, A>D, and A>E. That is, A causes these variables. It is only
synecdochic reasoning that can generate the overall conclusion that A=E as well as A>E
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at the same time. Synecdoche, rooted in the premise that the whole exists in all the parts,
allows for A to serve as a causative agency while also merging that causative agency with
the physical object. Therefore, A>and =B, A>and =C, A>and =D, A>and =E. The part
contains the whole within it and, therefore, it is the whole itself. Thus, A= B,C, D, and E
while nevertheless causing them. Under this synopsis, synecdoche has led back to
metaphor. Synecdoche is an extension of metaphor which accounts for numerous
variables. In metaphor, there is no mechanism to recognize that all the variables from B
through E= A It only allows for a variable to be merged with A Synecdoche provides
the mechanism for capturing the larger picture for how all the variables interact with A
by positing that the whole exists in all the parts. That means A equals any variable.
Hence, synecdoche is re-unifying and re-integrative.
What is most significant about these first three tropes is Kenneth Burke’s observation
that they “shade into one another.”'^ Each successive trope builds upon the one that
comes before it by utilizing its structure as the foundation for the next level of meaning.
For example, metaphor can exist without metonymy, and metonymy can exist without
synecdoche. But in order for synecdoche to function it requires the range and the
equation of the variables in metaphor and metonymy. For metonymy to function requires
the unity of metaphor from which to expand. For Burke, this progression through the
tropes is an automatic process. In terms of the formalist structure of the tropes, once
metaphor has been established it necessarily leads into metonymy and synecdoche.
Hayden White borrowed this model, suggesting that the changes of expression in
individuals and society-at-large could be charted as they progressively transitioned
through these modes of communication. By definition, something which happens
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automatically is done unconsciously. Not only does each one of these three tropes lack an
intrinsic self-conscious mechanism which would enable the historian to analyze what he
was doing while adopting such a trope, but also the entire process through the three
tropes is unconsciously driven. These tropes possess no principle for analyzing their
procedural assumptions. But the entire process moving through these tropes is extremely
productive. It is productive in that each trope goes towards the building of a foundation
that culminates in the inclusion of all historical action under a single macrocosmic
structure. In the example above, that structure is represented by the symbol A. Whether
real or imaginary, an absolute ground to reality, or A as the originating source and cause
of all the variables in a particular historical explanation, has been embedded into the
work of the historian. Since all three tropes shade into one another and ultimately back
into metaphor while at the same time lacking an analytical mechanism for reviewing the
poetic form intrinsic to their process, the term “metaphor” can be used, except in specific
instances where emphasis on a distinct tropal configuration is desired, in discussing all
three tropes. As White noted, metonymy and synecdoche are “kinds” of metaphor, only
they “differ from one another in the kinds of reductions and integrations they effect on
the literal level of their meanings and by the kinds of illuminations they aim at on the
figurative level.”'^ That is, the larger metaphorical construct is really a tri-fold procedure
for tying things together, disentangling them, and re-unifying them on a grander scale.
The fourth trope of irony, while still considered a kind of metaphor by Hayden White
in that it plays with meaning on figurative and literal levels, is significantly distinct
enough from the form-building process through metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche
that it must be examined on its own terms. The primary reason for this distinctiveness
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from the other three tropes is that it is negational rather than productive. It tears down
instead of building up. In order to tear down or deconstruct, irony would have to possess
a mechanism for critical awareness From its definition, it possesses just such an
awareness. Irony is the “negation on a figurative level" what is “positively affirmed on a
literal level.”'^ In certain cases, it can work the other way around as well. Intrinsic to
irony’s definition is a critical mechanism, a mechanism o f denial. This makes irony
“metatropological," or extending beyond the tropes, in that it subsumes the other three
tropes under its own systematic observations and criticisms.

Unlike the other tropes,

irony allows the historian to grasp how reality is manipulated by preconfigured
conceptions and linguistics. In this sense, irony is no trope at all—no figure of speech—
but a penetrative tool for unmasking what reality is and is not.
Where irony ceases to be metatropological is at the point where it behaves like the
other tropes. It mimics the behavior of the first three tropes in that it automatically
follows them in cumulative sequence. In sequence, it is the fourth trope. With
synecdoche, the epitome of metaphor is reached where all higher generalizations for the
seen and the unseen are subsumed under one grand macrocosmic generalization. Irony,
with its negation of explanation on a figurative level, naturally develops in response to
synecdoche and this vast abstraction. In denying the figurative level of meaning, irony
essentially attempts to negate the existence of the non-phenomenal world. Therefore, the
figurative explanations o f metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche actually provide the
material from which irony unfolds. Without them, irony cannot become manifest. Its
sequential development entirely depends on the three tropes issuing before it. But, as
Hayden White explained, irony is not an “ultimate state but only the end of a cycle of
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development.”'^ For him, what followed was metaphor. At some moment, the critical
aspect of ironic consciousness had to break down. Irony had to turn on itself and
metaphor had to resurface.^® Irony turned on itself through the realization that it did not
stand alone as ultimate truth. Irony, in denying a ground to reality on the figurative level,
must finally deny itself. It must deny its own representation as a higher generalization by
acknowledging its own limitation as merely one possible means for examining the
historical record. That is, the metatropological capacity in irony leads it to recognize its
own proper place as a trope, yet only another impermanent figure of speech.
These four tropes are the linguistic techniques through which historians infuse
interpretation into a chronological sequence of events. The four tropes can undergo a
reductionism that contracts them into two categories; metaphor and irony. Metaphor is
essentially a technique that relies on collapsing things into one another and separating
them as the manner of explanation for the technical details o f historical events. On the
other hand, irony is a technique that achieves its specific interpretation by denying one
level of the metaphorical explanation. If irony is compared with metaphor, irony denies
the process of collapse and separation because it negates the framework of that dualism.
Whereas metaphor allows A and E to merge, irony repudiates the existence of one or the
other variable, thereby making the admixture of the two variables a philosophical
impossibility. In this case, what becomes clear is that metaphor and irony are linguistic
techniques for expressing philosophical positions. Embedded into metaphor is the
assumption that something larger than the physical organism exists and can be collapsed
into it. Embedded into irony is the intrinsic function of demonstrating something to be a
philosophical absurdity. From this perspective, what metaphor and irony really represent
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as interpretive techniques is the way in which historians encode, whether purposely or
accidentally, their own biased world view towards either the philosophical position of
realism or nominalism.
Like the tropal configurations, I am treating the philosophical configurations for
realism and nominalism a bit loosely in the present work. Philosophical realism possesses
a long historical record, and its meaning has not always been consistent over time.^'
Philosophical nominalism possesses so many degrees of interpretation which gradually
lead to an ever more pure nominalism that it becomes imprecise from a definitional
standpoint.^^ With this in mind, it is best to adopt a broad definition, such as that offered
by Kenneth Burke, which encourages considerable interpretive flexibility. For Burke,
realism allows for “generic terms,” or higher generalizations, to be treated as “real
substances” whereas nominalism denigrates them to mere “conveniences of language.
This definition presents realism in terms o f its original platonic roots. Plato, the fourth
century B.C. Greek philosopher, premised the existence for an order of reality beyond the
material world. This meant that the human intellect could perceive above the flux of the
visible world a “system of unchangeable truths.”^'* These unchangeable truths, stretching
out from the realms of the invisible, stamped imperfect impressions of themselves onto
the physical landscape during successive generations, but their ability to exist in a perfect
state of being on their own level was entirely independent of this interaction with the
physical world. Since the physical world was only a misleading, imperfect reflection of
an ultimate truth, one had to turn instead to higher generalizations, or universals, for
apprehending life’s processes. In direct opposition to realism, nominalism, perhaps most
clearly formulated by William Ockham in the fourteenth century A D , rejected Plato’s
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system of unchangeable truths because it allowed for the existence of universals in
reality Ockham maintained that universals were merely “convenient mental fictions,
signs standing for many particulars at once.”^^ By examining the particulars, one
discerned just how widely individual circumstances deviated from any over-arching
generalization, or unchangeable truth, placed onto them collectively The physical world
was not a flawed copy o f a larger truth. Rather, the higher generalization for that
supposed truth masked what was really going on within tangible existence.
In his essay, “Nominalist and Realist,” Ralph Waldo Emerson, the extraordinary
nineteenth-century writer, explained the paradox behind these two terms. His example
consisted of the assertion that there was a “genius of a nation” which was not to be found
in the “numerical citizens” but which nevertheless “characterized the society.

England

as a nation was “strong, punctual, practical, and well-spoken,” but if one actually traveled
to the island all one would find was “a great number of rich, ignorant, book-read,
conventional, proud m e n . . . [and] old women.”^^ These individual findings in no way
matched England as a nation. America was even more complex, Emerson observed,
because the “genius” o f the United States and the individual “performances” of its people
varied to an even greater degree.^^ And yet both the vision o f the nation and the personal
accounts were true, he asserted. In essence, what Emerson was saying was that both
philosophies led to equally valid, but significantly different, conclusions. How could this
possibly be? How could apparently contradictory procedures lead to equally valid
answers? For Emerson, the rejoinder was simple. He proposed that life itself was a dual
process. Nominalism and its realist counterpart were simply the two methods for
explaining two sides o f the same coin; the coin was life or “nature.”^’ Emerson’s
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proposition was as suggestive as it was enigmatic. He explained.
Life is made up o f the intermixtures and reaction of these two
amicable powers, whose marriage appears beforehand monstrous,
as each denies and tends to abolish the other. We must reconcile
the contradictions as we can, but their discord and their concord
introduce wild absurdities into our thinking and speech. No sentence
will hold the truth . . . Things are, and are not . . . All the universe
over, there is but one thing, this Old Two-Face, creator-creature,
mind-matter, right-wrong, of which any proposition may be affirmed
or denied/®
To utilize both nominalism and realism at the same moment in historical explanation
proved to be an absurdity. The procedural methodology for each philosophy
pre-determined a mutually contradictory outcome. Nominalism denied realism; realism
affirmed what nominalism rejected. Therefore, at any interpretive juncture, the historian
had to make a choice, unconsciously or otherwise. To achieve realism’s firm grasp on
higher generalizations, one had to turn the coin of life completely over, nominalist side
down. To reach nominalism’s clear-sightedness of the particulars, one had to disavow
realism. Since nominalism and realism were the two sides to nature, one subsequently
followed the other. “Your turn now, my turn next” was the rule of the game for these two
attributes/' For Emerson, it was the “secret of the world” that “all things subsisted and
did not die, but only retired a little from sight and afterwards returned again
Nominalism and realism successively faded out of the scene as one or the other gained
dominance for a temporary duration.
In relating the philosophies of realism and nominalism to the tropes of metaphor and
irony, one immediately perceives two correlations. First, realism and nominalism, by
definition, each possess an affinity towards one of the tropes. Realism, in its quest for
overarching generalizations, gravitates towards the metaphorical trope. Metaphor allows
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these generalizations to be considered part o f reality. In contrast, nominalism, in its quest
to deconstruct subject matter, gravitates towards the ironic trope. Irony encourages a
fragmentation that ultimately contradicts the larger historical picture. That is, irony revels
in illuminating the discrepancies between variant levels of examination. This leads to the
rejection of generic terms since it denies the figurative level on which they exist. What
this correlation between the binaries of realism-metaphor and nominalism-irony suggests
is that if a historian embraces a realist or nominalist philosophy he will emplot that view
into his text through its corresponding trope. The trope serves as the linguistic form
which conveys the philosophy. Second, the transitional flux through realism and
nominalism (as described by Emerson) and the transitional flux through metaphor and
irony (as described by White) are homologous precisely because a philosophical position
and its respective trope function within a binary system. The transition of linguistic form
from metaphor to irony and back to metaphor naturally accompanies the larger
philosophical shift from realism to nominalism and back to realism. This signifies that
any change in historical writing fundamentally consists of two parts: the philosophical
aspect and the linguistic, or poetic aspect.
Each of the binary relationships, realism-metaphor and nominalism-irony, can be
subsumed under a single label. The complementary pair, realism and metaphor, can be
collapsed into the term "unconscious productiveness." The combination of nominalism
and irony can be reduced to the term “critical intellect " Recognizing that the tropes as
well as their underlying philosophies successively roll through one another in a dualistic
dance, the affirmation o f the Russian philosopher and historian, Helena Petrovna
Blavatsky, is apropos. She commented, “An age of great inspiration and unconscious
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productiveness is invariably followed by an age of criticism and consciousness The one
affords material for the analyzing and critical intellect of the other

Not only are the

terms “unconscious productiveness” and “critical intellect” used in a manner correlating
to the rolling motion o f the tropes and their respective world views, but the terms
themselves capture the essence o f the realism-metaphor and nominalism-irony categories
It has already been suggested that metaphor, as a linguistic tool, possesses no mechanism
for analysis and self-reflection. Therefore, it is fundamentally an unconscious literary
process. That is, it is a linguistic tool which escapes or bypasses the reasoning function
within mental awareness. At the same time, realism is extremely productive as a world
view because it provides a vast, singular, overarching generalization as the explanation
form for countless, divisible and diverse people and things. The term “unconscious
productiveness” clearly unites the metaphorical trope to its realist philosophy. On the
other hand, the term “critical intellect” fuses the ironic trope to its nominalist philosophy.
Irony, as a linguistic tool, possesses just such a mechanism for analysis and self
reflection which metaphor lacks. Therefore, irony is fundamentally a conscious literary
process. Hand in hand with nominalism, which seeks to deconstruct higher
generalizations through a step by step examination of historical singularities, irony
becomes a powerful tool which embraces the reasoning fiinction within mental
awareness. Subsequently, the higher generalizations from the realist-metaphor
perspective afford the material for the specific brand of logic from the nominalist-irony
amalgamation to dissect into individual and extremely contradictory components.
In examining how historians embedded a phenomenal and non-phenomenal
dichotomy into their texts, the structural frameworks of “unconscious productiveness”
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and “critical intellect” directed the way unseen forces were incorporated into their
interpretations. “Unconscious productiveness” introduced a metaphorical explanation of
historical action which simply assumed two separate levels o f existence, seen and unseen,
that could be merged into a homogeneity. “Critical intellect,” being the natural temporal
successor to “unconscious productiveness,” analyzed the material provided by its
predecessor. That could only mean that the dialogue for seen and unseen forces would
not come to an end. Instead, it would merely change form. Inseparable from the irony of
“critical intellect” was the methodological process for examining two levels of existence
and subsequently denying one of them. In most cases, it was the unseen force, or the
over-generalized reality of “unconscious productiveness,” that was negated.

The Dialectic in American West History
The term dialectic refers to Hegel’s historical model where a thesis is negated by an
antithesis which is subsequently sublated by a synthesis that becomes the new thesis.^'*
With the synthesis, the thesis and antithesis are sublated within a new form, but each of
the two parts remains partially intact. This Hegelian dialectic can be used to explain the
developments in American West historiography. Realism, in conjunction with its
metaphorical trope, coincides with the thesis aspect in Hegel’s model. Over time,
nominalism, in conjunction with its ironic trope, usurps realism. Realism fades into the
background but not entirely. Nominalism, as realism’s successor, uses the realist
perspective as its material in constructing an alternate, antithetical interpretation. Once
again, time moves forward and realism reasserts itself as the synthesis. But the synthesis,
or third view, is a much more complex process than the first two. The synthesis is the
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byproduct of both realism and nominalism, but the synthesis is constructed during that
period when realism comes to the forefront of historical thought once more While the
critical insight o f the nominalist position is not completely forgotten, it recedes into the
distance because realism’s metaphor is not capable o f self-reflection. Synthesis is as
much a return to metaphor as the commingling of two opposing world views. This is why
dialectical tension essentially resolves into harmony. From a theoretical standpoint, the
combination of realism and metaphor lacks the critical apparatus necessary to disturb that
harmony.
One can develop a hypothetical scenario to elucidate just how Hegel’s dialectic
functions as a historical model. Three historians writing at fifty year intervals can be
postulated. The first historian. A, roots his text in a realist-metaphorical style, or what has
been termed “unconscious productiveness.” As a result of this style, he necessarily
emplots a dualism between the realm of the spirit and the physical earth, much as the
metaphorical Hegel did in his The Philosophy of Historv.^^ Historian A s
conceptualization o f the world includes both physical and psychical aspects in nature. His
metaphorical trope demands that it is so. Thus, it is the trope that establishes and
maintains the thesis aspect of Hegel’s dialectic. For example, the metaphorical trope in
this case might serve as the groundwork for a historical argument that the geographical
migration o f people across the physical globe with its corresponding rise and fall o f
civilizations was in and of itself the movement of a larger unseen force. From this
perspective, if the unseen force were working through a particular civilization, the
civilization flourished. If the unseen force were withdrawn, the civilization deteriorated.
The thesis for this argument on geographical migration is entirely dependent on the
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metaphorical trope distinguishing between unseen forces and a visible world and then
collapsing them into an identical historical action. Skipping ahead fifty years, historian B
rises to prominence. He argues against the thesis that certain civilizations were grandiose
and others were not. But this critical argument is solely based on the assumptions
inherent to the use of an ironic trope. The ironic trope assumes that either the figurative
or literal level in metaphor is patently false. In many cases, irony assumes that the
figurative level is false. Even though historian B has no means o f verifying this
assumption, he proceeds to disclaim the superiority of certain civilizations. This
disclaimer is solely dependent on removing a generalized unseen force from the field of
play. Such a removal is purely a poetic and philosophical function rather than a historical
one. Nevertheless, this removal, achieved by emplotting a nominalist world view into the
text through the agency o f an ironic trope, creates the antithesis and the subsequent
historical perspective o f the historian. The antithesis is a combination of nominalism and
irony, or “critical intellect.” Another fifty years pass (for a total one-hundred years) and
historian C dominates the historical profession. But historian B has so profoundly shaped
the culture of the surrounding society that historian C cannot immediately rid himself of
the intellectual climate engendered over the past fifty years—much as historian B could
not completely rid himself o f the metaphorical assumptions scattered out into the cultural
milieu by historian A. Regarding historian C, he is deeply indebted to historian B.
Irregardless, he falls back into “unconscious productiveness.” It is just here that historical
contradiction occurs. Historian C may, in unison with historian B, consciously disagree
with historian A’s fundamental thesis that certain civilizations rise and fall because of a
larger unseen force. He may even appear to argue to that extent in his text. But that
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conscious argument becomes invalid once the historian has returned to metaphor because
metaphor undergirds the text with a number of unconscious assumptions That is,
metaphor embeds a causal unseen force into his writing. Whatever his conscious opinion,
encoded into his text is a larger unseen force at the root o f all historical action. And that
includes reference to the rise and fall of civilizations. As such, historian C's argument
contains the philosophical and linguistic framework to support historian A’s thesis. This
becomes the synthesis, or new thesis. Neither the original thesis or the antithesis
disappears entirely, but the original thesis clearly reasserts itself. The more intuitive
scholars looking at historian C’s work likely recognize at this point that the antithesis is
no longer the sole model for explaining history. The re-emergence of overarching
generalizations cannot be ignored. Efrstorians must admit the defeat of “critical intellect.”
The philosophical-linguistic style in “unconscious productiveness, ”even in total
contradiction to reigning political correctness or cultural norms, implants an unseen
force, though under a different name, at the source of historical causation which restores
historian A’s original thesis that civilization flourishes or declines based on the
prevalence of such an unseen force. In the end, metaphor gets the last laugh Since it
intrinsically lacks a mechanism for self-reflection, the historians who adopt it have no
way of determining just how much their metaphorical assumptions actually contradict
their more overt opinions. In essence, this intrinsic shortcoming allows synthesis to
resolve into harmony.
In fact, the hypothetical scenario detailed above is not so hypothetical at all. Under
closer inspection, it actually describes the process by which American West historians
have shifted through three distinct modes of writing from the I890’s to the 1990’s.
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Historians A, B, and C portray real flesh and blood men, men who clearly stand out as the
transition points in American West historiography. They are Frederick Jackson Turner,
Henry Nash Smith, and Richard White. In comparison, their work corresponds to the
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis o f the dialectic. That is. Turner presented a thesis. Smith
an antithesis, and White a new synthesis. Frederick Jackson Turner, with the publication
of his 1893 masterpiece, “The Significance o f the Frontier in American History,” ushered
in an era of “unconscious productiveness” for western history. Not until some fifty years
later was the Turner thesis successfully replaced by the alternative paradigm proffered
by Henry Nash Smith in Virgin Land (1950). The essence of Smith’s challenge, however,
was not so much historical as it was philosophical and poetic. Turner, writing as a realist
through a metaphorical trope, necessarily emplotted into his work the two-fold process of
collapsing and separating unseen forces and the visible world into and from one another.
In the same way that Hegel emplotted his conceptualization for the interaction between
the phenomenal and non-phenomenal under the metaphor of the “World Spirit, ” so
Turner emplotted the relationship between the seen and unseen under the metaphor of
“vital forces.”^ With the metaphor of “vital forces” directing the interpretive aspect of
the Turner thesis. Smith, who may or may not have presented sufficient empirical
evidence to contradict Turner, made his assault on Turner by shifting into a philosophical
and poetic style capable o f undermining metaphor. Smith’s Virgin Land was rooted in the
denial of Turner’s “vital forces” from a nominalist-ironic position, or “critical intellect.”
Smith signified the transition into an era expounding “critical intellect” over
“unconscious productiveness.” From the perspective o f “critical intellect,” the denial
of Turner’s ‘Vital forces” could proceed in two different ways, but the result would be
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the same. Irony could negate on a figurative level what was positively affirmed on a
literal level. Or it could negate on a literal level what was positively affirmed on a
figurative level. In the first case. Smith could negate Turner’s “vital forces” by pointing
to an alternate conceptualization for unseen forces that contradicted them. Smith utilized
the concept of “imaginative constructions” as just such a negational mechanism. A “vital
force” could not commingle a physical organism because a “vital force” was really just
an “imaginative construction,” or an illusory fancy o f the human intellect. The unseen
quality of a “vital force” did not match the unseen quality that a physical organism
possessed. Therefore, the “vital force” did not exist. In the second case. Smith could
negate at the literal level to show the figurative level o f “vital forces” as false. That is , he
could contrast Turner’s description o f a physical object with his own literal description to
demonstrate that no overarching “vital force” applied. For example, a strong, healthy,
beautiful buffalo (according to Turner) could be reduced to a dirty, smelly beast, thereby
negating the ability to reasonably subsume the animal under a spiritual “vital force.”
The primary distinction between Smith and Turner was that Turner established “vital
forces” as the ground to reality, or ultimate originating source for all historical action
whereas Smith established “imaginative constructions” as a negational tool to disprove
the validity of that ground to reality. Through Turner’s “vital forces,” an outside spiritual
world was conceived to interact with the physical world and trace its patterns upon it. The
presence of “vital forces” reinvigorated a region with powerful ennobling influences
For Turner, all historical inquiry could be traced back to the “vital forces. ” Smith could
not accept this over-generalization. He proceeded fi'om nominalist assumptions. While
Smith’s “imaginative constructions” did at times function as causative, non-physical
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agents (and therefore qualify for categorization as unseen forces), they were not linked to
a more spiritual world nor were they essentially primal “Imaginative constructions”
were just as much a byproduct of the physical world as the physical world was a
byproduct of them As byproducts of an often violent and chaotically selfish physical
world, “imaginative constructions” were far removed from being part of a larger spiritual
context for reinvigorating the landscape. Instead, they were designed specifically to
circumvent and subsequently negate the free intermingling and merging of the spiritual
and physical worlds which was at the heart of Turner’s historical explanation.
While Henry Nash Smith’s paradigm reigned supreme for nearly half a century, it too
would receive its challenge. In 1995 Richard White published a short book entitled
The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River which reunited western
history with Turner’s philosophical and poetic style. While scholars were busy assessing
his previous work. It’s Your Misfortune and None of Mv Own: A History of the
American West (1991), which purported to be a “synthesis” using “old literature and new
literature,” the significant transitional quality in The Organic Machine was overlooked.^^
In hindsight. It’s Your Misfortune was nothing but a restatement of the antithetical
“critical intellect ” developed over the past forty years from Smith’s Virgin Land to
Patricia Limerick’s The Legacv of Conquest: The Unbroken Past o f the American West.
It certainly was not a fair combination of the Old and New Western histories dating from
the 1890’s. Therefore, it was not a valid synthesis. In contrast. The Organic Machine was
precisely just such a synthesis. While still maintaining much of the irony inherent to
“critical intellect,” White nevertheless shifted into “unconscious productiveness,”
embracing metaphor and realism through his concept of “energy.” “Energy” was both
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abstract and physical at the same time. It existed at the root of all historical action. Like
Turner’s “vital forces,” “energy” was the ultimate originating source or the ground to
reality to which all living beings and things owed their existence. Those beings and
things which possessed more “energy” were often reinvigorated to the point that they
came to dominate the physical landscape. That conclusion, though not always
consciously made explicit by White but nevertheless consistently implied through his
metaphor, matched Turner’s thesis. This interaction between “energy” and the visible
world, as expressed in The Organic Machine, was White’s real synthesis. Metaphor once
again usurped irony, realism overpowered nominalism, and western history moved
forward into a new era of “unconscious productiveness” as Hegel’s dialectic came full
circle. White’s synthesis, or third aspect of the dialectic, initiated the emergence of a neoTumerian revolution.
Nothing evolves from within a vacuum, however, and neither did the dialectic. Other
twentieth-century western historians intersected the transition points represented by
Turner, Smith, and White, contributing to the intellectual culture as it rotated through
“unconscious productiveness” and “critical intellect.” In particular, a detailed
examination including the work of Donald Worster, William Cronon, Elliott West, and
Patricia Limerick is crucial to providing the historical context behind the dialectical
transition points. Subsequent to the writings of Turner and Smith, Donald Worster
adopted “critical intellect” and strengthened its position within a Marxist firamework.
While still rooted in an ironic trope, William Cronon unconsciously initiated the return to
metaphor and Elliott West, following White’s lead, amplified it even further. As for
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Patricia Limerick, she signified the moment at which ironic consciousness turned on
itself, ultimately motivating her to temper irony with more moderate consensus.
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CHAPTER 2

THE HISTORIANS
In the present work, the writings of seven major western historians are analyzed to
establish the historical context for the dialectical transition points leading through
“unconscious productiveness” to “critical intellect” and back to “unconscious
productiveness” The return to the philosophical and poetic roots o f “unconscious
productiveness,” which covered approximately one hundred years from the I890’s to
1990’s, signified the emergence of a neo-Tumerian revolution In order, the historians
examined include Frederick Jackson Turner, Henry Nash Smith, Donald Worster,
William Cronon, Richard White, Elliott West, and Patricia Limerick. What is being
examined is how their respective histories were a byproduct of how they attributed
causation to a non-physical property. The ways in which they viewed causation
predetermined the outcomes of their analysis Since that interpretive moment reflected
the perspective for how a particular historian viewed the interaction between an unseen
force and the visible world, the dialogue for understanding it necessarily turns to a study
of the tropes and their corresponding philosophy. This is because the combinations of
realism and metaphor, nominalism and irony are the fundamental styles through which
historians emplot such a relationship within a text.
These dialectical transition points corresponded to the way historians conceptualized
the interaction between the phenomenal and the non-phenomenal under three different
30
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terms. The terms have already been enumerated; the “vital forces” for Turner,
“imaginative constructions” for Smith, and “energy” for White. For the sake of
continuity, these terms have been adopted throughout the work at hand even when a
particular historian did not always identify his conceptualization under that term. For
example. Turner’s application of the term “vital forces” in his 1893 thesis conveyed a
specific conceptualization for how noumenon and phenomenon interacted. While he may
not have resorted to that identical expression in later works, those works were
nevertheless based upon the original conceptualization. In the case of Smith, he did not
employ the term “imaginative constructions” to capture the relationship between human
thought and physical culture until the twentieth anniversary printing o f his book in 1970.
In hindsight, the term works as a succinct catch-phrase for Smith’s overall
conceptualization. As for White’s “energy,” he assumed the term from the outset in
The Organic Machine but, at times, substituted the word “power” for “energy.” As to the
other historians, Donald Worster conceptualized noumenon and phenomenon in much the
same style as Smith, but he refrained from using the term “imaginative constructions.”
On the other hand, William Cronon introduced the term “energy” into a historical context
and Elliott West later fostered and embraced it. Both of these historians conceptualized
“energy” along the same lines as White. Therefore, each one of these three terms, or
rather the conceptualization driving the meaning of each expression, represented a
distinct paradigm from which the respective historian proceeded to reconstruct history.
In the introduction, an overarching definition was provided for the terms “vital force,”
“imaginative construction,” and “energy.” Grouped under the broader categorization of
unseen forces, they were described as linguistic devices used by a historian when he
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shifted into a style of explanation that established a causal factor which was well outside
of the physical senses to be the originating source of a physical effect. To establish a non
physical causal factor, the historian must necessarily turn to realism or nominalism,
metaphor or irony. The style o f explanation would be either “unconscious
productiveness" or “critical intellect.” As such, “vital forces,” “imaginative
constructions,” and “energy” were the concrete, manifest expressions conveying an
identifiable philosophical and tropal style. Thus, a thorough understanding for how
western historians utilized these terms leads one to discover the larger interpretive model
behind them. That discovery implies the uncovering of the distinctive nuances between
three periods of historical writing, originating with a thesis, progressing to an antithesis,
and finally resolving into a synthesis.

From Turner to neo-Tumerian
Frederick Jackson Turner loved collecting. In particular, he assembled a vast
menagerie of pamphlets and news clippings which dove-tailed his own historical
interests. On closer examination, a number of them also dove-tailed his fundamental
conceptualization for how unseen forces interacted with the physical world. Therefore, it
would seem that Turner’s concept for the “vital forces” was being developed alongside a
broader historical context that promoted a unique, tum-of-the-century metaphorical
notion for the relation between noumenal and phenomenal worlds. Tucked into Turner’s
files were writings from three men who both influenced Turner as well as were
influenced by Turner. They were his contemporaries and colleagues; Woodrow Wilson,
Robert La Follette, and Theodore Roosevelt. All three were prominent politicians and
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two of them, Wilson and Roosevelt, were historians. In recalling their views. Turner’s
“vital forces” receive a preliminary degree of contextual clarity.
To begin with. Turner’s collection contained a February 1913 copy o f Woodrow
Wilson’s “The New Freedom; A Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a
People

The selection of articles under this title ran serially in World’s Work, a

publication that reappeared continuously throughout Turner’s files, from January to July,
1913. In Wilson’s essay, “The Liberation of a People’s Vital Energies,” extracted from a
number of his 1912 campaign addresses and miscellaneous speeches published in book
form under the title The New FreedonL his words could have been mistaken for Turner’s
own.^ In the title of the essay, Wilson immediately resorted to language that established
a dualism for the human being and the “vital energies” coursing through him. Nowhere in
the subsequent essay were these “vital energies ” clearly defined Wilson simply took
them for granted. But what he did make clear was their causative impact on historical
action. The thrust of Wilson’s argument was that these “vital energies” had to be released
and utilized for a culture to attain and subsequently retain its strength and vigor Looking
out upon American society through the eyes of its recently elected twenty-eighth
president of the United States, he realized that all the “vital energies” o f the nation’s
citizenry had not been emancipated or freed/ Without complete emancipation, he
prophesied the eventual stagnation o f an unredeemable America. For Wilson, what
happened in society was a delicate balance between how much of these “vital energies”
were translated into constructive activity and how much was wasted. A country that
failed to manifest these “vital energies” would spiral into decline. What Wilson
established in his essay was an interpretation for historical action that depended on the
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interplay of “vital energies” and the surrounding physical objects. The “enterprise” of the
laborer, the “efficiency” of their Victories, the “richness” of their fields, the “wealth”
extracted from their land, and the “inventive genius” surging through their “brains” all
relied on the liberation of people’s “vital energies.”^ For example, if an “enterprise” was
to be successful, it required an individual invested with a tendency to risk new ventures,
new methods, and new ideas. The investment of those qualities in an individual only
occurred if the “vital energies” were released and present in him and his surrounding
society. As such, the byproducts o f those new ventures, new methods, and new ideas, or,
in short, the entire spectrum of culture including institutions, technological innovations,
political systems, and religious fervor, emerged only as a result o f the “vital energies ”
fertilizing the mental and physical characteristics within a geographical region. Wilson
painted a world that was totally alive on two fronts; the visible and the invisible. The
world bustled, brimmed, and moved as a swirl of active interchange between two
complementary realms. Wilson’s conceptualization of the unseen in American history
corresponded quite closely to Turner’s “vital forces” in the American frontier.
Whether Turner saved this “New Freedom ”filing because his attention was directed
to it out of respect for his old friendship with Wilson or because its contents resonated so
harmoniously with his own writings is unknown. Its inclusion generates no surprise for
Wilson was, after all, the newly risen star ascended to the presidency. It is possible that
Turner remained completely unaware that Wilson’s reliance on “vital energies ”to
explain historical causation matched his own. In one conversation with Wilson, however.
Turner had timidly asked, “Is society an organism?” Taking Turner to one side, holding
his coat lapel, Wilson whispered, “Yes, but keep it in the dark.”’ That Turner and Wilson
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shared the same views on society as a living organism is clear. It was this theme that
Turner embraced so strongly in his 1891 essay, “The Significance of History .” In this
piece. Turner cited both the propositions of Johann Herder and Auguste Comte; “society
grows” and “society is an organism.”^ This framework resided at the heart of Turner's
boldest statement in his later 1893 thesis, ‘The Significance o f the Frontier in American
History.” He wrote that “behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and
modifications, lie the vital forces that call these organs into life and shape them to meet
changing conditions.”^ Society grew precisely because it was an organism and must
therefore follow the laws o f an organism. That is, it was an entity adapted for living by
means of numerous physical and cultural components, but ultimately these components
comprised a single larger infrastructure. The differentiated components, covering the vast
array of institutions and political structures, had to somehow spring into existence. What
cased the development of these various components? Turner replied that “vital forces”
called them into existence. For Turner, the sweeping motion o f the “vital forces” across
the physical landscape nourished society’s institutions just as the blood sweeping through
the arteries nourished the body’s organs. It is not exactly clear where these “vital forces”
were except they abided behind x\ie objects they brought into being. At this point. Turner,
like Wilson, left unanswered where these “vital energies ” or “vital forces” were and
specifically how they commingled with the human organism or physical landscape. But,
like Wilson, Turner made explicit what these “vital forces” did. They were the
driving force behind all the variations for what humans have come to know as their
visible culture. In making that point explicit. Turner, and Wilson after him, attributed
historical causation to an unseen, unknown, abstract force.
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Without conducting a painstaking, in-depth analysis of all the cultural and ideological
idiosyncrasies running through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the most
that can be done to assess why both Turner and Wilson’s work was filled with common
underlying assumptions about how the physical world interacted with intangible forces is
to offer a few brief suggestions. On the small scale, religion might have been a
contributing factor. Wilson's Presbyterianism could have been conducive to his
acceptance of this idealistic division. Despite its conservative aspect, the Presbyterian
church also possessed a less sectarian element emphasizing “spontaneity, vital impulse,
and adaptability.”^ Though raised a Presbyterian, Turner’s later adoption of
Unitarianism, a denomination which he regarded as a convenience to label his freethinking propensities, also harmonized with such a visionary duality. But, on an orthodox
level, Presbyterianism and Unitarianism diverged. When Wilson had attempted to induce
Turner over to Princeton to teach, he could not overcome the refusal of key staff
members from this exclusive Presbyterian college to embrace a Unitarian into the
faculty.^ As a Unitarian, Turner believed he would encounter problems entering into
educational institutions, such as Wesleyan University, that were inimical to his religious
beliefs. Clearly, what was being objected to in this case, however, was Turner’s Unitarian
tradition, not his underlying assumption for “vital forces.” On the large scale, it appears
that the conceptualization o f “vital forces” transcended religious issues. The concept may
have been embedded into American figures of speech far more than any consensus on
religion. Paul Boyer argued that millions of Americans had already broken free of
traditional religious restraints by the mid-nineteenth c e n t u r y . Th e small number of
people who expressed lively sentiment in matters of traditional religion were relegated to
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orthodox believers. This does not mean the general mass of Americans stopped attending
church. It does mean that, despite continuing church attendance, the nature of their belief
had been modified. What belief remained for those outside the caste of zealous orthodox
adherents was the very simple idea that the soul existed and was an intangible something,
though no one knew what, that somehow interacted with the visible world. The idea of a
relationship between the tangible and intangible was perpetuated but severed from its
Calvinist backdrop. It had been cut away from its secular doctrinaire underpinnings and
replaced with high-minded civic ideals. In accord with Boyer, Mina Carson explained
that a civic “religion of humanity” had developed by the late 1800’s which, while
carrying forward many of the pre-existing moral attitudes, focused on bringing a “higher
life” to society without the accompanying sectarian accouterments. ' ' The emergence of
this fresh civic religion coincided with the growth of philosophical Idealism, such as
expounded by Josiah Royce, in the United States. In response to the rising materialism of
empirical science, philosophical Idealism asserted that the physical world was derived
from a spiritual world. To understand the world of phenomenon, one had to look to the
realm of the invisible which was its originating causal source. Human thought aspired to
capture the essence of spirit and was itself an activity expressing the purpose of the
spiritual world

Philosophical Idealism was essentially Hegelian revivalism in the way

it viewed the spirit manifesting itself onto the physical landscape. Kerwin Klein was
correct in identifying Turner as a Hegelian.

As such, that placed Turner in the midst of

Boyer’s shift away from traditional religion towards Carson's “religion of humanity” and
Royce’s philosophical Idealism.
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In addition to Woodrow Wilson, another Turner colleague spoke from the same
idealistic vision. Buried in Turner’s collection of files is a copy of La Follette s
newspaper, a devotional to the Progressive agenda of the great Wisconsin Senator, Robert
La Follette. Turner had documented his admiration for La Follette as early as 1879 when
La Follette delivered his prize- winning oration on Tago” from William Shakespeare’s
play, Othello.*^ In this piece. La Follette represented lago as a “truly supernatural
character” that defied “immutable moral laws” and “disrupted cosmic order.” '’ That was
a pretty tall order for a regular physical human being to fill so La Follette had to elevate
lago, the physical person, into an “Evil Principle” that dominated the action of the play
Consequently, lago did not merely represent a physical being but also some type of force
that worked through that particular body. In this case, that force produced maleficent
effects rather than beneficial ones. What La Follette biographer Carl Burgchardt noticed
about this interpretation was that it “revealed for the first time his propensity for reducing
a complex phenomenon” into a “simple melodramatic scenario where good and evil
were clearly contrasted.”'^ There was no ethical ambiguity in this scenario for La
Follette; there were Evil Principles and Good Principles directing human action and each
produced its respective finit. In the news clipping from La Follette s newspaper, dated
February 19, 1910, stands emblazoned the proverb, “Abuse of power may retard, but it
cannot suppress a movement based on vital principles.”'^ What was implied by “abuse of
power” can be easily inferred by reading his speeches, such as the one delivered at the
Annual Banquet of the Periodical Publisher’s Association in Philadelphia, February 2,
1912.'^ In this oration, he described the periodization of corporate enterprise as it
transitioned through four successive stages from Jeffersonian individualism, to the
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private corporation, to the combination o f corporations, and finally the combination of
combinations. With this consolidation came the forfeiture of democratic freedoms which
Turner suspected would occur in the twentieth century with the loss of the ever-receding
fi'ontier line. But there is insufficient context in La Follette s speeches and writings for
what could have been meant by “vital principles.” What were they? Why had he made
these principles the core o f his political ideology? Did a lack of explanation in this case
suggest that “vital principles” were simply taken for granted as pre-existing qualities in
human life? Had the concept for their existence become so embedded in American
language that it required no further elucidation to garner acceptance, even in relation to
solely political contexts? It appears that conceptualizations corresponding to Turner’s
“vital forces” had become so ingrained in the American mind by the early twentieth
century that no one questioned why they were there and gave little thought to the fact that
they were there at all. The fact that they were present, however, shaped the way in which
the early twentieth-century American intellect approached problems of historical
causation. From a linguistic and philosophical level at least, “vital energies,” “vital
forces,” and “vital principles” were conceived as transformative agents whose presence
or absence could determine the outcome o f historical action. Robert La Follette s “vital
principles” stood for a set of spiritual qualities which, when actively integrated into
human character and institutions, invigorated an otherwise degenerating society.
A third Turner associate, Theodore Roosevelt, shared Turner’s idealism when he
assumed that history was a study in the interplay between unseen forces and the physical
world. Roosevelt, while most notably the twenty-sixth president o f the United States, was
something of a western historian himself with his publication of the Winning of the West
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in 1889. While Richard Slotkin may or may not have been correct about placing
Roosevelt’s frontier thesis in opposition to Turner’s, what is clear is that both men shared
common assumptions about the “vital forces” impelling historical action.^" Roosevelt
had in fact been one of the earliest proponents o f Turner’s frontier thesis, writing to
Turner on February 10, 1894, that T think you have struck some first class ideas, and
have put into definite shape a good deal o f thought which has been floating around rather
loosely.”^' What was not made clear by Roosevelt was where these thoughts were
floating, what was their source of propulsion, and the extent of looseness or porosity they
exhibited prior to forming a definite shape. What was displayed in this remarkable
passive was Roosevelt’s fundamental assumption that thoughts underwent some sort of
transformation that allowed them to become tangible objects. That had been Turner’s
own premise when he lectured a group of schoolteachers in 1892; “Thoughts and feelings
flow into deeds. Here is the motive power that lies behind institutions.”^^ This insight
originally surfaced in Turner’s “The Significance of History, ”first published in the
October-November issue of the 1891 Wisconsin Journal of Education. In that piece.
Turner elaborated, “Have you thought of better things, a reform to accomplish? ‘Put it in
the air’. . Ideas have ruled, will rule.”^’ One would be hard-pressed to argue that Turner
did not take this insight literally. It resurfaced over and over again in most of his writings
and talks. For example, in his 1895 “Lake Forest University Lecture,” he re-conjured the
image, writing, “deeper than the facts of individual life, and political institutions, are the
great undercurrents of society, that ocean that moves, and changes, and surges evermore
beneath the ships of state that float on its bosom

This world of ideas surged, bubbled,

and seethed. For Turner and Roosevelt, there was some sort of interaction between this
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world, which was left undefined as to its precise contents and qualities, and the
phenomenal world. Both men envisioned the process of historical change as part of this
interaction between noumenon and phenomenon.
It is perhaps Theodore Roosevelt’s speeches delivered during his travels in Europe
that show most clearly this interaction between noumenon and phenomenon. In “The
World’s Development,” delivered at Oxford University, Roosevelt tackled the question
whether the time of growth for a civilized Britain and United States was coming to an
end. He ultimately decided that no one could tell, but what he did make plain was that the
eventual determination of events would be guided by “forces that we can see and other
forces that are hidden or that can but dimly be apprehended.”^^ These forces existed in
perpetual motion “all around us,” working “both for good and for evil.”^® What
constituted “goodness” for Roosevelt was clarified in his “The Uplift of Nations”
delivered at the University of Berlin; peace, justice, morality, ethical development, and a
sense of brotherhood. These ideals could only be retained by a nation that continued to
exhibit the “virile qualities” that stimulated such traits.^^ When these “virile qualities”
were absent, another type of quality emerged—one of an “enervating . . . softness” that
drained an organism, a human being or a society, of its strength until it degenerated to a
point where “barbarism” washed over it.^* This statement mirrored Turner’s own view.
In a 1925 essay, “The Significance of the Section in American History, ”Turner asserted
that a region, in the process of expanding westwards from the East coast, experienced a
temporary rendezvous with the “vital forces,” which were subsequently manifested as
distinct ideologies and geographic idiosyncrasies. In the brief period when this
culmination of forces settled into a region, the evolution of that particular locality
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quickened, resulting in a brilliant flowering of culture that slowly disintegrated into
recurrent “traditions, memories and inherited insights” possessed by local inhabitants.^^
The American West was a moving section for Turner because the “vital forces” energized
a new region but oftentimes just as soon vacated it. The remnants of that influence, or
Roosevelt’s enervating forces, required additional years for further decay. Once
enervation set in, that particular region could no longer be classified as the American
West. The true American West was the playground for “vital forces.”
Turner, Wilson, La Follette, and Roosevelt all embraced a concept of historical
change that resonated with the same dualistic idealism. Roosevelt’s “virile qualities”
acted in the same maimer as Wilson’s “vital energies.” La Follette s “vital principles”
functioned just like Turner’s “vital forces ”All four men identified the same process
using similar language. If a certain region or institution was possessed of these unseen
“vital forces,” it would prosper and produce the type o f civilization that reflected an over
aching spiritual quality. If these forces were lacking, the necessary quality to produce that
more noble environment would also be absent. The rises and falls within any given
society were fundamentally the precise reflections of the ability of that human culture to
utilize the life energy o f unseen forces. What is most fascinating is that none of these four
men ever attempted to transcend, question, or dissect this concept of the “vital forces” in
a way that would have given it more complexity.
In Turner’s case, a thorough examination of his private letters to family and friends
makes clear that he fell far short of being a mystic searching for the details of a nonphenomenal reality. The existence o f these “vital forces” may or may not have been
continually on his mind, but he certainly did not struggle to learn enough about them to
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determine how an invisible world actually interacted with the physical surroundings. He
took their existence and the manner in which they were expressed for granted. O f the four
men, Theodore Roosevelt probed the deepest, which was perhaps a result of his
Freemasonic affiliation with the Matinecock Lodge No.806, Oyster Bay, New York/"
To some extent, Roosevelt’s fraternal membership in the order provided him with a
philosophical framework which he then welded into a unique historical vision. But even
Roosevelt did not provide any further details on exactly what were the “vital forces” or
why they existed at all. In regard to Turner, much of his daily life appears devoid of this
philosophic idealism that so openly emerged in his more speculative writings. His letters
to his wife, Caroline Mae Sherwood, and daughter, Dorothy Kinsley, demonstrated a
down-to-earth frankness that displayed Turner was well-grounded in practical, everyday
affairs. Except for an occasional inspired utterance to a colleague (very seldom did such
inspiration appear in his family records) unassumingly placed within an otherwise
lengthy and factual account, his correspondence was dull and uninspiring At times a
cheerful love nip whisked its way into a family letter, such as his April 27, 1901 message
to Mae, “kisses to my own wife and anything else she wants—except riches!”^’ In
general, his correspondence was anything but reminiscent of the sweeping romantic
visionary that appeared in his published articles and led such fine men as Ulrich B.
Phillips to proclaim, “To F.J. Turner, my first and greatest master, to whom my heart ever
t u r n s . T h e man, Frederick Jackson Turner, in everyday life was obviously not that
master, but he, like a number of others from his generation, had found a method for
conveying certain ideas that inspired and motivated others. Only when he was able to
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“spark” so to say and grasp onto that special way of conveying information did Turner
rise above the crowd. Otherwise, Turner was in fact rather mundane in his daily affairs.
The uncritical adoption by Turner, Wilson, La Follette, and Roosevelt of the “vital
forces” as an integral part of historical process demands categorization. The validity for
the inclusion of these elusive forces at the core of their interpretations was never
questioned by themselves nor were the details sought out to substantiate their admission
as significant factors. Their acceptance was the result of an “unconscious productiveness”
on the part of Turner and the others. The usage of the concept was immensely productive
because it provided each physical representation with an overarching whole to which any
manifestation of visible change could be traced back—“the vital forces.” That made
Turner’s writing both realist and metaphorical. The “vital forces” as they intertwined
with physical objects in a dance of transformation and change became for Turner the
basis of all historical action. That this special dance appeared to be linked with an East to
West migration of human beings led some scholars, such as William Coleman, to assert
that Turner’s visible “frontier process,” rather than his behind-the-scenes “vital forces,”
stood “universal and omnipotent

But if indeed Turner had accepted the visible

frontier process as universal and omnipotent, then it could not also have been subject to
the “disruption or change or evolution” which Coleman asserted that Turner attributed to
it.^'* For nothing that is omnipotent can be acted upon since that would imply the power
of disruption and, therefore, causation rested with another source. In a letter to Carl
Becker, Turner admitted that the frontier process had limited applications “to certain
portions of Old World history, as well as to that of the New, and sometime it will be
worked out thus.”^^ Beyond the frontier process was the “conception of history as a
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complex of all the social sciences. . . the One-ness of the thing” that tied together
subjects each as a “phase o f the whole,” all the while realizing that it was “only a
p h a s e . I n fact, what Turner did was initiate a holistic treatment of society as an
organism in which specific discontinuities of institutional and cultural subsystems,
labeled as the frontier process, were symptoms rather than causes. The continuum in
which an infinite amount o f division could take place were the “vital forces.” Therefore,
what Gerald Nash actually envisioned for the twenty-first-century Western history as a
departure from Turner was what Turner himself had already established. That is, the
formulation of a “broad generalization” that would explain the “complex interaction
between the environment o f the West and the culture and values o f its occupants.

The

productiveness achieved by a historian using the concept o f “vital forces” was that it
pointed to the source of these complex interactions and could be consistently reapplied to
each situation; the unconscious part of it was that it escaped the analysis and critical
examination necessary to understand exactly what was being done to the historical
picture by using the term and yet it continued to be employed by Turner as the mainstay
of his world vision.
To categorize Turner’s writing as “unconscious productiveness ” is to only explain one
of the divisions necessary for the construction of a system o f classification. One category
demands the existence of at least one other competing category. Any one label implies
that there are circumstances that fall outside the body of that definition. In this case, the
field outside “unconscious productiveness” has been termed “critical intellect.”^^ If
Turner and the others of his generation naively and inextricably embedded the concept of
“vital forces ” into their work, then it is legitimate to establish a category for those who
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did not. The simplistic qualities of “unconscious productiveness” would immediately
become apparent to those gifted with a more analytic and less idealistic perspective.
Rather than creating consensus and support for a historical vision that was
holistic yet not very well understood, these upstart individuals would be more concerned
with the nuances and complexities o f that vision. Instead of building up an accepted
historical tradition as “unconscious productiveness” did, the attempt of “critical intellect”
would be to shatter its crystallized form and bring human consciousness out of its dream
like reverie. In effect, the child-like perspective o f the one would afford material for the
analyzing and critical intellect of the other.
This was precisely what happened in the I9S0’s. The essential philosophical and
linguistic structure behind the “vital forces” was not overturned until Henry Nash Smith’s
Virgin Land. It is true that by the late Progressive period in the 1930’s Turner’s
assumptions were being challenged. His realism and metaphor had embedded into the
perception of American character a special exceptionalist quality which later
Progressives, influenced by profound disillusionment subsequent to America’s
involvement in the First World War, denounced/" But there was no singular, popular
work which overthrew his conceptualization of “vital forces.” After Turner’s 1893
frontier thesis, the most important work prior to Smith was Walter Prescott Webb’s
The Great Plains (1931). If anything, Webb’s interpretation ultimately supported Turner,
not Smith. Although Webb was clearly more of a materialist than Turner, Elliott West
was correct to emphasize Webb’s intuitive prowess when it came to historical vision.
Webb acknowledged there was an “instant” when one could apprehend a connection
among facts that “illuminated more-far more-than the facts themselves.”^ West
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commented that this kind of vision, which Webb called “patterns of truth,” was “not
history in the usual sense.”^' Webb’s confession that there existed a “mystery of the
influence of the plains” was driven by his feel for these “patterns of truth ”behind the
American West/^ The plains were the American West for Webb and he recognized their
exceptionalist quality. The West was different in that its inhabitants underwent such a
“sense of change, bodily and mental. . . a wonderful exhilaration ”that it “lifted man
above himself.

Something fresh and alive coursed through the western man. Webb

wrote.
When the Easterner came in contact with this man of the West, whose
vision had been enlarged by a distant and monotonous horizon, whose
custom it was to live and work on horseback, and who carried at his side
the power o f life and death over his adversaries, the Easterner was at
once impressed with the feeling that he had found something new in
human beings.^
For Webb, the mystery o f the American West was this “something new” in human
beings. He intuited its existence but did not attempt to prove it. He possessed a feel for
this interaction between a larger unknown force and the physical westerner, considering it
important enough to close his book with the theme. In hindsight, the interaction between
noumenon and phenomenon was “problematical and mysterious” because, as Kenneth
Burke explained in A Grammar of Motives, “wherever we find a distinction between the
internal and the external, the intrinsic and the extrinsic, the within and the without. . . we
can expect to encounter the paradoxes of s u b s t a n c e . T h e paradox was that each time
one scrutinized the concept of substance, or the interaction of noumenon and
phenomenon, it “dissolved into thin air.”^ Conversely, the moment one relaxed his gaze
a bit, “it re-formed again

Webb saw deeply enough into this paradox to admit of its

presence while at the same time maintaining his distance so as to avoid entanglement.
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That Webb’s successors in the post-19S0’s were not as wise led them to launch a fullscale assault on the paradox o f substance, claiming that an interaction between noumenon
and phenomenon did not exist as such. In the end, the paradox won out. The paradox
states that those who attempt to avoid using unseen forces will become entangled in them
and those who do use unseen forces will never be able to define them clearly. Historians
after Webb became so determined to deny the existence of unseen forces that they
became hopelessly entangled in using them. At those points in which their logic broke
down in terms of historical causality, the paradox reasserted itself and a dual relationship
between unseen forces and the physical world emerged encoded into their works.
In line with Turner and Webb, Smith did recognize a dichotomy between the
phenomenal and non-phenomenal. He asserted that "‘men could not engage in purposive
group behavior without images which simultaneously expressed collective desires and
imposed coherence.”^^ This statement contained all three tropal styles conducive to
Tumerian metaphor and antithetical to irony. Smiths’ analysis involved metaphor
because “images” and their physical representations as “purposive group behavior” could
be traced onto one another. They were the same thing. It was metonymic because the
“images” were responsible for “imposing coherence ” It was synecdochic because an
image expressed “collective desires ”From this perspective, history, for Smith, was still
about the relationship between unseen forces and the physical world. But where Smith
diverged fi’om Turner centered on the context in which he enveloped that statement. It
was through that context that he assaulted the paradox of substance, attempting to negate
on a figurative level what Turner affirmed on a literal level. On a literal level. Turner had
assumed that the “vital forces” were real absolutes, existing in fact and not merely
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seeming to exist for certain human beings. What Smith did was negate on a figurative
level what Turner had assumed quite literally. That is. Smith reconfigured the noumenal
world. Substituting “imaginative constructions,” which were treated as mutable figments
of the human mind, for “vital forces,” the noumenal world lost its place as an objective
reality. This reconfiguration took place because, as Gene Wise noted, men like Smith
were not certain that the Progressives “could see straight into realities.”^" Consequently,
they reconfigured noumena as “myths, symbols, and images.”*" These myths, symbols,
and images which for Smith constituted his “imaginative constructions” were viewed as
representative of reality rather than the ground to reality itself. Therefore, on a figurative
level, the figures of speech that captured an ultimate reality disappeared in Smith’s work.
Myths and symbols emerged from human action and subsequently impinged on it as
outside unseen forces, but those myths and symbols had become relative to a culture and
its values. It is primarily this revision of Turner’s dualism on a figurative level that allows
Smith to be classified as an early ironic historian functioning from a “critical intellect”
framework. Smith’s use of metaphor was severely tempered by an overriding ironic
agenda set up to disprove the validity of metaphor. His methodology was in contradiction
with itself. In attempting to deny one level of explanation. Smith became entangled in the
“paradox of substance.”
The historical profession o f the post-1950’s was shaped as much by Henry Nash
Smith as the pre-19S0’s had been shaped by Frederick Jackson Turner. An array of
books that reissued Smith’s basic philosophy appeared on the market. Leo Marx’s
The Machine in the Garden (1964) explored the “region of culture where literature,
general ideas, and certain products of the collective imagination meet.”*' William H.
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Goetzmann’s Exploration and Empire (1966) detailed how western explorers “sent back
to eastern dominant culture a set of images turned into myth and subsequent attitudes
towards new land. "*' Edward White followed the same line of thought in The Eastern
Establishment and the Western Experience (1968), explaining that adventuresome young
men from the East possessed of an “adolescent consciousness of alternative possibilities"
traveled West and then returned home as prodigal sons to reshape the “imaginative”
focus on the West.*' With the aid of his son, William H Goetzmann completed his
career along this line o f reasoning in 1986 with The West of the Imagination, a piece
which demonstrated how images were constantly reinterpreted as contact with the
environment changed *^ Even Earl Pomeroy who had discarded these dual figures of
speech by time The Pacific Slope appeared in 1966 had previously been charmed enough
to have pursued a brief encounter with them in his In Search of the Golden West (1957)
which attempted to measure “what the West meant to tourists and those natives who lost
it.”** It obviously meant something different to each group and their specific views
created certain effects which subsequently impinged on human lifestyles. In his prizewinning book. Dust Bowl (1979), Donald Worster went to innumerable troubles to prove
that the patterns of human thought contributed towards the tragedy of the I930’s.*" But
Henry Nash Smith’s ironic vision particularly culminated in Patricia Limerick’s
The Legacv of Conquest (1987),a work that epitomized an age of criticism and selfconsciousness, even expanding its broad wit to encompass a moralistic judgment on
Stephen Douglas’s waistline *' Her work focused on the images that white Americans
constructed as they moved into the western states. Then she set about testing the validity
of these images and how they were terribly imperfect copies of physical reality.
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At the moment complete success seemed imminent for this new critical version of
western history as scholars like Donald Worster made heroes out o f himself and his
revisionist colleagues, “We have been rewriting the study [of history] from page one and
watching it be accepted...! think it is time we acknowledged the achievement,”

something happened.^^ The death blow to Smith’s historical relativism struck just as it
was about to establish its own legacy of conquest. Patricia Limerick could claim that
New Western history, which had predominantly grown out of the New Left social history
of the 1960’s and Smith’s “myth and symbol” school, was fundamentally a “free-for-all,
not a party line of political correctness,” but a thorough reading o f Richard White’s
It’s Your Misfortune and None of Mv Own (1991) in which he engraved Limerick’s
theoretical hypothesis into textbook dogma would show that words do not always square
with the facts.*" The New Western history had crystallized around specific assumptions;
scholars and society in general had accepted them. These assumptions were now about to
experience the first rumblings of change.
What happened in the 1990’s was a neo-Tumerian revolution. The conceptualization
for “vital forces” as a ground to reality, and emplotted through a metaphorical trope,
re-emerged as the overarching historical construct that subsumed “imaginative
constructions ”beneath it. Only now the “vital forces” were discussed under the new term
of “energy.” No one really understood what “energy” meant any more than Turner
understood what the “vital forces” meant. And yet it was placed at the root of all
historical action and embedded into both the scene and the actors in the same manner that
Turner and the Progressives embedded the “vital forces” into machinery, agriculture,
towns, and people themselves. The acceptance of “energy” on blind faith suggests that
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these scholars had begun a shift away from “critical intellect” towards the “unconscious
productiveness” that had marked the development of Turner’s thought. “Critical intellect ”
had functioned on nominalist principles which did not allow overarching generalizations
in historical interpretation. Irony, as a nominalist tool, generally denied those overarching
generalizations from a figurative level. How human beings thought about their
environment still remained an important part of historical dialogue, but those thought
structures became dependent on how organisms absorbed “energy” and translated it into
action. How human beings constructed images, rather than merely being interpreted in
regard to a culture and its own values, became an effect of these new absolute laws of
“energy.” This assumption regarding “energy” meant the fruit of human action had to be
interpreted from a mechanistic standpoint rather than a relativistic standpoint. For
example, if an organism took in a certain amount of “energy,” it could do certain things.
And it could do those things better than an organism that did not take in that amount of
“energy .” The implication of this is that the value of “imaginative constructions” could
now be measured based upon the amount of “energy” absorbed by the organism, whether
societal or individual. This replicated Turner’s basic concept for “vital forces” moving
into a region, energizing it, and then leaving it, resulting in its deterioration into a shadow
of its former self. The human being still fabricated his own imaginative environment as a
byproduct of his physical actions, but the concept of “energy” allowed the picture to be
reversed once again where overriding unseen forces translated into physical action first.
From this perspective, physical reality resumed its position as an accurate reflection of an
ultimate ground to reality, “energy.”
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In William Cronon’s Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (1991), it was
his attempt to understand why human beings such as himself had created variant
“imaginative constructions ”that drew distinctions between the city as unnatural and the
countryside as natural that led him to stumble across nineteenth-century convictions for
the existence of a “superhuman energy” that seemed to radiate from cities, an “energy”
that human beings might try to “manipulate or control ” but never “create.

This

“energy” at its source was independent of “imaginative constructions” and it could
manifest itself through an object in the visible world such as a city or town prior to being
shaped by physical action. For late nineteenth-century Chicagoans, the city “became
almost a force of nature itself.”"' That Cronon accepted the city as this “force of nature”
was made quite clear by his own merging of city and countryside into nature. As nature’s
“energy,” unseen forces could shape cities prior to being shaped by human thought. It
does not require a wild leap of faith to envision Woodrow Wilson’s “vitality of America”
being superimposed by Cronon onto Chicago in the “efficiency” o f its meat packers, the
“richness” of its lumber resources, and the “enterprise” of the grain industry that “brought
a new human order to the country west of the Great Lakes.”"' Just as Wilson noted that
“American vitality” existed in whatever region human beings possessed enough
“irmovative genius” to successfully extract from nature its wealth, so Cronon
demonstrated that Chicago remained the “gateway city” only so long as its markets were
efficient, bountiful, and enterprising. Or, simply stated, full o f “energy.” That Chicago
declined by the 1890’s suggested those qualities no longer resided in that region, leaving
behind amidst “metropolitan vice” decaying memories of the city’s lost past."'
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If William Cronon’s own conflicted struggle between metaphor and irony prevented
him from openly adopting the concept of “energy ” at the core of his world view, it was
only a sign o f the times By the early 1990’s, historians had begun the preliminary shift
away from “critical intellect” and back to “unconscious productiveness ”Cronon was the
initial transition point. But if Cronon could not so easily give up the past nor fully
embrace the future, it would not take long before another historian did. In sharp contrast
to his previous books. The Roots of Dependencv (1983) and It’s Your Misfortune and
None of mv Own (1991), that adopted the popular assessment that “imaginative
constructions” led to differences among groups of people, Richard White reversed his
position in The Middle Ground (1991) by demonstrating that whites and Indians had
constructed a “common mutually comprehensible world.”"^ This suggested that
“imaginative constructions” were not always divisive but sometimes unifying. While that
unity did not suggest White had necessarily established an ultimate ground to reality to
which these common perceptions pointed, it did suggest a reversion to a holistic approach
where “imaginative constructions” were not always disconnecting groups o f people from
one another. This new perspective set the stage for his 1995 groundbreaking work. The
Organic Machine, which argued for an Indian-white world that was connected in a way
historians had not seen before—at least not since Turner. In this case. White openly
acknowledged that “energy” was the connecting force. He did not employ the concept of
“energy” from any critical analysis that it might provide, but because “energy” was such
a “protean and useful concept.”"* For White, the concept of “energy ” was a productive
tool just vague enough to be useful in almost any circumstance. As he wrote in his
introduction, “Seen in one way, energy is an abstraction; seen another it is as concrete as
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salmon, human bodies, and the Grand Coulee Dam.”"" That definition encompassed the
entire spectrum ranging from the phenomenal to the non-phenomenal Just as Wilson’s
“vital energies” expressed themselves in American factories, so White’s “energy”
expressed itself in the Grand Coulee Dam. Just as Roosevelt’s ‘Virile qualities”
manifested through strong men and women, so White’s “energy” became “power” in
human bodies and salmon. Just as Turner’s ‘Vital forces” lay behind institutions, so
White’s “energy ” lay behind the human labor that created those institutions. What White
did was shift from the “critical intellect” of the previous generation into an “unconscious
productiveness” that sought to produce fresh insights rather than merely critique old ones
Unlike William Cronon who apologized for the extreme ambiguities in his own usage of
the term “nature, ”Richard White offered no such apologies."^ He simply took “energy ”
for granted, placed it at the heart of the Columbia River, and jumped in! White had no
more idea or clarification for what “energy” was than did Turner know what were the
“vital forces.” O f course, White never completely retreated from certain relativist
principles in that he insisted on seeing history “more and more ” in terms o f
“relationships” but, through the conceptualization of “energy,” he implanted an absolute
ground to reality beneath those relationships."" “Energy” transcended both culture and
values. These relationships coalesced only as “energy” translated into physical action.
If Richard White took William Cronon’s nineteenth-century concept of “energy” and
extended it one step further, then it was Elliott West who took that concept and made it
into the whole of history. That he would eventually do so was first made apparent in
The Wav to the West (1995), a collection of revised essays from a 1993 lecture series. In
his first selection, “Land,” he wrote, quoting Lewis Thomas, “The astonishing thing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

56

about the earth . . . is that it is alive.”"" Reminiscent of Turner’s and Wilson’s discussion,
no longer would historians have to whisper in the dark their sentiments favoring a living
earth for fear of critical backlash. Unlike Cronon who stated what nineteenth-century
convictions were and then carefully masked his own views behind them. West openly
adopted those convictions as his own, utilized them to explain historical action, and then
went on to receive overwhelming praise from his colleagues for his penetrative historical
insight. On the back of the dust jacket of his The Contested Plains Ü998). Patricia
Limerick had written, “West’s gifts at historical interpretation, especially in the discovery
o f the ties between events in the human mind and events in material reality, will set the
standard for the historical profession.”'" What Limerick missed in her brief statement
was that his work did not so much reinterpret the ties between the human mind and
material reality as it placed a new, overarching construct on them. Like the “myth and
symbol” school which preceded him. West admitted of a “perceived environment” that
consisted of “everything” an organism was “aware of in its surroundings.”" This
“perceived environment” was representational only since a “part” of it did not exist in
“fact.”" The mind often created false impressions of material reality. But this was the
standard fare over the last fifty years since Smith and not deserving of an acclamation of
“discovery” that Limerick pretended it was. Where West did indeed differ was in his
adoption of an “effective environment” consisting of “everything that actually
influenced ”an organism and everything that the organism “in turn affected.”" Through
its perceptions, an organism could shape the environment but there also existed
influences that functioned prior to the imaging process. An “effective environment ”
accommodated both possibilities. Since it accounted for each historical possibility.
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West’s “effective environment,” like Turner’s “vital forces,” served as an ultimate
ground to reality. For West, those influences that went unperceived but were nevertheless
real were “energy” itself. He wrote, “part of an effective environment is the energy that
moves continuously around us. All organisms draw on that energy, convert it, and use it
in order to live.”'^ Organisms converted “energy” and used it, but did not originate it.
That insight was in line with Cronon’s earlier insight that human beings might try to
manipulate or control a city’s “energy” but never create it. “Energy” became the thing
that allowed “every human event” to take place." In this case. West’s real contribution
that set the standard for the historical profession was the relating of mind and matter back
to an ultimate source. Each living thing could apply “energy” in “only a few o f many
available ways” depending on an organism’s ability to contain it; that was a literal
re-rendering of Turner and Roosevelt’s nineteenth-century “vital forces” and West
adopted it wholesale.'" What West had dropped from Smith’s “myth and symbol” school
was the ironic figurative denial of that literal re-rendering. The way in which “energy ”
was able to be applied became the cause o f all physical action.
At this point, two distinct camps o f American thought have been identified. In the
ways already described, William Cronon, Richard White, and Elliott West all participated
in Turner’s vision for a top-down process for the interaction between noumenon and
phenomenon. Physical effects were traced back to their originating primal source. An
unseen source preceded physical types. In the case of Henry Nash Smith and his
adherents, the process was generally reversed. Antecedent physical reality evolved
thoughts and representations that supposedly were mistakenly endowed by humans with
primal qualities. Thoughts could subsequently influence physical society, but their source
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of origin was in that physical society itself This was a bottom-up process. What
significance should he attributed to the fact that the recurrence of a top-down theory for
this dualism was spaced a hundred years apart at the close of each century is open to
debate. But it did recur. Even Donald Worster who so passionately distanced himself
from Turner conceded that “nature was mainly a set of cycles, a tireless repetition o f old
ideas.”" The use of the general terms “unconscious productiveness” and “critical
intellect” have been an attempt to capture these two camps of American thought.
With the dialectic having come flill-circle, this brings us back to Turner’s love o f
collecting. And it brings us back to his collection of materials containing the writings of
Woodrow Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Robert La Follette that addressed the
interaction of noumenon and phenomenon in very similar ways. Hayden White argued
that people made sense of history “by endowing what originally appears to be
problematical and mysterious with the aspect of a recognizable, because it is a familiar,
form.”"

There is a point in historical narrative at which causation is necessarily given

over to unseen forces. A few intensely materialistic historians have managed to evade
that point for the most part, but they have never been able to free themselves completely.
As Kenneth Burke noted, “only by systematically dwelling upon the paradoxes of
substances [noumenon and phenomenon] could we possibly equip ourselves to guard
against the concealment o f ‘substantialist’ thought in schemes overtly designed to avoid
it.”" A pronounced aversion to an idealistic dualism often leads historians to
unknowingly embrace a disguised version of such a dualism. Thus, the dualism between
noumenon and phenomenon has never really been absent from historical interpretation.
The problematical and mysterious nature of the “paradox of substance” has always been

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59

paît of the historical profession. It is simply that the problematic nature of such a difficult
issue has been masked by enshrouding it in recognizable forms. These forms become so
familiar and comfortable within the prevailing culture that they are taken for granted.
Familiarity closes off further inquiry into the validity of the interpretations that the forms
necessarily give to us. A culture begins to feel comfortable with the tropes it has adopted.
Over time, the repetition of the trope becomes the explanation itself. Progressives like
Turner, Wilson, Roosevelt, and La Follette embodied the mysterious under the same
philosophical and linguistic form. The form itself might not satisfactorily explain
anything nor might the historians even understand what it meant. But the historians and
their generation would recognize the form, if not the significance, and would be
comfortable with it. That allowed it to become part of the “explanation” of history.^" The
linguistic and philosophical form became the answer rather than the facts. For whatever
reason, perhaps a change in character of the people, that form over time became
unrecognizable to the ideological preconceptions of a new generation. People were no
longer comfortable with that form as the correct perception of the way things really were
“Critical intellect” developed as an attempt to escape the “paradox of substance.” But
every terminology only lends itself to the creation of a new recognizable form of its own.
That new form became the tool o f explanation in Smith’s “myth and symbol” school and
in the New Western history. For Hayden White, the “explanation ” of historical events on
these terms was the “fictionalization” of history.^' The explanation form of explanation
merely reflected that point at which human consciousness felt comfortable in its
surroundings; “explanation” for either group represented the point at which inquiry
stopped. That was because the process of how people make sense of the world—that is.
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by attaining to recognizable forms and not necessarily by attaining to an actual objective
knowledge of reality—had been completed. Turner’s collection displayed one of two
possible forms for delineating the relationship between unseen forces and the physical
world.
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CHAPTERS

THESIS
Not one of Frederick Jackson Turner’s essays can be properly understood without
taking into account how he embedded unseen forces in his work Turner’s historical
writings consistently presented the frontier in terms of an interaction between an
underlying ground to reality rooted in an invisible world and a surface physical reality
rooted in a visible world. The main flaw that Hayden White saw in such historical writing
was that it merely “assumed a world view” and then treated it “as if it were a cognitively
responsible philosophical position.”^ In contrast, philosophers o f history developed a
philosophy wherein its logic validated the historical-ness of its world view. Turner was
partially guilty of this flaw for merely assuming a world view consisting of “vital forces.”
He adopted the realist world view of his time and enwrapped it in a metaphorical tropal
language most conducive to its expression. To vindicate Turner, Kerwin Klein
masterfully uncovered clear philosophical underpinnings drawn from German historicism
that Turner adapted to confirm his world view.^ Nineteenth-century German historicism
functioned from the premise of a dualist idealism and Turner’s dichotomy of “vital
forces” and the physical world was simply the American extension.^ Peter Hans Reill
demonstrated how Wilhelm Von Humboldt, the founder of German historicism, drew on
Enlightenment Vitalism in treating physical action as an “immanent principle of self
movement whose sources lay in active powers residing within matter itself.”^ In his
67
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1821 essay, “On the Historian’s Task, ”Humboldt established the historical relationship
between noumenon and phenomenon
The historian’s task is to present what actually happened. An event,
however, is only partially visible in the world of the senses. To only
look at outward events and not actual inner truth would mean choosing
actual error in order to escape the potential danger of error The truth
of any event is predicated on the addition of that invisible part of
every fact.®
Humboldt continued, stressing that certain individuals and nations were, at various times,
able to manifest more of a spiritual idea than other people or countries. In fact,
individuals and nations might leave behind records of grand deeds and events but more
important than these accomplishments was the “spiritual individuality” they impressed on
the landscape.^ That this “spiritual individuality” could only be “recognized in the events
themselves” meant that Humboldt was encoding the relationship between noumenon and
phenomenon as metaphor.^ For Humboldt, “spiritual individuality” could be collapsed
into physical action, thereby merging them into a homogeneity. Successive German
historicists, and some of their American counterparts who were influenced by them,
never abandoned Humboldt’s underlying concept. And neither did Turner. Turner’s 1891
‘The Significance o f History” was a serious attempt to underpin the idealism of his world
view with a cognitively responsible philosophical position drawn from the German
historical school. But not only was this essay his only serious attempt to construct a
cognitively responsible philosophical position but it also fell far short of providing a
clearly defined terminology for understanding immanent spiritual principles and outward
manifestations. As a result. Turner’s work took for granted the use of philosophical
realism and tropal metaphor as the familiar form acceptable to the Progressive
“Zeitgeist,” or spirit of the age, for constructing historical interpretation. This familiar
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form, or what has been labeled “unconscious productiveness,” was what distinguished
Turner’s frontier theory as the initial thesis of a three-pronged dialectic running through
the course of the twentieth century.

Frederick Jackson Turner
Georg Friedrich Hegel maintained that history was the “prose representation of a
dialectical interchange between externality and intemality, as that interchange was

lived'"^ For him, the process of life itself was dual. Therefore, historians, in attempting to
capture life’s processes, must embed this fundamental division into their work. No better
example for Hegel’s argument can be offered than by presenting an overview of Craig
Miner’s preface in West of Wichita (1986). Miner envisioned historical research not
merely as a procedure o f “reading and writing” but also as the expenditure of a
tremendous “emotional energy.”^ In this case, the phenomenal signifiers of physical
action, reading and writing, accompanied the non-phenomenal signifier of emotional
energy. Miner explained that the motivation for writing his book “came not from
documents” but from “my strong sense of the High Plains of Kansas as a special and
powerful region, a sense that has been part of my consciousness since childhood.”'"
From these statements. Miner considered historical writing as much a noumenal process
as a phenomenal process. Some sort of vague, emotional energy was integrated into the
very process of reading and writing. In addition, a non-phenomenal sense, as part of his
consciousness, drove him to complete the manuscript. In line with Hegel, Miner clarified
that, at least for him, the process of living was an interchange between externality and
intemality. But Miner did not stop there. Miner subsequently transposed the existence
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for a two-fold process to life itself onto his contextualization of Kansas history For
example, he stated that western Kansas existed “partly as a feature of the planet and
partly in the psyches of those who saw it.”" Here Miner suggested, though he did not
sufficiently carry the suggestion through the scope of his book, that western Kansas was a
physical object subject to sensory perception but also that it abided in a non-sensory
world, in relation to the phenomenal, possessing a life of its own separate from any
immediate physical contact. Miner concluded, T sense that the blue hills seen always on
a limitless horizon. . . has had as important an effect on my father’s character and
outlook as they had had on his father’s or his grandfather’s and that the lack of everyday
proximity would not keep the blue hills from also swaying me.”'^ Irregardless of his
physical proximity to the blue hills, the perpetual ennobling influence of the idea o f them
would, entirely independent of the physical realm, continue to assert itself in
transforming his internal character and consequently his external actions. Thus, an
accurate historical representation of the lives of his father, grandfather, and great
grandfather had to take into account the same interchange between externality and
intemality that Miner himself at that very moment was living. In light of Miner’s preface,
Hegel may well have been correct in his assertion that history was the prose
representation of the dual interchange between extemality and intemality taking place in
the process of life itself. At the very least. Miner’s preface suggests that the place to
begin to understand historical writing is with the real life experiences o f the historian.
In examining the writings of Frederick Jackson Tumer, his real life experience, an
experience which did in fact correspond to Miner’s extemal/intemal interchange,
underpinned his sense of history. In 1893, Tumer formulated his famous frontier theory
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in ‘The Significance o f the Frontier in American History.” This frontier theory received
fuller explication by Tumer in his follow-up essay, “The Problem of the West,” in 1896.
The frontier and the West were the same; a region in which the interchange between
extemality and intemality transformed human character. Tumer wrote;
The West, at bottom, is a form of society, rather than an area. It is
the term applied to the region whose social conditions result from
the application of older institutions and ideas to the transforming
influences o f free land. By this application, a new environment is
suddenly entered, freedom of opportunity is opened, the cake of
custom is broken, and new activities, new lines of growth, new
institutions and new ideals, are brought into existence. The wildemess
disappears, the ‘West’ proper passes on to a new frontier, and in
the former area, a new society has emerged from its contact with the
backwoods. Gradually this society loses its primitive conditions, and
assimilates itself to the type of the older social conditions of the East;
but it bears within it enduring and distinguishing survivals o f its
frontier experience. Decade after decade. West after West, this rebirth
of American society has gone on, has left its traces behind it, and has
reacted on the East."
Tumer was a man who, though clearly not a conscious mystic, filled his papers with
brilliant metaphors designed to communicate how pioneer ideals, frontier individualism,
and American exceptionalist democracy all developed from human contact with the
wide-open spaces o f virgin forests and unexplored lands. In part, he wrote this way
because it was his real life experience. Bom in 1861 in the wildemess town of Portage,
Wisconsin, Tumer did in fact grow up to believe that he had lived on the edge of society
where “savagery,” to quote Tumer, met “civilization.”'^ That is. Portage was on the edge
of two cultures. Native American and European American. European American was the
appropriate label for Portage in the late nineteenth century because, as Ray Allen
Billington (Tumer’s chief biographer) stressed. Portage actually consisted of a
hodgepodge of first generation immigrants from Holland, Scotland, Wales, and Germany.
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Only a small portion of the population was American bom. From his own life experience
in Portage, its seemed obvious to Tumer that a new nationality was being bom as these
diverse groups intermixed and that an old nationality, the American Indians, was dying
out in the process of white expansion westwards. Tumer came to realize he was raised in
a different place than the East. He “felt” the influence of the frontier wildemess around
him." He sensed that it had changed him and intuited that it had changed others as well.
That Tumer subsequently transposed this personal feeling for how the frontier had
transformed him and his Portage neighbors into an overarching generalization that the
frontier, with each stage o f human advance, must necessarily transform all who came into
contact with it should come as no surprise. As Billington pointed out, Tumer was a die
hard Emersonian; he read Emerson and loved Emerson. His 1883 oration on “The Poet of
the Future,” a piece inspired by Ralph Waldo Emerson’s own essay entitled “The Poet,”
was a tribute to his idolized mentor." That Tumer should transfer his own experience to
the general “self-consciousness o f mankind” was a reflection of Emersonian realist
metaphor." In his essay, “History,” Emerson wrote, “There is one mind common to all
individual men. Every man is an inlet to the same and to all the same.”" In his
“American Scholar,” Emerson continued, “Going down into the secrets o f his own mind
he has descended into the secrets of all minds.. the deeper he dives into his privatest,
secretest presentment, to his wonder he finds this is the most acceptable, most public, and
universally true.”" For Tumer, the frontier changed others because it had changed him.
From this perspective, it was only natural that the transformative quality o f Tumer’s own
real life frontier experience should have become the immutable ground to reality rooted
into his historical interpretation.
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In his daily life. Turner repeatedly came into contact with the great wildemess
outdoors and, each time, his internal character underwent something of a religious
experience. In terms o f orthodox religion, David Noble correctly argued that Tumer left
behind most of the Christian implications of his predecessor, George Bancroft.^" But
Turner’s contact with the wildemess blazoned forth as an epiphany of its own. Tumer
loved ftshing and hiking. Poet Henry David Thoreau’s words were apt for describing
Tumer’s outdoor adventures, “His ftshing was not a sport. . . but a sort of solemn
sacrament and withdrawal fi'om the world, just as the aged read their Bibles.”^' Like his
ftshing, Tumer took special joy in his romps through the tall forests of the Maine coast.
One of the more endearing photographs of him was taken in 1904 on a hike accompanied
by his daughter Dorothy. With hands confidently resting at his hips and standing poised
next to her as only a proud father could, the pair were towered over by the majestic tree
line receding in the distance.^^ In “The West and American Ideals, ”Turner wrote of his
experience crossing the Cascades on the way to Seattle and how his “heart was stirred”
by the “whirling spaces o f woods and peaks” through which he passed." In later letters
to Dorothy, he detailed his outdoor excursions with the most thrilling imagery, such as in
his description of the Southem Califomia mountains with their “snowy peaks hung in the
air, silvery and blue.”" Obviously, these wildemess encounters deeply affected Tumer.
He agreed with his companion on the way to Seattle that the “crowded tenements and
noisome alleys of the eastern cities and the Old World ” needed to be “let loose in the vast
forests and ore-laden mountains to leam what life really is!”" For Tumer, nature reigned
in its pristine glory and it was at its shrine that he worshipped most constant."
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Within a historical context. Turner’s belief that contact with the vast open-spaces of
the American landscape would transform human character was not unusual In fact, it
was common during the Progressive period. Jane Addams, the famous social reformer
and founder of Hull-House in Chicago, underwent a terrible emotional struggle each time
when, after her students finished their learning sessions, those poor children had to return
to the harsh urban streets from which they had come." It broke her heart. She realized
that she could only take those children away from their impoverished, overcrowded
environment for a short time each day. Hull-House remained in Chicago, but Addams
longed for the vast open-spaces o f an American West where her children could develop
mentally, morally, and physically free of the inner city’s pollution and vice. Katherine
Tingley, another Progressive social reformer, recognized that Chicago, like New York,
was “too big . too lively for real harmony to exist.”" Consequently, she uprooted the
headquarters of her Universal Brotherhood and Theosophical Society organization from
New York and transplanted it, with new educational facilities and all, to the beautiful
sandy beaches of Point Loma near San Diego, California by the early twentieth century.
At that time. Point Loma was still rather a frontier town and San Diego had not
undergone its transformation into a metropolis. For Tingley, the Point Loma environment
would strengthen the minds o f her “Raja-Yoga” children as well as their bodies." She
endearingly wrote her students;
To think that you are getting the sweet breath of life out of the ozone
at Point Loma, in the garden, with the sweet air, mountain air, and
desert air blending, which is said to make the purest ozone in the world!
This goes for building up your health, making new life and keeping your
minds clean and strong.
When Henry James, the American master of the psychological novel, visited Southem
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California in 1904, he felt more “imaginatively alive” in San Diego than elsewhere.®*
Speakii% of the “oranges and olives, fresh from the tree” and himself lying “awake nights
to listen, on purpose, to the languid lisp of the Pacific,” James marveled at how
“everything sinks in and fertilizes and renews in its golden promise.”®^ Turner’s own
feelings for the impact o f the Far Western region on human character were mirrored in
the general tenor of the Progressive period between the 1890’s and the 1930’s. Historian
Jackson Lears captured this general tenor of Progressivism when he remarked that the
“new idiom” for the period was “therapeutic rather than religious; it promised selffulfillment through intense experience rather than salvation through self-denial.”®®
In a very special photograph of Tumer taken in September 1916 while on an excursion
hiking in Montana near McDonald Lake Glacier Park, Tumer was once again framed by
a forest of huge trees towering so far into the distant sky that their tops were lost in the
dazzling sunlight. Tumer was just barely visible down at the bottom of the photo, thereby
adding emphasis to the immensity of trees stretching their limbs upwards surrounding
him on all sides. If one turns the photograph over, one finds penned on the backside in
Tumer’s handwriting, ‘T.J.T. With heart bowed down.”®^ This phrase captured the awe
he must have felt in the presence of such magnificence From a linguistic standpoint,
what Tumer did to capture that awe and magnificence was root the phrase in a
metaphorical trope. What this essentially means is that the word “heart” did not refer to
the physical organ (for how could that bow?) but rather to some unknown quality for
which the word “heart” had come to represent. Kermeth Burke stated it best;
Language develops by metaphorical extension, in borrowing words
from the realm o f the corporeal, visible, tangible and applying them
by analogy to the realm of the incorporeal, invisible, intangible; then
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in the course of time, the original corporeal reference is forgotten,
and only the incorporeal, metaphorical extension survives
The “heart” was still doing the bowing only now the “heart” had become a metaphorical
extension of the physical object. The “heart” as an intangible, invisible unknown had
been endowed with the ability to act. That is, the “heart” could bow. In the same way,
“bowed down” did not refer to the actual physical process of stooping over but rather
possessed its own metaphorical extension derived from the internal qualities most
associated with physical bending which are respect and assent. Since respect and assent
are aspects of consciousness or the way people think, “heart” as a metaphorical extension
became consciousness itself. Therefore, Tumer’s use o f the language “with heart bowed
down” exhibited a metaphorical extension that showed human consciousness acting by
shifting into a condition of respect and assent. To what was human consciousness bowing
in respect? It was bowing to the overarching magnificence of the divinity of the forest.
“F.J.T. With heart bowed down,” read Tumer’s note. That is how Tumer described this
photograph of himself standing amidst a grove of trees. He did not describe what was
taking place in the picture in terms of physical action, but rather he gave the power of
action over to noumenal forces(in this case, consciousness and its action) and then
described what happened in the physical scene in those terms.
If an observer viewed the photograph of Tumer at Me Donald Lake Glacier Park
through an alternate tropal lens, he would see an entirely different picture than the one
Tumer envisioned. Tumer’s metaphor allowed his own physical organism, filled with
blood and bile as it were, to be identified with the noble ideas flowing through his
consciousness. Dropping the metaphor which allowed the non-phenomenal to be
collapsed onto the phenomenal even when the two were apparently incongruous, all one
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would see was a tiny, weak man in the foreground of some rather tall trees Perhaps some
of those trees were rotting. Or perhaps Tumer discarded some trash on the ground. For
the observer viewing the picture from this perspective, he would immediately take note of
the incongruity between consciousness and physical action, henceforth refusing to allow
them to be mutually interchangeable. Going a step further, he might even deny, based on
the contradictory physical evidence, that a noble consciousness could be present in such a
scene. This is precisely the view one attains to when employing an ironic trope. When the
figurative level of explanation contradicts the literal level, the ironic observer denies the
figurative level of explanation, or the metaphorical trope in this case. In contrast,
Tumer’s metaphor allowed the two levels of explanation to be contradictory and yet still
both be true. In “The Problem of the West, ”Tumer established his rationale for this
position by making it clear that although the western frontiersman may have been
physically “rude” and “gross,” he was an “idealist withal.”®^ A rude and gross physical
exterior did not prevent a noble consciousness from being collapsed onto the crude bodily
organism, thereby defining the quality of that organism in much more positive terms.
Thus, consciousness, in accord with the Philosophical Idealism of his time, existed
independently of physical matter but could also be integrated with it to redefine the
quality of physical matter.
The issue as to whether unseen forces could function separate from physical matter
underwent intense debate among the scientific community in the late nineteenth century.
To a certain extent, Tumer was familiar with the scientific views of his time. For the most
part, the science of the late nineteenth century denied the existence of a “vital principle ”
separate from “atomo-mechanical laws.”®^ Any possible “informing, ever-present.
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moving-power and life principle” owed its origins to physical processes.®^ Under this
assumption, the phenomenal world brought the non-phenomenal into manifestation. But
there were a fair number of dissidents who urged that there was a “vital principle without
which no molecular combinations could ever have resulted in a living organism.”®^ For
these dissidents, the non-phenomenal acted first and independently of physical matter
The more radical scientists held that unseen forces were “self-active” principles/" Only
subsequently did physical processes come into play.
The position held by these more radical scientists emerged initially to challenge the
materialism of Darwinian theory and later developed to account for the revolution in
science from a “matter-based physics” to an “energy-based physics” which took place in
the final years of the nineteenth century.'*' On closer inspection, these radical scientists
were part of a broader intellectual movement sweeping across Europe to America during
this period. This movement represented a “New Vitalism” and its foremost proponent
was the French philosopher, Henri Bergson/® Although Wilhelm Von Humboldt’s
earlier Vitalism never completely died out, post-18S0’s thinkers functioned from deeply
materialist convictions that dampened its overt influence. Henri Bergson, along with
other great thinkers like Hans Driesch, re-invigorated Vitalism in their rebellion against
the rank materialism o f their age. According to T.S. Eliot, Bergson’s Vitalism became an
“epidemic” in Great Britain by 1911 and, as Thomas Quirk noted, the reaction was “even
more enthusiastic” in the United States, eventually outstripping the popularity of
renowned psychologist William James/® What Bergson’s New Vitalism proposed was
that there existed an “elan vital,” translated into English as “vital impulse” or “vital
force,” that manifested through physical form. The “elan vital” was not physical itself or
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at least not at its purest, spiritual level. At whatever point this “elan vital” broke through
onto the physical plane, there resulted an infusion of vigor and energy, creation and
evolution." But the outpouring o f the “elan vital” proved to be limited and soon
exhausted itself in its very manifestation.*® It energized physical matter but only for a
temporary duration. As for the human being, he was not the “elan vital” in its most
spiritually pure form, but rather he was an admixture of “elan vital” already “loaded with
matter.”" That matter, physical in substance, distinguished itself from pure “elan vital”
in that it was the “congealed parts,” dross, or lees of its parent substance, the pure “elan
vital.”*® As such, the human brain was not, strictly speaking, the “organ of thought nor of
feeling nor of consciousness” but simply an organ that allowed consciousness, feeling,
and thought to be kept “tensely strained on life” by allowing the pure “elan vital” to
freely flow through it.*^ Consciousness was not produced by the physical brain. Instead,
a well-functioning brain allowed the “elan vital” to manifest through it, thereby creating
the conditions for a keen and perceptive consciousness. The brain’s role as a tool o f the
“elan vital,” and consequently consciousness, was why there needed to be but a “slight
modification of the cerebral substance for the whole mind to be affected.”*" From this
perspective, Bergsonian Vitalism was strongly monistic at the same time that it was
strongly dualistic. The “elan vital ”was the source of all life as well as the spiritual
essence of physical matter. The “elan vital” acted as the ground to reality but could also
be integrated with its byproduct or physical form. This relationship served as a perfect
metaphor, conforming to Hegel’s poetic form where consciousness must be separated
from its object and then united with it once more.
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In regard to Turner’s writing, his early ideas, expressed in his 1878 Portage High
School graduation speech entitled “The Power of the Press, ”already adhered to a view
that placed “vital forces” prior to physical action. That they did so at such an early age for
Tumer before he had mastered the scientific theories of his day suggests that his style
may have been unintentionally shaped by a surrounding cultural or religious atmosphere
rather than any conscious implementation on his part. Or it could be that his
“transcendent objectives” in dealing with “learning, democracy, and Christian values”
simply catered to the adoption o f some form of tropal language that was either chosen to
match his own views or shaped his views as he employed that specific trope.®" From a
philosophical perspective, the search for transcendence necessarily implies that the writer
believed something existed above and independent of the limitations of the material
universe. Even if a writer considered transcendence a possibility without knowing any of
the details regarding such transcendence, would not that contribute to a literary style that
automatically embedded spirit and matter into his text? In “The Power of the Press,” the
young Tumer tried to capture the significance of John Guttenberg’s invention of letter
press printing. In the very first sentence, he established a pattem of speech that continued
throughout his career which allowed him to adopt pre-existent “vital forces” as a valid
approach to historical dialogue. In this case, his tropal configuration was metonymical
as opposed to metaphorical in order to account for the causative effect of these “vital
forces” on physical action. He wrote, “About four centuries ago was bom in the brain of
John Guttenberg, an idea destined to be the propagator of leaming, of Christianity, and of
civilization, and thus to sway the future of the world.”®' Instead of romanticizing the
individual, he reduced John Guttenberg, the physical person, to a secondary vehicle.
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He removed the physical person of Guttenberg as the causative agent He gave primary
agency, a means used to secure some effect, to idea rather than physical action The idea
instilled knowledge, shaped religion, and uplifted culture. It is crucial that the idea was
bom “in” the brain as opposed to “from” the brain o f John Guttenberg. If idea was bom
“from” the brain, then his statement would reflect the positivist materialism o f late
nineteenth-century science that insisted unseen forces were simply physical atomomechanical operations. That would have negated Tumer’s tropological groundwork
because it would have mitigated any distinction between spirit and matter. But the word
“in” clearly made the linguistic style of the statement conform to the type o f dualistic
metonymical relationship between spirit and matter as envisioned by Kenneth Burke.
Burke explained that metonymy was “a ‘metaphorical extension’ back from the
intangible into a tangible equivalent. Burke wrote that the “the first ‘carrying over’ from
the material to the spiritual” was “compensated by a second ‘carrying over’ from the
spiritual back into [emphasis added] the material”.®® Tumer’s statement moved beyond
the simple metaphor of the earlier “heart” example which lacked a cause-effect
relationship. In that case, physical matter became so identified with the unseen qualities
that it could recede into the background and still appear to be the subject talked about. In
this case, physical matter and idea were also closely identified, but the historical dialogue
demanded some sort of cause-effect relationship. That necessitated the creation of a
hierarchical relationship that distinguished the dualism to explain causation. In this case,
idea as a “vital force” shaping physical action was placed above matter, thereby
establishing a world view wherein the unseen forces could exist independent o f matter.
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The metonymical relationship established between idea and matter, however, did not
specify the nature of their qualities beyond the fact that one caused the other to occur It
did not clarify where idea and matter stood in relationship to the whole o f the historical
process But Tumer embedded the key to that answer later in the essay. And that
subsequently moved Tumer into the trope of synecdoche. Reaching a fervent pitch at the
climax of the piece, Tumer exclaimed, ‘Truly, there was something more than human in
Guttenberg’s idea! The invention o f printing was almost divine in its character.”®® That
something “more than human ” existed in idea meant that idea was a higher quality than
human-ness. Considered from a scientific point of view, being human consists of having
a physical body, a highly developed brain, the powers of articulate speech, and abstract
reasoning and imagination. Reasoning and imagination may account for the personality,
prejudices, and preferences of the individual from his more ignoble passions to his
beautiful noble sentiments, but Tumer’s idea was placed beyond that. And it was the
idea, not the sentiments of human-ness, that shaped the institutions of the world.
Nevertheless, idea only possessed power because the “divine” resided in it. “Divine” is a
very loose term, but it obviously signified a higher quality than an idea. That the “divine”
worked through an idea allowed the idea to achieve a certain level of efficiency in the
same way that an idea worked through physical matter to create machinery which in turn
produced greater efficiency. By introducing the “divine” as the overarching construct to
idea and matter, Tumer created a three-tiered division that allowed the qualities of each
to be defined, albeit in the simplest o f ways. As agents in historical action, physical
matter was the lowest component, idea the middle component, and the divine the highest.
At each step of the way, the smaller segment recapitulated the larger tendency of the
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whole because it had been infused with the qualities of the component above it. The
microcosm reflected the macrocosm. That relationship went beyond metonymy and
merged into synecdoche.
In his more mature works, Tumer became very comfortable with these figures of
speech culled from his real life outdoor experiences as well as the broader intellectual
climate which emerged during his youth. Within his later essays, Tumer thought nothing
of disentangling the immaterial world from the material world and giving it a historical
life of its own by allowing it, in Bergsonian fashion, to act independently of physical
matter. In their own way, the adoption of metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche all
contributed toward that end. They all provided mechanisms for giving the unseen world a
historical vehicle. In his 1914 "The West and American Ideals,” Tumer wrote, “A famous
scientist holds that the universal ether bears vital germs which impinging upon a dead
world would bring it to life.”®* Then he confirmed the assumption, “So, at least it is, in
the world of thought, where energized ideals put in the air and carried here and there by
the waves and currents of the intellectual atmosphere, fertilize vast inert areas.”®® In this
passage, he confessed that the unseen world possessed its own processes that had to be
taken into consideration. Ideas moved along their own “waves and currents” through an
invisible “intellectual atmosphere” where, if “energized” just right, they could exert an
uplifting influence on the “vast inert areas” o f human thought-life. But, just like
Bergson’s “elan vital,” the energizing influence of the “vital germ s”within a region
eventually dissipated. Those “vast inert areas” of human thought-life, initially invigorated
by the “vital germs” but later enervated in their absence, corresponded to what Tumer
later termed in “The Significance of the Section” as wom-out “memories, traditions, an
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inherited attitude o f life.”®" For as long as “idealistic influences” reigned supreme within
a given region (both Tumer and Bergson recognized the “vital forces” and the “elan
vital” had to be selective in where they manifested since they could not manifest
everywhere at once), they strengthened everyone in that region. They gave to the
“pioneer farmer and city builder a restless energy, a quick capacity for judgment and
action, a belief in liberty, freedom of opportunity, and a resistance to the domination of
class which infused vitality and power into the individual atoms of this democratic
mass.”®® According to Tumer, the reason that “vital germs” or “vital forces” especially
existed within a frontier region was because the environment forced human beings to
develop innovation, individualism, and self-reliance. While this view has been criticized
by modem scholars, what is significant about it was how closely it corresponded to
Bergson’s own view for why the “elan vital” manifested in certain places. In his 1911
essay, “Life and Consciousness, ” Bergson explained;
When is it that consciousness attains its greatest liveliness? Is it not
at those moments o f inward crisis when we hesitate between two,
or it may be several, different courses to take, when we feel that our
future will be what we make it? The variations in the intensity of our
consciousness seem then to correspond to the more or less considerable
sum of choice, or, as I would say, to the amount o f creation which our
conduct requires.®*
For Tumer, the “vital forces” manifested when an individual was required to demonstrate
the frontier qualities of innovation, as Bergson’s “creation,” and self-reliance, as
Bergson’s “sum o f choice. ” These were qualities which Tumer asserted became dominant
in the frontiersman during the process of his falling back onto his own willpower to
conquer an inhospitable wilderness frontier.
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The reason that Turner conceptually envisioned the American West as a moving
section continually progressing westwards as opposed to simply being a single,
permanent, geographical place was tied into his view of the “vital forces.” His view was
two-fold. First, human beings themselves called down the manifestation of the “vital
forces” through their conduct as they came into contact with the wildemess and
creatively transformed it to suit their needs. Since geographical migration across the
American continent generally proceeded East to West, the “vital forces” reappeared in
successively westem regions. Second, the “vital forces,” being conceived as independent
from the physical world, possessed a historical process of their own. That is, they
possessed a purpose. Realism tends to be teleological. Tumer’s realism was no exception.
The teleology in Tumer’s work comes from the fact that his “vital forces” did possess
their own purpose within the historical process Tumer’s central declaration in his 1893
thesis has already been stated, “Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and
modifications, lie the vital forces that call these organs into life and shape them to meet
changing conditions.”®" That declaration did not stand alone in his text however Only a
few pages later, Tumer elaborated just how these “vital forces” went about their business
shaping the physical realm in his reference to an “expansive power.”""
It appears then that the universal disposition of Americans to emigrate
to the westem wildemess, in order to enlarge their dominion over
inanimate nature, is the actual result of an expansive power [emphasis
added] which is inherent in them, and which by continually agitating
all classes of society is constantly throwing a large portion of the whole
population on the extreme confines of the State, in order to gain space
for its development. Hardly a new State or Territory formed before the
same principle manifests itself again and gives rise to a further emigration;
and so is it destined to go on until a physical barrier must obstruct its
progress."'
This statement embedded an independent unseen force, under the altemate label
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“expansive power,” into human beings which possessed a purpose o f its own—to gain
space for its development—and consequently agitated society to achieve that purpose.
The “expansive power” was doing the agitating. This “expansive power” operated
independently of the physical world for its motivation (its own need to develop), but once
it touched the physical realm it became a causal %ent that manifested itself periodically
to spur on human migration so that its own development could be achieved. The relation
of noumenon to phenomenon was causal and teleological at the same time. Travelers
emigrated to the West because an unseen force compelled them to do so and at a rate that
matched its own timetable, not their timetable. During the process in which this
intangible “expansive power” affected the physical environment, its presence left patterns
on the landscape. Through reading those patterns, the tangible could be identified with
intangible. That was Tumer’s metaphor. His extension of this basic metaphor into
metonymy was in establishing the phenomenal world as the extrinsic manifestation of
such agents as “vital forces” and “expansive powers ”presumed to exist behind the
phenomenal world.
Throughout Tumer’s career, a tropal language akin to metaphor that legitimized the
separation and integration of noumenon and phenomenon was his preferred style At
times in his writing, one can discem those special moments when Tumer became actively
engaged in making an interpretive choice, though not necessarily consciously conceived
in tropal terms, for one style o f tropal language as opposed to another. In his prose,
metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche all merged into one general category of metaphor.
Tumer embraced this general category of metaphor while rejecting any semblance of
ironic emplotment. One example of this rejection of irony was briefly alluded to in
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“The Problem of the West” where Turner allowed ideas and physical characteristics to be
at odds with one another yet he allowed both to retain their accuracy in representing
historical reality. Later in the essay, this rejection of irony was evident in Tumer’s
critique of the view of one of his contemporaries. Professor M. Boutmy. Boutmy had
previously argued that “the striking and peculiar characteristic of American society” was
that it was not so much “a democracy” as “a huge commercial company for the
discovery, cultivation, and capitalization of its enormous territory .”"® In truth, the United
States was primarily a “commercial society, and only secondarily a nation. ”"® To have
accepted this statement would have required the concept of “a nation” from a literal level
to be replaced by the figurative impression of a commercial enterprise, comprising the
whole of the United States, crawling its way across the American expanse. That would be
irony at its most sublime. While Tumer may have been willing to accept that Boutmy’s
description “hit the substantial fact,” he nevertheless declared it a “serious
misapprehension” because it did not take into account the relation of ideals to society."*
For Tumer, ideals and physical action had to be established within a substitutive
relationship where they could each be merged into the other as metaphor before historical
explanation could proceed. That is saying the same thing as that the rejected Boutmy’s
statement not because it missed the fact but because it was not configured metaphorically.
Tumer obviously did not say, “This is not metaphor—I do not like it.” But his choice to
tum to unseen forces before discussing the so-called historical facts demonstrated that he
was not comfortable discussing American society as this vast corporate machine until he
had settled into his own way of talking about it. That is, ideals and energy were
conceived by him to be part of the historical facts. Only after Tumer established this new
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American society as “Energy, incessant activity” would Tumer confess that “America is
like a vast workshop . . . No admittance here, except on business.”"® Whereas an ironic
configuration would have placed the physical extension of a “huge commercial
company” at center stage, metaphor reduced it to an offshoot of energy’s “incessant
activity. ”“Energy, ” like “vital forces” and “expansive power, ”became the key historical
actor and its physical counterparts became a way to read where it had been and what it
had done.
One can tum to Tumer’s menagerie of news clippings for insight into the broader
contextualization behind his anti-ironic position. In particular, one clipping from a 1909
issue of American Magazine bears special relevance. Tumer had cut out an article
entitled Tn the Interpreter’s House” which discussed how a negative perspective on
human action led to “picturesque” and “excessive” interpretations that distorted historical
tmth " The article proposed to demonstrate how a short history o f the United States
would appear when written from such a negative view. From such a negative view, the
history of the United States could be summed up as follows, “The whole nation was
steeped in profligacy and vice. The rich were without exception corrupt and immoral.”"®
By this point, Tumer had already underlined the article’s core message. It does not take
much stretch of the imagination to superimpose this negative view, which would have the
entire United States corrupt and immoral (especially the wealthy), onto Boutmy’s own
view. In essence, Boutmy’s irony was functioning fr^om a negative view of history that
was just as excessive and picturesque, and hence falsifying, as Tumer’s more positive
metaphorical view. Tumer knew history could be written fi'om a counter perspective, but
he did not write fi'om that perspective because he believed it contorted the historical
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picture. Irony replaced the figurative level of explanation in metaphor with its own
figurative level. Since irony still retained a figurative level, however, it was just as
fallible to overstating historical fact.
If Tumer’s favored trope was metaphor, that favoritism had to have been motivated by
an overriding philosophy which found metaphor conducive to its general tenets.
Metaphor allows for the existence of noumenon and phenomenon in historical
explanation. Noumenon, since it extends beyond the five senses, can only be expressed as
an abstract generalization. As an abstract generalization, it can only be conceptualized as
the vague, originating source of perceptible, phenomenal manifestations. In this position,
noumenon stands as the ground to reality for all historical action. Therefore, the use of
noumenon in a historical text implies that the author is working from a realist framework.
That is, realism integrates abstract generalizations, or over-arching generalizations, and a
ground to reality into interpretation. The embeddedness of noumenon, as that ground to
reality, in a historical piece signifies the driving power of realism. No sentence better
captured Tumer’s philosophical realism than the one drawn from “The First Official
Frontier of the Massachusetts Bay” which stated that the “very essence ”of the American
frontier was the “graphic line which records the expansive energies of the people behind
it, and which by the law o f its own being continually draws that advance after it to new
conquests.”"* It is nothing new to suggest that the frontier was “universal and
omnipotent” for Tumer."" William Coleman and many others have already done that. But
it is new to explain why The fi'ontier acted according to the “law of its own being” and
that meant it had not been caused by anything. The fi*ontier was a combination of
noumenon and phenomenon. Its “expansive energies” could be metaphorically collapsed
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onto the physical humans trudging westwards. But causation rested with an unseen force,
this unknown “law of its own being.” Hence, Tumer’s frontier was “universal and
omnipotent ”because it stood as the ground to reality necessary to the operations of a
realist philosophy.
In discussing vocabularies used by writers which signified that a ground to reality was
being employed, Kenneth Burke noted that over-arching generalizations of “freedom and
necessity” were the two most commonly exercised.®" Whenever they appeared, one knew
they were in the “presence of ‘God-terms,’ or names for the ultimates of motivations.”®'
Freedom and necessity were the two primary over-arching generalizations comprising
Tumer’s frontier. The earlier example from “Contributions,” in which Tumer integrated
“idealistic influences” into both the pioneer farmer and the city builder, demonstrated that
freedom was tied up with the expression of “energy” and “vitality” while the example
from “The First Official Frontier” argued for the necessity of the frontier process through
the automatic unfoldment o f its own laws. Numerous other similar illustrations abound;
“Destiny set [the American] in a current which bore him swiftly along through such a
wealth of opportunity that reflection and well considered planning seemed wasted time;”
“[Democratic society] was a mobile mass of freely circulating atoms, each seeking its
own place and finding play for its own powers and for its own original initiative; ”“We
see the vigorous elements of all nations . .. peaceably congregating and mingling
together on virgin soil. . . led together by the irresistible attraction o f force and broad
principles.”®® In each case, there was an unseen force present which was connected to the
concept of freedom or necessity. In the first quote, the word “destiny” signified one’s
predetermined lot in life, whether of the individual or the group. “Destiny ” meant there
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was a pattern to life upon which historical action had to conform. The pattern of
“destiny,” whatever that might have been, became the law by which physical action
proceeded. It is not difficult to see how “destiny” and the law of the frontier’s own being
could be substituted for one another. Both possessed their own law of being that
subsequently shaped the process o f the human landscape. “Destiny” fulfilled Burke’s
requirement for necessity pointing to a ground of reality. When “destiny” was involved,
things could have happened no other way. As to the second quote, it was the consummate
expression of freedom. When looking at human beings in many historical situations, they
are terribly constrained by physical experiences that seem to shackle the human body.
How could one argue that the West or democratic society (which were the same for
Turner) was truly blessed if such constraints were visible in the historical picture? For
Turner, the answer was simple. All one needed to do was shift to a different level of
observation where those constraints were no longer visible. For example, if a person was
perceived to be constrained, the organism could be reduced to its smallest component
parts and then examined again from this new perspective. Within the altered framework,
the previous confinements no longer pertained to the organism at this reduced level.
When faced with the obvious restrictions and constraints in the everyday life of the
westerner. Turner shifted the level o f observation by conjuring up images o f the atom
with its respective “powers” and “initiative” finding free play. In this revised world, a
world viewed from such a radically different perspective, the physical constraints of
daily life in the West no longer existed. These “freely circulating atoms ” satisfied
Burke’s requirement for freedom. Nor is it a far cry to equate those atoms with the “vital
germs” travelling through Turner’s “universal et her. Fi nal l y, in the third quote, the
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“irresistible attraction o f force and broad “principles” once again satisfied the category
for necessity. Turner described an unknown force too powerful to be resisted that drew
certain people together. He never explained why this force did it, but it is not too hard to
identify the properties o f this force with his notion for an "expansive power” which
pushed people around the continent in order to “gain space for its own development.”^^
This force did what it had to do out of necessity to cultivate its own fulfillment. It
possessed purpose. It was teleological.
Turner may have placed these unseen forces as a ground to reality, but that does not
mean the way he expressed it linguistically could not also have resulted in a deflection of
the reality which he attempted to convey. The phrase “deflection of reality” refers to the
fact that Turner’s language could have inhibited his ideas from accurately capturing the
way unseen forces and the physical world interacted. All three examples given above
conformed to Burke’s “paradox of substance.” If one attempted to scrutinize the unseen
world, it disappeared. But if one relaxed his gaze, it re-formed again. How can one
capture this interaction between two worlds in historical writing if the interaction itself
eludes an easy grasp? And what if that interaction is at the core of a historian’s world
view? He must stretch rational limits even to reach for a simplified vocabulary to express
this interaction. If, as Burke asserted, “men seek for vocabularies that will be faithful
reflections of reality,” then it can be assumed that Turner did the same.^^ Turner had
some notion swirling around in his head of how large-scale historical processes worked
and he hoped to put it down on paper. Just as men seek for vocabularies that are faithful
reflections of their reality, so they must “develop vocabularies that are selections of that
reality.”’^ In Turner’s case, being a realist interested in a “mass history” that captured the
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development of the American people as a collective whole meant that his selections had
to point to a broader ground to accommodate all of their actions.^ Such phrases as
“destiny,” “democratic society,” and “irresistible attraction o f force” were some of his
selections to explain the visions in his head of what pushed a collective human society
westward across the continent The process of Turner’s thought itself in conceptualizing
what happened historically prior to his actually writing it down included the concept of
an invisible propeller behind the patterns of visible movement These phrases enumerated
above, as well as others such as “vital forces,” “expansive power, ”and “energy,” were
his selections to reflect the reality of that propeller. As Burke noted, however, any
selection of reality “must, in certain circumstances, function as a deflection of reality
In its selectivity, it became a “reduction.”^ The reduction in turn became a “deflection
when the given terminology, or calculus, was not suited to the subject matter which it
was designed to calculate.”*® Turner’s choice of language for metaphor, metonymy, and
synecdoche all fit into this category of deflection and improper terminology The
terminology of metaphor spoke of an invisible world when it was in fact supposed to
describe the visible world. Metonymy was supposed to describe the invisible world but in
fact couched its speech in physical terms. The terminology of synecdoche allowed the
subject matter at the macrocosmic level to be described from the microcosmic level,
thereby creating a disjunction between fact and perceived reality. For example. Turner
asserted that pioneer farmers and city builders were composed o f “individual atoms ”
Then he proposed that this mass of people was democratic. Implicit in any deduction
from this combination is that there are “democratic atoms.”*' This is a fallacy in the
same way that human beings may be comprised of chemicals and human beings can talk.
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but that does not mean there are “talking chemicals.”*^ But synecdoche condones such a
deduction. Hence, metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche all allow historical subject
matter to be discussed with a terminology not suited to explain that subject matter To
really understand what Turner was saying one would have to expand these reductions
back into their original meanings. For Turner, what did he actually mean by an
“irresistible attraction of force?” What was “destiny?” But such clarification is
impossible because, with these terms being tied up with the theoretical noumenal quality
behind physical substance, any concrete definition necessarily vanishes into thin air. That
suggests that the terms on their own can neither be analyzed or defined. They are used
but without any means to understand them. As for Turner, he included no explanative
commentary to decode them. That is why they were deflections of reality in his writing.
Defying analysis and definition, the inclusion of such terms by Turner meant his history
corresponded to the “unconscious productiveness” of historians in which they do not
know what they are doing, but they nevertheless employ terms because they are so useful
and protean that they serve as structural underpinnings to any and all possible
conceptions of historical action. The “unconscious productiveness” o f Turner’s
language, a mixture of realism and metaphor, corresponded to Burke’s “paradox of
substance.” Turner’s historical writing, as the thesis in a three-pronged dialectic, was
essentially a formulation for the way he approached that paradox. Turner’s frontier was
the historical expression o f a very specific world view for how noumenon and
phenomenon interacted.
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CHAPTER 4

ANTITHESIS
The publication of Henry Nash Smith’s Virgin Land in 1950 represented the defining
transition point in the move away from Frederick Jackson Turner’s “unconscious
productiveness” to a new philosophical and tropal style of historical writing. This new
style has been labeled “critical intellect. ”While the late 1920’s and 1930’s produced
some degree of preliminary shifting, those years did not produce a single defining
historian who would shape the coming age. Only in the 1950’s with the emergence of
Henry Nash Smith did that single defining historian appear. In a sense. Smith became a
prophet for American West historians because it seemed he had successfully challenged
Turner. In fact, American West historians embraced Smith because his adoption of a
nominalist philosophy and an ironic trope provided an interpretive framework supportive
of the left-liberal and Marxist political stances emerging in the historical profession by
the 1960’s. Smith’s own moderate left-liberal political position may not have gone far
enough for some of his more radical critics who objected that his assumptions of
“American exceptionalism, national consensus, and the existence o f the rational
individual” led to a “reaffirmation of the bourgeois capitalist state and its white male
elite,” but it is c^ar that his nominalist view for “imaginative constructions” and his
implementation of an ironic trope were typically Marxist.' This is not to say that Smith
was himself a Marxist or that the left-liberals within the profession were necessarily
100
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Marxist. It does suggest that Smith’s combination of nominalism and irony produced an
interpretation that was supportive of those shared intellectual, moral, and political values
held both by the left-liberals and the Marxists. The same philosophical and linguistic
structure lay beneath the historical interpretations of both groups. This is extremely
significant because it explains why the succeeding generation of historians adopted his
vision rather than Turner’s vision. Smith’s new intellectual system took hold precisely
because it contained assumptions that were palatable to the increasing number of New
Left historians entering the profession. Smith and the field of American Studies which he
helped to create have generally been described as a transition emerging from the postwar
enthusiasm of 1945 that paved the way for the full-blown cultural studies of the 1960’s.
The cultural studies of the 1960’s brought out the Marxist perspective of the New Left
which subsequently retained Smith’s position on the relationship between unseen forces
and the physical world because it overlapped with their own pre-established ideology.
The New Western History, gaining momentum through the 1960’s until it culminated in
Patricia Limerick’s official declaration of its existence at the 1989 Santa Fe “Trails”
Conference, adopted the same framework because it was leftist or Marxist oriented. New
Western historians felt comfortable with Smith’s world view.^ Smith’s world view
became the “Zeitgeist,” or spirit of the age, for the post-1950’s. It would be
oversimplifying matters a bit to suggest that the shift from Turner’s “vital forces” to
Smith’s “imaginative constructions ”was solely the result of a shift towards a Marxist
perspective, but this did constitute an aspect of what happened. In fact, a case can be
made for the correlation between a Marxist perspective and “imaginative constructions.”
The significance of this correlation is that the Tumerian “vital forces” were replaced by
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Smith’s “imaginative constructions” simply because the historical field was gradually
becoming rooted in an ontology that corresponded to a Marxist perspective
In this case, the antithesis of the three-pronged dialectic running through the twentieth
century derived its interpretive framework from how historians encoded the interaction
between unseen forces and the physical world into their work. Just because Marxism was
materialistic did not mean that it was not a metaphysics designed to explain the origin of
things. Marxism was as much a metaphysics as Philosophical Idealism or Vitalism. It
simply proposed that the origins of things was in physical matter itself as opposed to
spirit. That very assumption set the stage for the use of an ironic emplotment to deny the
figurative level in metaphor which assumed the existence of spirit. That assumption also
established a nominalist procedure for undermining the validity of spirit as the ground to
reality.
With Smith directly challenging the figurative level of explanation and the over
generalized ground to reality in Turner’s writing, he would also find himself confounded
by the “paradox of substance.” Just because Smith shifted away from “unconscious
productiveness” to a “critical intellect” which allowed the previous historical generation
to be critiqued and analyzed did not mean he eluded that paradox in making such a shift.
In fact, the adoption of an ironic trope, since it attempted to deny metaphorical
conceptualizations for unseen and seen worlds, centralized the relationship between
noumenon and phenomenon at the core of Smith’s work. Smith’s Virgin Land would not
stand or fall based on its presentation of historical fact; it would stand or fall based on
whether subsequent scholars agreed with his ironic way of re-arranging the relationship
between noumenon and phenomenon. This is true because it is the philosophical and
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tropal arrangement for noumenon and phenomenon that leads the historian to his ultimate
interpretation for historical fact. Later historians gave their support to Smith’s
philosophical and tropal arrangement because it essentially encoded into history a New
Left moral and political position. Donald Worster, the leading Marxist New West
historian of the 1970’s and 1980’s, embraced Smith’s linguistic style in constructing his
history. Like Smith, Worster used this new linguistic style to reorganize the ways in
which one thought about the relationship between noumenon and phenomenon. That
revised formulation for how these two worlds interacted necessarily led to a revised
interpretation for what was the meaning of any particular historical action. Physical
events were being re-interpreted at figurative levels through Hayden White’s
“preconceptual” ways of thinking long before historians resorted to any physical facts in
support of their case. As such, dealing with figurative levels of thought placed Smith and
Worster into a head-on collision with “the paradox of substance.” For the most part, the
integrity of Smith’s and Worster’s work survived the collision. “Critical intellect” would
remain dominant as the antithesis to Turner’s thesis from the 19S0’s through the 1980’s.
But the fact that irony was supposed to be a trope that could be utilized to see through the
flaws of metaphor and yet itself became embroiled in the confusion of a “paradox of
substance ”would lead to the eventual downfall of “critical intellect” as the definitive tool
for historical interpretation.

Henry Nash Smith
There is no better place to start to see the shift from “unconscious productiveness” to
“critical intellect” than in the 1969 twentieth anniversary preface o f Henry Nash Smith’s
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Virgin Land. By this time, the distinctions between the two schools of thought were
becoming sufficiently pronounced for Smith to recognize that his own work, originally
published in 1950, had only been a rudimentary transition bridging two extremes. In
Virgin Land. Smith argued that human beings as they encountered new environments
created images o f what life was and how it ought to be. These images subsequently
impinged on how human beings decided to transform the landscape around them. Smith
hoped to reduce the ambiguities introduced into historical works as a result of Turner’s
“unconscious productiveness” by determining just what was the relationship between
human thought and physical action. But later critics from the 1960’s and 1970’s arrived
at the conclusion that Smith was just as guilty o f vague definitions and an imprecise
terminology when it came to his “imaginative constructions.”^ They argued that, like
Turner, he had embedded a strong but false dualism between the phenomenal and nonphenomenal into his work. One would have thought Laurence Veysey was speaking of
Turner when he condemned Smith’s approach to the construction of myths within human
imagination, “The myth was narrowed, and all too soon, it became an abstraction
dictating as it were a vast person. The myth moved actively; it was the subject of many
verbs

Perhaps Bruce Kuklick’s criticism was the most damaging as it demolished

Smith’s distinction between mind and the physical world altogether and equated him with
a long line of misled “platonists” who adopted an inadequate theoretical position that
allowed “a set of eternal ideas existing independently of the individuals thinking about
them” to be placed in opposition to the physical world/ Critics were appalled that he had
exhibited physical “empirical fact” and “products of the imagination” on a “different
p l a n e . T o them, that dualism oversimplified the more sociological underpinnings for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

105

which they looked. Veysey wrote that Smith’s “bleak dualism” left unanswered a most
basic question; “why certain ‘myths’ and not others should arise in a particular social or
physical climate.”’ Smith had no answer because he had eliminated Turner’s “vital
forces” as the underpinnings of human thought and behavior. The concept of “vital
forces” would have allowed Smith to assert that human beings mythologized in certain
ways simply because these “vital forces” were energizing that particular region. Smith’s
relativism prevented him from adopting such a base while, at the same time, his over
emphasis on “collective mentalities” as opposed to physical institutions and their downto-earth structural processes (something which he regretted later) denied him the more
materialist base required by his later peers.* Smith had not altogether given up realism at
the same time he was fighting against it. That meant Smith was a man caught between
two worlds—the one going out and the other coming in. What the preface to the twentieth
anniversary printing showed was just how much Smith had in fact succeeded in bringing
attention to the problem of the relationship between noumenon and phenomenon in
historical dialogue. The profession had moved so quickly in the new direction that it soon
passed him, forcing him to back-track twenty years later and apologize for his own
shortcomings in establishing figures of speech that ultimately deflected the clarity which
he had hoped to give to the subject—that is, the precise relationship between the mind
and the physical environment. He apologized that his “metaphor of distinct planes was
too severely fixed and dualistic,” thereby formulating a reductionism, both in language
and idea, that prevented a more integrative approach to the two worlds.® The transition
into “critical intellect” which Virgin Land represented was recognized as just that. It was
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an initial transition and not the (ull-bloom world view that would eventually develop
from it.
Henry Nash Smith did establish, whether completely successful or not in applying it in
his own work, an objection to figures of speech that obscured meanings. He especially
objected to Frederick Jackson Turner’s “conception of nature as the source of occult
[hidden] powers ”because it depended on “metaphors that threatened to become
themselves a means of cognition and to supplant discursive reasoning.”'® He proceeded
to quote from a section o f Turner’s “Contributions of the West” in which a “beneficent
power emanating from nature” was shown “creating an agrarian utopia in the West.”"
The agent, this “beneficent power emanating from nature,” was in fact an undefined
“ennobling influence” that brought forth the type of American character that Turner saw
unique to each successive west.'^ “Ennobling influence” merely served as another term
for “vital forces.” Smith lamented that the difficulty with Turner’s concept of nature was
that it had become the source for “spiritual values.”'^ For Turner, these spiritual values
lay underneath all human ideals and physical action. On closer examination, it becomes
clear why Smith felt this way. In “Contributions,” Turner had merely replicated the
“divine, idea, and physical matter” structure that first appeared in “The Power of the
Press.” In fact, the closing phrase from “Contributions” repeated it exactly; “Let us see to
it that the ideals of the pioneer in his log cabin shall enlarge into the spiritual life of a
democracy where civic power shall dominate and utilize individual achievement for the
common good

All three levels existed here: spirit overarched ideals which

subsequently developed into responsibly directed human behavior. This was Turner’s
world view as opposed to a cognitively responsible philosophical position. As Kenneth
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Burke pointed out, when a world view attempted to encompass an ultimate ground to
reality such as a spiritual base (what Burke called “God-terms), the “concepts become
poorer in contents or intension in proportion as their extension increases, so that the
content zero must correspond to the extension infinity.”'^ The “vital forces,” being
interchangeable with the frontier and treated as universal and omnipotent, necessarily
reached the conceptual extension where they became undefinable. “God-terms” explained
“too little by explaining too much.”'® Smith maintained that Turner’s metaphors had
essentially become “God-terms ” that obscured historical meaning.
Laurence Veysey and Bruce Kuklick were correct in that Smith allowed his own
figures of speech to construct a world in which unseen images could be spoken of as
separate agents that overarched physical action, but they missed the more penetrating
insight that these “imaginative constructions” nevertheless were not “God-terms” like
Turner’s were. For Smith, “notions” of a northwest passage to India could “motivate”
human exploration or the “myth o f the garden ”could determine the future of the
Mississippi Valley.'’ Clearly, Veysey could see that Smith was thoroughly enmeshed in
the “paradox of substance.” He complained, “When all happenings in American history
have been rechristened in mythological terminology[that is, the relationship between
images and empirical fact], the end result is apt to be .

more elusive and synthetic than

clarifying ”'* But Veysey missed the most important point. Smith’s “imaginative
constructions ”were first and foremost byproducts of physical action. Only after they had
been created by physical human beings tramping westwards could they subsequently
impinge on their western institutions. That is significantly different fi*om Turner’s “vital
forces” that often preceded physical action. The difference is wide enough to argue that
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Smith’s unseen forces were not in fact “God-terms” like Turner’s. It is true that Smith’s
“imaginative constructions” sometimes “exerted a decided influence on practical affairs,”
but they were distortions (irrespective of his apologies and back-tracking) of empirical
fact, not the ground to it. '® In Turner’s case, when the historian returned to the unseen
forces or spoke of them as unseen agents he came closer to capturing an ultimate ground
of truth. Not so in Smith’s case. As one returned to overarching ideals he did not
encounter immutable spiritual values. Instead, Smith demonstrated that these so-called
spiritual values were actually constructed over a period o f time. They underwent change
and at no time were they any better or any more immutable than any other. The great
civic qualities which Turner saw as the productions o f “vital forces” were reconfigured
by Smith into trivial figures o f speech, no longer meant to be taken “serious, ”that
degenerated more and more into “exaggerated stereotypes.”^®
These immutable spiritual forces were at the root of Turner’s explanation for physical
action even when not specifically referenced To explain history with the inclusion of
“God-terms” such as the “vital forces” allows the historian to employ what Burke called
the principle of parsimony

Parsimony is a reduction in language in which the words

themselves only convey a partial explanation of what is actually meant First, the
historian postulates “a sense of things as powers or acts.'"^ Then he differentiates
between agent and act, making the “invisible soul” the agent and the “visible material
process” the act.^ Subsequently, realizing that agent and act describe the same thing and
that the agent is always present in an unchanging form, the terms for the invisible force
can be dropped and the description curtailed simply to terms of visible action. But the
invisible force remains implicit in the structure of physical action. If it was premised that
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the process of “raining” was the act of a God, it could be expressed, “the God is
raining ”^^ Under “the principle of parsimony,” the historian can omit the unseen force,
simply saying, T t is raining.”^^ It becomes burdensome for the historian to have to
repeatedly refer back to the causal agent which he has by this time taken for granted as a
convenience. In understanding the relationship between unseen forces and the physical
world. Turner’s frontier thesis has to be seen in this light. He described classes of society
rolling “one after the other” into successive western regions, progressively developing
from the savage to the trapper to the pioneer to the farmer and finally the coming of
industry and civilization.^ That description of evolution by Turner was essentially
parsimonious. The “God-term” of the “vital forces” had been set up at the beginning of
the essay as the agent of his historical action. It was a constant; it was always there. As an
agent, it was never supplanted by anything else. Turner quoted from Peck’s New Guide
to the West (1837) a “suggestive passage” which reflected his own views and stylistic
language.^’ Without the reduction of parsimony, the passage would appear as follows;
Generally, in all the western settlements, three classes, like the
waves o f the ocean, have rolled one after the other [because the
“vital forces” successively incarnated in each group]. First comes
the pioneer [because the “vital forces” incarnated in them first], who
depends for the subsistence of his family chiefly upon the natural
growth of vegetation, called the ‘range,’ and the proceeds of hunting.
His implements of agriculture are rude [because that is the extent to
which he could absorb the “vital forces”], chiefly of his own make . . .
The next class of emigrants purchase the lands, add field to field, clear
out the roads, throw rough bridges over the streams, put up hewn log
houses with glass windows and brick or stone chimneys, occasionally
plant orchards, build mills, schoolhouses, courthouses, etc, . . . and
exhibit the picture and forms of plain, fhigal civilized life [because that
is what the “vital forces” allow them to do]. Another wave rolls on
[because that is how the “vital forces” work]. The man of capital and
enterprise come [because it is their turn to absorb the “vital forces”].
The settler is ready to sell and take advantage of the rise in property,
push farther into the interior and become, himself a man of capital and
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enterprise in turn [because the “vital forces” have likewise influenced
him]. . . Thus wave after wave is rolling westward [because that is the
pattern of the “vital forces”]; the real Eldorado is still farther on [because
that is where the “vital forces” will appear again]/*
What has happened in this case is the agent has been extrinsically dropped but
intrinsically implied (as noted by the inclusion of brackets). At the extrinsic level, one is
left solely with the concept of “motion” of physical action, a reduction or parsimony of
the actual intent of the intrinsic level.^
In contrast, the reduction of a “God-term” as a function of parsimony did not exist in
Smith’s work like it did in Turner’s. Rather, Smith’s unseen forces competed with one
another, resulting in a mutability that disallowed them to be considered as an ultimate
ground. In chapter sixteen of Virgin Land, entitled “The Garden and the Desert,” he
demonstrated how the “myth of the Great American Desert” was overcome by the “myth
of the garden.”^® The “imaginary figure of the wild horseman of the plains” was
destroyed and replaced by the stout yeoman.”^' One set of intrinsic qualities which the
West was formerly imagined to possess was now replaced by another. The qualities of
the westerner which Turner took literally as perpetually self-existent were in fact a
purposeful manipulation o f images by human beings with an intent to produce specific
physical actions. Smith showed how Samuel Aughey and Charles Dana Wilbur, as
representative examples o f their time, helped to construct the “myth of the garden ” in
newer western regions so that it would appeal to people to emigrate. For them, the
success of a region depended on the men living there and their relationship to nature; it
was a huge “concert of forces—the human energy or toil, the vital seed, and the polished
raindrop that never fails to fall in answer to the imploring power or prayer of labor.
This new vision, carefully fabricated by its often less-than-worthy proponents, took hold
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of the American mind and replaced previous views. By creating a scene where these
“imaginative constructions” conflicted with one another and therefore changed each
other. Smith showed the impermanency o f the unseen forces on a figurative level. What
Turner believed on a literal level (that unseen forces were permanent things) Smith
demonstrated to be false on a figurative level (the unseen forces in fact were not). That
was Smith’s overriding irony in Virgin Land. It was the point at which he rejected
metaphor in favor o f an ironic trope. And it meant there was no stable unseen force
consistently grounding human action. That was the point at which he rejected realism in
favor of nominalism. As such, there was no "principle of parsimony” operative in Smith’s
work. This removal of the “principle of parsimony” was a function of his nominalist
philosophy. The “vital forces, ” as convenient mental fictions, had been removed because
they over-generalized individual particulars.
As to Smith’s irony, his entire story revolved around it. Some aspects o f metonymy
and synecdoche appeared, but they did not drive the piece. When such synecdochic
passages as “[James Fennimore] Cooper was able to speak for his people on this theme
[the relationship between freedom and law] because the forces at work within him closely
reproduced the patterns of thought and feeling that prevailed in the society at large ”
showed up, they were quickly subsumed in importance to the ironic trope.

Smith was

not interested in understanding how the individual (Cooper) related to his larger
community in terms of macrocosm and microcosm but rather how that individual was
caught between the endless contradictions o f his own society (between the opposites of
freedom and law). The ironic trope under-girded the entire contents of Book Two,
comprising chapters five to ten. He opened this second section with “Daniel Boone;
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Empire Builder or Philosopher of Primitivism” in which he worked towards the
conclusion that it was an absurdity to label Boone either as a “harbinger of civilization
and refinement” or a “cultural primitivist ”^ Instead, he argued, the “image of the Wild
Western hero could serve either purpose

The qualities commonly associated with

either the primitivist or the refined gentleman were merely constructed stereotypes and
not real at all. No one could actually possess them as they were envisioned; they did not
exist as outlined. The qualities of either character were the result o f an image that itself
was not real either. That meant the qualities could not be abstracted back to a source of
ultimate truth. For Smith, the human being was more complex than a simple stereotype.
Kenneth Burke explained how, as an aspect of the “paradox of substance,” people can
work on different levels at the same time. He illustrated how a “soldier may be nationally
motivated to kill the enemies of his country, whereas individually he is motivated by a
horror of killing his own enemies.”^® Defining the soldier in that way established a winwin situation if one were to employ the ironic trope in interpreting his actions. Irony is all
about showing how something may appear true at one level but false at another level. No
matter what position one takes in regard to the soldier’s real view o f killing, it can always
be shown as false when viewed fi'om a different level (nationally vs. individually). And
that is what Smith did in his example of Daniel Boone. The image o f Boone
corresponded to Burke’s role of the soldier only the national and individual motivations
of the soldier were replaced with cultural primitivism and gentlemanly refinement. Just as
the soldier could be defined at two different levels, so could Boone’s image. And that
was precisely the framework needed for the ironic trope to function. Smith set it up
perfectly.
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The successive chapters in Book Two operated within the same framework. In chapter
six. Smith placed Leatherstocking from The Last of the Mohicans in the same
relationship to freedom and law as Daniel Boone had been placed in relation to cultural
primitivism and harbinger of civilization/’ Leatherstocking’s “conflict of allegiances”
between the two was “truly ironic” because he could not possibly fully live up to either
one of them.^* In chapter seven. Smith continued the theme arguing that the “Wild
Western hunter,” descended from the Leatherstocking figure, could reach “full status as a
literary hero only at the cost of losing contact with nature.”^® As was demonstrated in
chapter eight. Smith’s new literary hero had to be transformed into a “canon of
civilization and progress.

But the virtues of this canon were no more tenable or

permanent that those associated with the canon of primitivism. That they were
fundamentally unattainable meant the canon could only degenerate further into a
ridiculous spectacle of myth. So argued Smith in chapters nine and ten. By contrasting
primitivism and progress on a figurative level. Smith was able to throw doubt on them at
the literal level. An individual might be motivated by both primitivism and progress (just
as the soldier was motivated at both a national and individual level), but he could not be
motivated by just one. For Smith to have admitted that would have meant the different
levels necessary for the ironic trope to function would be missing. Irony insists on
comparison and the relativism of that comparison. By comparing the unseen qualities
supposedly inherent in both primitivism and progress and showing them both as transient.
Smith eliminated the possibility that they could be placed as the ground to reality on the
literal level or what he referred to as empirical fact.
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Since Smith did not allow unseen forces as the ground to reality, he could only move
in one direction; materialism. Materialist doctrine generally asserts that physical matter is
“eternally existent” and “impenetrable.”^' For matter to be eternally existent means that
there is no room for a base beneath it. There can be no two eternals. For matter to be
impenetrable implies that there can be no “vital forces” acting outside the organism.
There can be no qualitative energies from outside the organism which it must absorb to
perform certain functions. In regard to the permanency o f matter. Smith drew the
distinction between empiric fact and what human emotion and imagination would make
of it. For him, empiric fact always came down on the side of physical expression. The
American West may have contained people who tried to create impressions of what it
actually was, but the American West was “nevertheless there, a physical fact of great if
unknown magnitude.”^^ The physical fact was reality; the unseen forces were not.^^
Smith embedded unseen forces into his text not because they pointed to reality, but
because they served as examples for how metaphor could be broken down through
critical analysis. His irony sought to disprove the validity of unseen forces taken on a
literal level. It took him to the same conclusion that Professor M. Boutmy had reached
before. America was not so much a democracy as a huge commercial company stretching
across the landscape. Smith wrote, ‘Tn view of actual conditions in the West, the ideal of
the yeoman society could be considered nothing but a device of propaganda manipulated
by cynical speculators.”^ That meant Smith had essentially utilized ideals not as
indicators of reality but as a negation of what reality was. In order to demonstrate that the
ideal was nothing more than cynical propaganda. Smith’s view required that the historian
critically analyze what was actually happening on the physical level. In its philosophy.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

115

this analysis of the ideal from a physical perspective was nominalist. This completely
contradicted Turner’s realistic use o f ideals, and hence metaphor, which was supposed to
point to empiric fact at the physical level. Smith’s use of ideals and metaphor did the
exact opposite; ideals and metaphor pointed away from empirical fact. Smith played with
“imaginative constructions” to subvert the validity of unseen forces in getting at reality.
This was both ironic and materialist.
In regard to the impenetrable-ness of physical matter, what annoyed Smith the most
was that the physical landscape and the human being could be infused with unseen forces
that gave them special qualities which others conceived to be real. After quoting Philip
Freneau’s early vision o f the American West, he condemned it for “bathing” the “stately
trees, the buffalo (somehow transformed into mild sweet-breathed dairy herds), and the
bland climate” in a “golden mist o f utopian fantasy.”^^ Smith has been accused by his
peers for being metaphorical but Smith’s criticism of Freneau, a criticism which
subsequently motivated the book’s entire argument, was in fact anti-metaphorical. Refer
back to Turner’s photograph from McDonald Lake Glacier Park for a moment Turner
had inscribed on the reverse side o f the picture, “F.J.T. With heart bowed down ” It has
already been explained how Turner allowed the physical heart to possess an intangible
extension which endowed it with qualities beyond what the substance o f matter had given
it. Smith was objecting to that type o f metaphor in this case. Freneau’s “stately trees”
implied that the physical tree was infused with an intangible essence that gave it a quality
not perceptible to the physical senses. Smith objected to this otherworldly identification.
As well, he marveled at how Freneau transformed the buffalo into “mild sweet-breathed
dairy herds.” For Freneau to have done so required him to extrapolate the existence of an
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intangible quality and then define the physical buffalo in terms o f it. That was pure
metaphor in which matter was penetrated by an unseen force; Smith objected to it early
on. If so, this seems to be the most direct inference that Smith objected to Turner's “vital
forces” and their inherent metaphorical structure.
By rejecting the metaphorical trope in this way, what Smith was really objecting to
was any world view that made an unseen force stronger than the physical agent. For him,
such “intimations reached beyond logical theory.”^ That this was indeed his view
becomes most clear when examining his argument against the safety-valve theory The
safety-valve theory maintained that the vacant lands opening up in the West would help
solve the problems associated with American industrial progress. The West would act as
a balance to the East by allowing the “vital forces” to manifest somewhere and
simultaneously relieve some of the pressures in the East As Turner noted, “society
seemed able to throw off all its maladies by the very presence of these vast new
spaces.”^’ Robert Atheam in The Mythic West hinted at what the safety-valve really was.
Depending on the topography, there was vertical “space” and/or horizontal “space.”^*
Mountains offered feelings o f sanctuary while the plains offered a broad perspective. But
the physical mass of the mountains alone could not affect a person that way; it was the
interrelationship between the mass of the mountain and the “space” around it—vertical
“space” in this case—that created the “expanses” that shaped men’s minds and
attitudes.For Atheam, “space” was an intangible expression tied into the physical
landscape and yet it was not the physical landscape itself. “Space” was the quality that
allowed the physical landscape to have its magical effect on people. That meant “space’
had to be some sort of energy that could impart its own spiritual qualities to an observer
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through his contact with the environment. Thus, the safety-valve theory actually preached
that an ultra-powerful unseen agent influenced the intrinsic nature of men The
subsequent change in their character would help them to deal with the new outward
problems of the industrial age In dealing with the safety-valve theory. Smith chose to
reduce this ultra-powerful agent to an “imaginative construction,” which meant it had
been transformed into a will o’ the wisp issuing from any average man’s imagination.
Whereas Turner’s “vital forces” were often not merely the byproduct of man’s mind.
Smith’s “imaginative constructions” were. Smith discarded the “pleasing suggestion”
that a “beneficent nature stronger than any human agency ”actually existed.^" Instead, by
placing the safety valve theory as a mere “imaginative construction,” he was able to show
that what certain nineteenth- century men and women believed on a figurative level was
not true on a literal level. The “empirical fact” was that the safety valve theory masked
“poverty” and “industrial strife.”^* Once again, this was irony at its most subtle. Smith set
up the relationship between “imaginative constructions” and physical action as metaphor,
but the dual levels of existence were treated solely as a useful mechanism for employing
an ironic trope that had as its goal the negation of metaphor’s ability to point to an
ultimate ground of reality
But was Smith’s severe distaste for placing unseen forces as a ground to reality just a
world view that he assumed to be correct or did his thought have a foundation in a
cognitively responsible philosophical position? Did he display a coherent theoretical base
for his world view or did he simply accept it because it simply seemed to be the right
world view to take on? Bruce Kuklick and Alan Trachtenberg criticized him for not
exhibiting a cognitively responsible philosophical position Trachtenberg wrote of
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Virgin Land. ‘Tts informing theory nowhere gets a theoretical exposition; the book
prefers to exemplify rather than th eo rize .K ucklick and Trachtenberg were criticizing
Smith (their predecessor) for precisely the same error that Smith had found in Turner
(his predecessor). Both Turner and Smith possessed an imprecise terminology and
framework when it came to defining unseen forces. Both Turner and Smith gravitated
towards a very basic world view conforming either to philosophical realism or
nominalism, but neither historian had defended their historical theories with a substantial
theoretical exposition. What they did instead was employ a trope that automatically
encoded that world view into their text as historical explanation. The tropal category of
metaphor or irony reflected their world view. What Kuklick and Trachtenberg were really
trying to do with their criticism of Smith was push him even further into the materialist
camp. Smith had gone much of the way, but Kuklick wanted him to go even further. He
urged scholars like Smith to re-examine the plausibility of their world views in light of
the work of Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind (1949). Like Karl Marx, Ryle argued
that there were unseen forces and a physical world, but the unseen forces were so closely
identified with seen forces that they were in fact the same thing He explained, “The
realm of the mental is not a realm of inner things, but a realm of observable activities and
p r o c e s s e s . T h e mental state was in the physical action itself and therefore unseen
forces totally disappeared in Ryle’s schemata This position would correspond to
metaphor except for two distinctions. First, metaphor allows for the integration and
separation of noumenon and phenomenon. Ryle’s schemata did not allow for such a
separation. Second, in the process of that integration and separation, the validity of
noumenon, or the spiritual world, is never denied Ryle’s schemata denied the spiritual
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world. Consequently, Ryle’s perspective was an even more materialist view than what
Smith had adopted. With Kuklick attempting to push Smith towards Ryle’s more
extremist perspective, the possibility could be raised that Smith was only the preliminary
transition figure between the idealism of the Progressives and the radical materialism of
the New Left
In later years. Smith did get support from colleagues arguing that he did have a strong
theoretical base underpinning his work. In the same way that Kerwin Klein defended
Turner’s world view by demonstrating that it mirrored the philosophical positions of
Hegel and Johann Droysen, so Brian Atterby argued that Smith’s world view resembled
that of Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey was much more materialistic than either Droysen or
Hegel and that view clearly matched Smith’s own. Dilthey believed that “our innermost
selves are formed from cultural materials; language, customs, laws, institutions, and
art.”^'* On the other hand, these “cultural structures” also expressed “the beliefs, habits,
and desires of individuals.”^^ Dilthey allowed things to happen both ways by configuring
a circular argument. Outward forms (physical customs, physical institutions, etc.) created
the inner self (thoughts, feelings, consciousness) yet in turn the inner self as the newly
acquired desires and beliefs of the individual subsequently transformed those “cultural
structures.” Nowhere was it necessary to deal with an ultimate ground to reality in this
arrangement because the circular argument was self-contained. This was Smith’s
theoretical base as well. Smith’s “iimer self’ or the human mind was a metaphor for the
outward forms of the cultural structures but it was not a ground to reality. In fact, there
was no ground or ultimate reality in Smith’s argument. Smith allowed the human mind as
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“imaginative constructions” to shape outward cultural structures and yet the mind itself
was a byproduct of those same structures
This was a significantly different argument than Hegel’s. Rather than having outer
physical forms and the internal self revolving around on the edge of the circle, he had
them raying out from an imaginary point. In the process of that raying out from this point,
a distinction arose between the inner self, or the divine part of man, and his
desires/beliefs. The inner self produced the desires and beliefs (according to its own
time-scale and need for development) which made the cultural structures possible. This
concept eliminated the arrangement where cultural structures and desires/beliefs re
created one another. Instead, the capacity of the inner self to replicate itself grew
consistently weaker as it rayed out through desires/beliefs into cultural structures until
those components were too feeble to retain an impress except in the most unconscious
way.^^ This argument placed the inner self as the ground to reality Unlike Dilthey’s
inner self, it was not produced by anything. Rather, it was the source of all historical
action. Turner adopted this proposition wholesale. His “divine” was the inner self, his
“ideals” were desires and beliefs, and “physical matter” was the cultural structures.
Turner allowed both desires and beliefs as well as cultural structures to degenerate the
further they were removed from their central life-giving source.
Neither Smith or Turner worked out the details for defending their acceptance o f one
or the other theoretical base. They merely assumed a position and then applied it to a
historical situation without really having a clue as to whether it was true or not. Dilthey’s
arrangement was more conducive to Smith because it did not assume an ultimate truth.
For Smith’s irony to function, he had to start with components that could be shown as
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untrue. That is because irony only exists by subverting the truth in opposing components.
An ultimate ground to reality would have demolished Smith’s tropal configuration.
Hegel’s thought was more conducive to Turner because it was based on an ultimate truth.
Since an ultimate truth was assumed to exist, the use of metaphor was validated. If an
unseen ground to reality existed, then it was only natural to search for it behind the veil of
physical matter.
With the publication o f Virgin Land in 1950, the door was opened for Dilthey’s more
materialist, theoretical base which Smith forwarded as his world view to supplant
Turner’s idealist, Hegelian vision. By the close of the book. Smith believed he had laid
down the “new intellectual system” that was “requisite before the West could be
adequately dealt with in literature or its social development understood

Indeed,

Smith’s world view became the dominant system of thought in the post-1950’s. The
construct of “vital forces ” disappeared as they were merged into the more ordinary
desires and beliefs of human beings. Human consciousness became a mere byproduct of
cultural structures. Unseen forces still existed in contemporary historical texts. It is just
that as “imaginative constructions” rather than “vital forces” they could more easily be
manipulated to serve the rising materialism of the historical profession. Now everyone
wanted to show how “the ideal yeoman society” could be considered nothing but a device
of propaganda managed by cynical speculators. The stage for an age of “criticism and
consciousness” had been set. Irony was its master trope and, under Donald Worster’s
Marxist interpretation. Smith’s “new intellectual system” would achieve fUll-bloom form.
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Donald Worster
In order to understand Donald Worster, it is necessary to understand the philosophical
and tropal structures underlying Marxism. Like Henry Nash Smith’s left-liberal position,
Marxism functions on nominalist and ironic principles. It has been described in the
previous section that Smith’s “imaginative constructions” were essentially about
removing a Hegelian “superagent” as the cause of physical action/^ Hegel’s view was
that human consciousness served as the mediator that allowed the needs and will of an
ultimate ground to reality to express itself physically. That meant the physical world was
a byproduct of unseen forces. In contrast. Smith embraced Dilthey’s more materialistic
conception that emphasized human consciousness as a mere byproduct of a physical
world. This view rejected the possibility o f “vital forces” moving across the landscape
inspiring human consciousness to interact with the environment in new and progressive
ways. In its method, Marxism mirrored the Dilthey-Smith orientation. As Kenneth Burke
noted, Karl Marx subverted the Hegelian relationship, “deriving the character of human
consciousness in different historical periods from the character of the material conditions
prevailing at the time” rather than from any unknown superagent

Burke continued,

explaining how Nikolai Lenin saw “consciousness, reason, and sensation” as derivative
of matter.”^ Friedrich Engels similarly held that “thought and consciousness were
products of the human brain.”^' Marxism did not allow for any ultimate unseen force
from which physical action was derivative. Nothing existed beyond physical reality. For
example, if Marx and Engels were lookings at the daily events within a city and they had
to discern just what was the historical truth for what went on in that city, their
conclusions would vastly differ from Hegel’s. That difference can be accounted for in
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their method for viewing the relationship between unseen forces and the physical world.
Take the issue of justice for example. Marxism would define justice along lines o f class
nominalism, observing the interactions between people within the city and noticing
inequalities between rich and poor. Class nominalism did not go as far as pure
nominalism in rejecting realism in that class nominalism did allow individuals to be
categorized under the generalized terms “bourgeoisie” and “proletariat” based on their
economic standing. Having noted this quasi-realist aspect of Marxism, Marxism
nevertheless predominantly functioned on nominalist principles. The notion of justice for
the Marxists was reached by direct observation of how the events appeared solely at the
physical level. Since there were so many nuances in the relationships between people,
many different examples of justice would exist but no overarching idealized construct of
justice could be extracted from the overall situation to cover them all. The city as a unit
could not be called just if there were cases of what appeared to be injustice at the
individual levels and subsequently the class levels. As noted, Marx did proceed to
generalize these individual levels into two class levels, but the result of the generalization
was still a “dialectical materialism” pitting two very physical groups of people against
one another as opposed to being a noumenal/phenomenal dichotomy as found in Hegel’s
realist generalizations.^^ In nominalism, each and every physical event would have to be
viewed on its own to ensure that what was actually being meted out was justice before
such a declaration of a just city could be made. In contrast to Marx, Hegelians sought a
higher concept of justice, an “ideal justice” derived at a “higher level of generalization,”
that allowed there to be a justice prevailing above and despite what appeared as injustice
from the limited physical perspective.^^ For example, some individuals might be hurt
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during certain historical processes, but justice was still being served because they were
part of a larger purpose, the agenda of an unseen superagent, which in and of itself was
just. But the Marxists countered that such an ideal justice masked a material injustice,
which meant that the ideal justice was not real at all. For them, higher levels of
generalization masked “disunities” within the generalization itself when viewed from a
different level of observation.^ That Marxist methodology denied the existence of a nonphenomenal superagent meant that their concept of justice was predetermined by that
denial. The way they viewed the relationship between the unseen and the physical world
dictated the way they moralized physical events.
Henry Nash Smith’s “imaginative constructions” confronted the theme of justice with
the same methodology as the Marxist perspective. Once the ideal of the yeoman society
with its vast expanses and free land had been removed as the higher generalization for
what was the American West, Smith could approach the issue of what the West really
was by looking at individual examples. And he too, though somewhat more loosely than
Marx, categorized these individual examples under a class nominalism for wealthy and
poor. His selection included a number of “cynical speculators” and therefore, based on
examining each one of the singular cases, he labeled the West as unjust .^^ Smith could
arrive at this conclusion because his “imaginative constructions” resembled a Marxist
perspective rather than an Emersonian one like Turner worked through. Emersonian
tendencies were fundamentally Hegelian when it came to constructing higher
generalizations for physical events. In Ralph Waldo Emerson’s essay, “Nature,” there
was a passage that clearly indicated he believed there was a higher level of justice than
what a simple observation o f physical events appeared to show. He wrote;
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The charming landscape which I saw this morning is undubitably
Made up of some twenty or thirty farms. Miller owns this field,
Locke that, and Manning the woodland beyond. But none o f them
owns the landscape. There is a property in the horizon which no man
has but he whose eye can integrate all the parts.. This is the best part
of these men’s Arms, yet to this their warranty-deeds give no title^
For Emerson, there may have been individual ownership of specific properties which
meant there would have been inequalities between rich and poor within that region. But
he did not label the region unjust because of that physical observation. Instead, his
concept for justice came from what he perceived as the “unifying idealism ”of the
region.^^ Whatever physical inequalities that existed were mitigated in light of how the
individual physical discrepancies all fit into a larger nobler context. Justice existed in the
fact that, while there my have been an unequal distribution of who owned the farms, no
one could own the landscape. The landscape served as the tool of a higher generalization
in this case.
At an individual or class level, the overzealous businessman might dominate the
physical scene but Emerson did not look to that when defining what a particular region
was like. And neither did Turner. Turner dealt with the issue of justice and the
inequality of physical wealth in a way that mirrored Emerson’s vision as opposed to
Smith’s. In the most obvious example that showed he believed historical reality had to be
defined in terms of higher generalizations. Turner wrote;
But the very task of dealing with vast resources, over vast areas,
under the conditions of free competition furnished by the West, has
produced the rise of those captains of industry whose success in
consolidating economic power now raises the question as to whether
democracy under such conditions can survive. For the old military type
of Western leaders like George Rogers Clark, Andrew Jackson, and
William Henry Harrison have been substituted by such industrial leaders
as James H. Hll, John D. Rockefeller, and Andrew Carnegie.
The question is imperative, then. What ideals persist from this
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democratic experience of the West; and have they acquired sufficient
momentum to sustain themselves under conditions so radically unlike
those in the days of their origin? In other words, the question put at the
beginning o f this discussion becomes pertinent. Under the forms of the
American democracy is there in reality evolving such a concentration
of economic and social power in hands of a comparatively few men as
may make political democracy an appearance rather than a reality?
The free lands are gone. The material forces that gave vitality to Western
democracy are passing away. It is to the realm of the spirit, the domain
of ideals and legislation, that we must look for Western influence upon
democracy in our own days.“
This passage demonstrated just how aware Turner was of the concentration of wealth in
a few hands. He recognized that physical conditions had changed so much that the ideals
which had explained American history before might no longer be valid. By solely looking
at physical conditions, one could argue that democracy was not longer just. But Turner
realized that physical conditions could often belie the truth behind historical events. As
pointed out before, he admitted there was an extreme materialism pervading the early
pioneer movements, but this did not make that entire historical process materialistic.
At the physical level, materialism may have been rampant among people. But above all
that there was an “idealistic conception” of vacant lands and a new order of things that
more closely and accurately defined what was going on physically

Turner’s

abstraction for an idealistic conception was a higher generalization like Emerson’s
unifying idealism. Only by understanding the higher generalization could one understand
the physical scene. So too in the instance with the concentration of wealth. Instead of
deriving his historical interpretation that American society was unjust based on the
physical reality that wealth was being concentrated among the rich, he declared one must
in fact turn to the “realm of the spirit” if one was to interpret those physical events
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properly7° Turner believed there was a higher concept of justice than that to which
physical conditions pointed.
What the Marxist perspective and Smith’s “imaginative constructions ” shared in
common was their denial o f higher generalizations. That higher generalizations could be
denied was only possible by using the ironic trope. On a figurative level. Turner assumed
that a higher generalization could be true—a higher code o f justice for instance. But his
detractors argued that once viewed on a literal level, the higher generalization was
negated. That was the “critical intellect ”aspect of irony—negating a previous assumption
by examining it from a different level of explanation. That was the method adopted by
Smith and the Marxists. The purpose for their irony was the intention to paint a relativist
and materialist picture o f historical events. In the case of the American West, this meant a
more tragic portrait o f the human condition was the end-result. To what else could the
breaking down of the idea that the yeoman farmer was inspired by divine forces lead?
Hayden White explained that the Marxist perspective heavily utilized metonymy and
synecdoche, but these tropes were subordinate to its initial overriding purpose, to
“translate Irony into Tragedy.”^* For White, tragedy was an explanative device used by
historians to allow them to moralize the end-result of their historical findings. A tragic
fi'amework proposed that not only were the past and present situations bad but the future
would be even worse. The only consolation was that the agent viewing the scene of
desolation could at least learn something fi’om the experience. If irony was essentially
about de-establishing the validity of higher generalizations and tragedy was the end result
of that ironic procedure, that meant tragedy was the byproduct of how historians
theorized about the relationship between noumenon and phenomenon. Tragedy resulted
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simply because the historian removed higher generalizations (concepts that could exist
independently of physical explanation just like the “vital forces” could) from their way of
thinking. The best example is the one concerning concentration of wealth in the hands of
a few. Without a higher generalization for the concept of justice, the historian could only
arrive at a tragic conclusion. Simply stated, the widening gap between rich and poor led
to oppression and abuse. But if there were a higher concept of justice, such as that
everyone living in America received the benefit o f experiencing the vitality and energies
associated with a growing and rapidly expanding country, then the physically derived
concept of injustice was displaced. There was no tragedy involved from this overarching
metaphorical perspective. The New Western historians, using Smith’s “imaginative
constructions” and the Marxist perspective, never were able to disprove that energies and
vitalities did not make a region special; they only shifted to a different tropal category
that did not take these things into account because its concepts were solely physically
derived.
Donald Worster was part of that New Western history and he, along with colleagues
like Patricia Limerick and Richard White, paved the way for a broader acceptance of
Smith’s tropal shift. But why did these historians adopt Smith’s historical approach in the
first place? In part, the New Westerners would argue that it was accepted because they
conceived it to be a more historically accurate position than what Turner’s metaphor had
to offer. And they would admit to some extent, albeit reluctantly in a few cases, that its
acceptance stemmed from their own experiences in the protest movements of the
I960’s—which just happened to be leftist or Marxist. The 1960’s brought about a radical
transformation of the intellectual environment in the historical profession. Historians
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became more critical and self-conscious. But the main reason a new approach was
accepted was because the Marxist conception of how the interaction between noumenon
and phenomenon occurred allowed for “imaginative constructions” instead of “vital
forces.” Marxism’s ontology did not allow physical things to have an essence beyond
physical matter. Working from that framework, the New Western historians had no
option but to turn the unseen world into one big imaginary construct of misplaced hopes
and illusory dreams.
Donald Worster’s Marxist ontology gave him a natural conduit connecting New
Western history to Smith’s “imaginative constructions ”Marxist ontology was a
paradoxically complicated dance that needs to be examined more closely before simply
labeling it as materialistic. In fact, it allowed both for materialism and idealism at the
same time. Marxist ontology was materialistic in claiming many of America’s ideals to
be false, but it was also idealistic in that it only labeled those ideals as false because it
was combating materialistic interests. Marxism sought to free men of the “false bondage
of materials” at the same time it insisted “materials were all that existed.”^^ That meant
Marx’s idealism could only be expressed in terms o f physical matter and therefore,
though it pretended to be idealistic, that idealism never really created a dichotomy
between noumenon and phenomenon. It could be idealistic materialistically but not
spiritually. That is, the Marxists stressed the material basis rather than the spiritual basis
of man’s inner fulfillment. This paradox between materialism and idealism resided at the
heart of Donald Worster’s writings and served as the informing ontology that shaped his
historical outlook. He openly struggled to explain himself in his 1993 book. The Wealth
of Nature, in which he described his philosophical position as “antimaterialistic
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materialism.”^ On the one hand, he praised materialism and hoped to see “a little more
materialism of the right kind” enter “politics, economics, highway engineering, music,
and newspapers.”’^ On the other hand, he criticized society for taking a “narrowly
materialistic attitude” toward materialism.’^ Worster’s “antimaterialistic materialism ”
was nothing other than Marx’s idealistic materialism. Like Marx, Worster saw that man’s
inner fulfillment would come not by looking towards the spirit but from a “greater
awareness of the materiality of the planet, its limits, diversity, and dynamics.”’*
To be working from a Marxian ontology meant that there had to be a specific
combination of materialism and idealism in a historian’s compositions. The materialist
aspect had to concur that everything was ultimately derived from physical matter.
Physical matter was the basic building block of the universe and the only essence of
being. Since spirit had been denied in that initial premise, Marxist idealism could only
refer to the states of physical matter. Marxism was idealistic in that it maintained that a
set of material conditions could be translated into another more refined set of conditions
through the transformation of the physical environment itself. Both aspects appeared in
Worster’s first full-length solo effort. Nature’s Economv: A Historv of Ecological Ideas.
Oftentimes when one reads an interpretation of an author’s work one learns more about
the perspective of the interpreter than the author under study. Such is the case with
Worster’s analysis o f Henry David Thoreau’s philosophy. In his section on “Mechanism
versus the Life Force” in chapter four, Worster wrote that Thoreau, like many of the
environmental naturalists, promoted an “animism, pan-animism, or pan-vitalism” that
argued the most important part of a physical being was its “anima, or vital spirit.”” At
first, it appeared that Worster would be forced to interpret Thoreau’s concept for “vital
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Spirit” in the same way Turner viewed his “vital forces.” That is, “vital spirit” and “vital
forces” were transcendent of physical matter. That would seem to make an
environmentally responsible position such as Thoreau’s dependent on a metaphorical
understanding of the relationship between seen and unseen worlds. But Worster was
specifically fighting against metaphors in Nature’s Economv. criticizing them for being
“nonrational ways of perceiving and communicating” that distorted accurate ecological
approaches.’^ Something had to be done; Worster was arguing that metaphors distorted
an environmentally responsible position and yet the man who he portrayed as the most
environmentally responsible was guilty o f those same metaphors. Ingeniously, Worster
argued in chapter five that this “pagan animism ”of Thoreau’s “vital spirit” was in fact
“radically contrary” to transcendentalism.” Worster interpreted this “vital animating
energy” as part of the material world rather than the spiritual one. It was o f the “earth
earthy.”*” By interpreting Thoreau’s “vital spirit ”as antagonistic to transcendence,
Worster imbued physical matter with the power of creation. All things might be derived
from this “vital spirit” but it was considered an aspect of matter itself. Transcendence was
displaced as the ground to reality. This meant that metaphorical conceptions of existence
could much more easily be treated as false idealisms. By rooting the vitality of the earth
and its objects in matter itself, Worster removed any need of spiritual forces and the
particular tropal language accompanying them. That ensured the materialism o f his
environmental history.
As to Worster’s idealism, he was caught in the same paradox faced by all Marxist
idealists. How can one insist that all beliefs and institutions are byproducts of their
material culture and yet at the same time impose an unchanging set of moral principles
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from which to examine those cultures? While Marx insisted that man’s beliefs were
byproducts of their physical conditions, he himself argued against being able to look at
history from within the value measures o f the culture itself For him, there had to be an
outside measure to accurately delineate historical meaning. But for there to be an outside
unchanging measure implied that all facets o f culture did not arise from transient material
conditions. How else could there be an outside moral measure that defied the changing of
material conditions? Hence, all ideas and beliefs except the moral measure were
generated by material conditions! Worster bought into this paradox in Nature’s Economy.
On the one hand, his intent was to “include ecology in the purview of historicism, which
holds that all cultural events, beliefs, and institutions are valid relatively, suited to or at
least rooted in their times.”*' He questioned the idealism of the scientific establishment
because in fact it catered to the needs of its own community rather than necessarily
reflecting objective truth. Once bom, ideas could “pursue a life of their own” and
“become shapers and molders of perceptions elsewhere, ”but that the entire framework of
the book showed ideas as false and emerging from material conditions conducive to that
falsity naturally led to a tragic view.*’ Rather than being regenerative as in Turner’s
interpretation, ideas created illusions which subsequently motivated people to commit to
wrong actions. On the other hand, Worster’s intent was to develop a “gentler, more selfeffacing ethic toward the earth,” one that must lead the historian to “judge the past
critically where it has taken us another way.”*^ That “gentler ethic” represented
Worster’s idealism.
Worster’s idealism for a superior ethical treatment of the earth was clearly not tragic
in scope. Instead, it suggested a message o f hope and reconciliation for the future. As his
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career progressed into the 1990’s, he displayed more and more of this ethical idealism
which actually appeared to be anti-tragic. In one of his later works. The Wealth of
Nature, he indeed established the tragic circumstance where the “ecological crisis” had
become “//le crisis of modem culture,” calling into question not only the “ethos of the
marketplace or industrialization but also . . . the story of man’s triumph by reason over
the rest of nature.”** But rather than leaving the reader stranded without hope or
consolation as tragedy required, he concluded this work with strong comedic insight. By
the term “comedy” or “comedic” what is being referred to is Hayden White’s conceptual
antithesis to tragedy. Whereas tragedy envisioned a bleak unresolved future for society,
comedy placed a happy resolution at the end of its story. Society’s problems were
reconciled by its ultimate betterment. Worster maintained in The Wealth of Nature that
there was indeed a resolution to society’s problems. He proposed a solution in
establishing ultimate moral creeds forjudging sufficient levels of resource consumption
and economic growth that would contribute to competent restrictions once those levels
were exceeded. And, in fact, Worster recognized that it was “inevitable that such a shift
would occur at some point

All one needed now was the “new Adam Smith” who

would “reveal the direction in which we ought to fly.”** That was hardly a tragic
conclusion considering the tragic framework in which it was structured.
Hints of the same contradiction between tragedy and comedy appeared in Dust Bowl
and Rivers of Empire. His book Dust Bowl revolved on the irony that the noble ideals of
the citizens of Cimarron County, Oklahoma, and Haskell County, Kansas, were actually
delusions that worked against the inhabitants and the environment in the long run. The
concept of hope itself was demonstrated to be intensely flawed. Optimism could actually
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be a “form of lunacy.”*’ People’s responses to the environment had been an ecological
disaster. Their responses had primarily been motivated by themes of capitalist expansion
and greed that subsequently destroyed what held the land together—grass— and resulted
in the blizzard dirt storms. In his most ironic tone possible, Worster asserted that if plains
ecology was not a failure, then “success had a strangely dusty smell about it.”** This
insight represented the materialistic irony subverting the nobility of human ideals into a
tragic scene. But if the first 242 pages of Dust Bowl were ironic and tragic, the last page
was not. Something happened; Worster’s speech shifted to the comedic mode. In the
middle of all the tragedy made apparent by the ironic trope, he skillfully inserted his
comedic finale; “Man, therefore, needs another kind of farming by which he can satisfy
his needs without making a wasteland. It would be fitting if we should find this new
agriculture emerging someday soon in the old Dust Bowl ”*^ Like a rising phoenix
shaking off its charcoal ashes, the problems o f the old Dust Bowl society could be
reconciled in the potential rebirth of the right kind of society on its worn-out remnants.
No conclusion could be more comedic than that. Rivers of Empire followed the same
pattern. Throughout the piece, Worster shredded the mythical ideal that the American
West, which to him was the desert West, led to freedom and democracy. That optimism
was misplaced, argued Worster, and he employed irony to show that it actually led to
consolidation of wealth and empire. And nothing was “more certain in the modem West
than that the next stage after empire would be decline.’’”” That was a tragic supposition
drawn from the irony of subverting the value of mythical ideals. But, like in Dust Bowl.
he shifted fi*om a tragic explanation to a comedic one in the very last paragraph of the
book, asserting that if the desert West might be “relieved from some of its burdens of
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growing crops, earning foreign exchange, and supporting immense cities,” it might in fact
“encourage a new sequence of history” to “irrigate” the “spirit more than the ego” and
lead to an “incipient America of simplicity, discipline, and spiritual explanation.””' In
that phrase, Worster took on such Tumerian overtones that, if it was separated from the
larger context, one would think Worster was a comedic historian!
Something much deeper and more complex was happening with Worster’s underlying
contradiction than just that he could not make up his mind whether to emplot his
narrative tragically or comically. Hayden White has already been quoted as stating that
Marxism’s initial purpose was to translate irony into tragedy. But in fact White showed
that its purpose did not end there. Indeed, irony had to be emplotted tragically but,
ultimately, tragedy had to be manipulated into comedy.”’ A Marxist perspective could be
recognized because it utilized the ironic trope to run through the stage of tragedy into a
comic grand finale. That Worster bought into this transitional structure (above and
beyond his anti-capitalist rhetoric) is evident when he encoded the Marxist perspective
into his interpretation. The apparent contradiction of a tragic to comic shift, brought
about through the ironic trope, corresponded to Marx’s moral emplotment of history. It
was no contradiction at all but a way to use tropal language to moralize history along
specific ideological lines.
In his article, “Trashing the Trails,” Richard White boldly dealt with such themes as
irony, tragedy, and comedy, drawing a distinction between the Old West historians like
Turner who tended to write comedy and the New West historians who primarily worked
through tragedy or irony. That late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century
historians possessed a comic ideology was a sign of the times. Lewis Perry made that
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clear enough when he wrote of the period that the university and institutional culture
always held before them “a dimly-seen something towards which they stretched forward
their hands ’’”^ That “something” allowed for comic resolution; one merely had to grasp
it or move progressively closer to grasping it. In contrast. White maintained that the New
West historians of the late twentieth century either leaned towards tragedy or irony. For
him, Worster, the “best environmental historian of the West,” wrote tragedy as opposed
to irony, “Things don’t end well in the Dust Bowl or Rivers of Empire: we confront our
own fatal flaws ’’”^ But other New West historians, apparently less focused than Worster,
were, according to White, diverted by the “logic of their own view o f human-created
environments ” into the “far less satisfying mode of irony.””’ These ironic historians
“found people attempting one thing and very often achieving another.””* White’s
argument that Worster was tragic instead of ironic is difficult to accept for two reasons.
First, Worster’s Dust Bowl and Rivers of Empire were all about human-created
environments molded into his own view that the opportunity to extend capitalist measures
through the conquest of an arid environment by technological made-made innovations led
to tyrarmy and monopolization. That meant the structural content of Worster’s work
focused on human-created environments just like the ironic historians. Nothing here
made him distinctive from them. Second, Worster’s logic was the consummate
expression of showing how people attempted one thing but how they actually achieved
another. That would make Worster ironic. Richard White’s error in not recognizing the
primary importance of Worster’s irony was due to what Gilbert Ryle called a “category
mistake.””’ A “category mistake ” is when two categories (irony and tragedy, for
example) are placed on the same level when in fact one belongs above the other. Ryle’s
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example was that the University of Cambridge belonged to a higher category than its
constituent colleges. He wrote;
A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown
a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific
departments and administrative offices. He then asks ‘But where is the
University? I have seen where the members of the Colleges live, where
the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and rest. But I have
not yet seen the University in which reside and work the members of
your University.’ It has then to be explained to him that the University
is not another collateral institution, some ulterior counterpart to the
colleges, laboratories and offices which he has seen. The University
is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. When
they are seen and when their co-ordination is understood, the University
has been seen. His mistake lay in his innocent assumption that it was
correct to speak of Christ Church, the Bodleian Library, the Ashmolean
Museum am/the University, to speak, that is, as if ‘the University’
stood for an extra member of the class o f which these other units are
members. He was mistakenly allocating the University to the same
category as that to which the other institutions belong.”*
Irony and tragedy stand in relation to one another as the University stood to the museum.
As Hayden White explained, the tropes (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony)
were the underlying source to methods o f moral emplotment like tragedy and comedy.
They belonged at a different and higher level. The overarching trope used the method of
emplotment to create the moral of the story. If Hayden White was correct that in Marxism
the ironic trope moved through the sub-categories of tragedy and comedy, then irony
stood to them as the University did to its colleges. Marxism bought into a pre-established
pattern. Seen in this light, Worster’s tragedy, being a product of his own Marxist
ideology, must be seen as the initial expression of irony. Irony produced his tragedy.
Subsequently that tragedy was ultimately transformed into a comedic explanation. That
meant Worster’s perspective fulfilled Hayden White’s view of Marxism as the translation
of the ironic trope into tragedy and, finally, comedy. Whereas the Old West historians

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

138

immediately perceived comedic resolution (and worked hard to prevent that comedy from
shifting into tragedy), the New West historians, just as much a product o f their times,
underwent an ironic to tragic/comic shift that replicated a Marxist framework in order to
get there
This tragic/comic shift was essentially a byproduct of Marxism’s idealistic
materialism or, in Worster’s word, to an antimaterialistic materialism. The materialist
aspect initially produced a tragic narrative, but the subsequent application of idealism to
the emplotment transformed it into comedy. Materialism producing a tragic emplotment
is best seen in Worster’s condemnation o f “growth,” “progress,” “the westward
movement,” and the “march of freedom” for being false ideologies hiding the flesh and
blood struggle of imperialist violence for economic dominance that was really going on.”
Like most Marxists, Worster objected to these types of higher generalizations because
they masked physical reality. By denying the higher generalization for the westering
experience to be categorized under one o f these four classifications, Worster was
employing irony to obtain a materialist result. A figurative explanation o f growth and
progress could be demonstrated as untrue when examined on a literal level—which meant
on a physical level in this case. The literal level allowed him to only take into account
the pleasures and abuses associated with riches and social position (because they were the
most directly observable) while ignoring the possible joys of a businessman starting an
enterprise and bringing a new creation to life. That a business enterprise could bring new
creative life to a region would have entailed a higher generalization (because it was
fundamentally an abstraction) and reaffirmed the ability of Tumerian “vital forces” to
settle within a specific locale. Instead, Worster presented growth and progress as
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euphemisms for some singular merchant getting rich through cunning manipulation and
the pleasures that merchant, and he alone (along with his class in this case), received
from his success. Interpreting things this way without a higher generalization allowed the
easily demonstrable selfish qualities of an individual and the inequality of monetary
distribution to be emphasized. This brand of materialism necessarily emplotted the scene
as tragedy. It did not take into account the joys of life that overarched physical action.
At the same time that Worster used materialism to denounce higher generalizations as
false idealisms, he was being idealistic in that he was only doing it to combat
materialistic interests. In this case, he opposed the materialistic interests of the
businessman. If Worster had merely revealed the businessman as narrowly materialistic,
he still could have been considered solely as a tragic historian. Tragedy does allow for the
enlightenment of members within society. But it does not allow for that enlightenment to
be put into concrete action. Concrete action based on enlightened ideas would inevitably
lead to the formation of a better society and that would contradict the forlorn note of
tragedy. Worster’s idealism asserted that a moral lifestyle could not only be
conceptualized but also achieved. That meant his tragedy was antithetical to his idealism.
Something had to go. And what went was the tragedy. The tragedy was replaced by
comedic resolution. Two examples have already been presented where Worster shifted
from tragedy to comedy at the very close of his book. One more example will be deemed
to suffice so long as it makes clear that this shift to comedy was driven by his idealism. In
“Good Farming and the Public Good, ”Worster’s essay began in the usual way by
undermining the validity of some generally accepted idea held by Americans. For
Worster, people’s “extravagant ideas” about how agricultural productivity should be
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pursued led to mythic constructions that ultimately ruined American farming and
damaged the public good.'”” The directly observable physical facts were that individual
American farmers were “drowning in dreary statistics: crop reports, production charts,
mortgage rates, energy bills, land and commodity prices.”'”' This was a tragic
emplotment and it was driven by the materialism of not allowing there to be a higher
generalization behind the farmer’s goals and motives for what they were doing or why
they were doing it. A business enterprise (in this case farming) could only be described in
terms of riches and social position. Or “wealth” as Worster defined it.'”’ By the close of
the essay, farming’s “undoing” by the misapplication of these false ideals proved to be
only a temporary situation. '”’ And if a situation was merely temporary that meant it
could not be tragic because the problem would eventually be resolved. In fact, Worster
maintained that the old farming ideals would soon be replaced by new ideals that would
make the world a better place. Society was not only being enlightened by these new
ideals but also becoming capable of translating that enlightenment into definite physical
action. That was the real goal of idealism after all—to translate its ideals into physical
reality. This agenda was inharmonious with a tragic emplotment. If ideals in fact were
translated into physical reality, the problems facing the farmers would be resolved,
tragedy would end, and a comic resolution be established. Worster wrote, “In the not-todistant future, farming may come to mean again a life aimed at permanence, an
occupation devoted to value as well as technique, a work of moderation and balance.”'”'*
Worster’s belief that his ideals could be enacted, and were being enacted, into physical
reality was the essence of an idealism that produced a comedic resolution pointing to the
creation of a utopian world.
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Just what type of world did Worster create with his comedic resolution? Interestingly
enough, Worster envisioned a nostalgic one where the moral future of America could be
found in “less progressive comers, often in rural neighborhoods where there is still along
memory running back to a time where farm folk got their living together and worked as
partners with the land.”'*’^ For him, the farmers from preceding generations had passed
down their noble way of life to the present generation and all society needed to do to
continue the American dream was replicate the transmission To prove his point that the
rural life of the past had once truly offered the American dream, he quoted
O.E. Rolvaag’s Giants in the Earth, a novel depicting Norwegian immigrants who
migrated to the Dakota prairie, bringing little into that “grassland besides themselves and
their old-country habits of mutual aid.”'"^ They struggled, endured, competed in
“friendly" rivalries, bought property, built homes, constructed fences, and even
“prospered” to a certain extent.'®^ In the end, what they achieved was a “wary peace with
the prairie, an affectionate and understanding peace, a peace that reflected the fact that
they were at peace among themselves.”'”* Worster explained that the challenge for
contemporary society was to “retrieve that commitment to community from the past,
from scattered pockets of rural life, and to find a modem expression for it.”'” Except for
the extreme overemphasis on social bonding, that was the Jeffersonian dream. And it was
the dream Turner had adopted from Jeffersonianism and preached throughout his career!
But how is it possible to rationalize this vision of comedic resolution in Worster with
the tragic irony in other works that flatly contradict what he has said while employing
this comedic form? A comparison o f “Good Farming and the Public Good” with
“Beyond the Agrarian Myth” is revealing. In “Beyond,” Worster admitted there were
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many myths about the West but the principal falsehood was the story “about a simple,
rural people coming into a western country. . . and creating there a peaceful, productive
life.”'

In this new place, human nature could supposedly “rise out o f its old turpitude

and depravity; sturdy yeoman 6rmers would have here the chance to live rationally and
quietly, free of all contaminating influences.”" ' These newcomers would turn the land
into the “garden of the world.”"^ But, for Worster, these newcomers would in truth be
hypocrites rather than redeemers. Their assumption of the new land could only come
about from the murder of Indian peoples, “Never mind that much blood would have to be
shed first to drive out the natives; the blood would all be on others’ hands, and the
farmers would be clean, decent folk dwelling in righteousness.”"^ These same examples
which Worster used in “Beyond” to confirm that the nobleness o f farming life on the
frontier was completely untrue were also used in “Good Farming” to demonstrate that
rural life was indeed exemplary and a fact. In “Beyond,” Worster ridiculed the idea that a
simple, rural people could move into a new land and create a peaceful, productive life. In
“Good Farming,” he argued that such communities did indeed move into new lands and
establish a “peace that reflected the fact that they were at peace among themselves.”"'* In
“Beyond,” Worster ridiculed the idea that yeoman farmers (private property holders)
could live undisturbed and dignified amidst the “contaminating influences” of economic
greed.'" In ‘Good Farming,” he argued that the farmers owned private property and
even built fences but were strongly dignified. In “Beyond,” Worster implied that the idea
that farmers could be “clean, decent folk dwelling in righteousness” was a myth because
they now occupied land taken from slaughtered and dispossessed Indians."^ They lived
the lives of hypocrites. But were not Rolvaag’s Norwegian immigrants in Worster’s
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“Good Fanning” moving into the previously held Indian lands of the Dakotas? And yet
Worster presented them as righteous citizens worthy o f emulation The contradictions
between the two essays are overwhelming and it would be hard to believe they were
written by the same man except for one thing They were written by a man working from
a world view that allowed for tragic and comic emplotment within the same interpretive
framework. Therefore, what becomes important to discover at this point is the placement
of the emplotment style within the essays themselves. One immediately recognizes that
the tragic irony in “Beyond” which treated the virtues o f westering farmers as a myth was
being used at the beginning of the essay to establish a certain moral tone. That moral tone
changed by the close of “Beyond.” In contrast, where Worster brought in the comedic
resolution of Rolvaag’s rural westering experience in “Good Farming” was at the end of
the essay. Of course, the closing comedic passages had been preceded by a tragic
emplotment. Thus, what this comparison shows between “Beyond ” and “Good Farming”
is that Worster was able to take the same evidence for a singular historical experience but
put a different moral emplotment onto it depending on whether he was at the beginning
or the end of the essay. The Marxist shift from tragedy to comedy dictated that one
moralize a historical experience tragically at the beginning of a piece but comically at
the end.
In comparison, Henry Nash Smith’s Virgin Land was emplotted in the same way as
Worster’s essays with an ironic trope transitioning from tragedy to comedy. That Smith’s
“imaginative constructions” and Worster’s Marxist ontology were the same thing should
be clear enough by now. In both cases, irony was used to deconstruct higher
generalizations. That initially produced a sense of tragedy. Worster acknowledged Smith

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

144

as the “first bonafide revisionist. . . the prophet of a new western history” who “first told
us what was wrong with the old history and dared to call it myth.”' " Worster also
mentioned something else of tremendous importance and it needs to be examined here.
Worster noted that Smith believed that, while the “real world” might not quite correspond
to those myths, it “may come closer to the ideal as time goes on.”"* In fact. Smith
showed that the real world did eventually come to match the ideal. History eventually
resolved into harmony. That was an idealistic vision for comedic resolution at the end of
his history. And it meant Virgin Land ended as a comedy. Up through the close of
chapter twenty. Smith pretty much stayed with a tragic emplotment. He had elaborated
fairly clearly how the various interpreters o f the west had distorted its true picture. What
really happened with the westward march was an irrefutable disaster. To get this point
across. Smith closed out chapter twenty with Herman Melville’s tragic vision from his
poem “Clarel.”
Might be the New World sudden brought
In youth to share old age’s pains------To feel the arrest of hope’s advance.
And squandered last inheritance;
And cry—‘To Terminus build fanes!
Columbus ended earth’s romance:
No New World to mankind remains! '
But in chapter twenty-one, the next to last chapter. Smith implemented his shift into a
comedic emplotment and he did it through the personage of novelist Hamlin Garland. For
Smith, Garland’s work marked the “end o f a long evolution in attitudes” that had at last
made it “possible to deal with the Western farmer in literature as a human being instead
of seeing him through a veil of literary convention, class prejudice, and social theory.”'^”
Garland had been able to see that the western farmer was neither the “yeoman of agrarian
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tradition, nor a picturesque rural swain, nor a haif-barbarian like Ishmael Bush, nor an
amusingly unrefined backwoodsman, nor even a victim of a perverted land system.”" '
The dilemma for what the western farmer really was had been resolved; he was an entity
interacting in a “direct relation” with nature that conferred on him a “certain dignity” by
enlarging his stature by making him a “representative of suffering humanity, of man in
general.”'^^ Smith believed Garland had seen the light and stated things exactly as they
were. If Smith had merely declared that “a new intellectual system was requisite before
the West could be adequately dealt with” without having actually shown that the roots for
that system had been put into place, he might have been able to retain his tragic
em p lo tm en t.B u t, in the figure o f Garland, Smith showed that the roots for this new
system had in frict been established. Ideals had been translated into act. That meant the
dilemma where no one seemed to be able to see western history clearly had been
resolved. The solution had become a physical reality. A new way of writing had been
established. That was comedy.
But Smith’s transition into comedy was just as clumsily done as was Worster’s in
“Good Farming.” That is, the shift from tragedy to comedy was full o f contradictions.
Nor was it necessarily Smith’s or Worster’s fault. It is tremendously difficult to translate
ironic tragedy into comedic resolution without running into contradictions. In
The Wealth of Nature (from which “Good Farming” is drawn), Worster admitted that his
work “may seem to reader to be filled with contradictory ideas that the author has not
quite reconciled.”'^'* He continued, “I realize, for instance, that at times I express a
strong sense of, and respect for, the order of nature while at other time admitting that
order is a troubled idea.”'^^ Worster did not seriously attempt to explain why the
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contradictions were there. The reason for these contradictions were that Worster was
translating irony successively through a tragic and then a comic emplotment. The seams
did not always match up during the translation because tr%edy was achieved by getting
rid of higher generalizations whereas the comedic resolution depended on them When
Worster shifted into comedy at the close o f ‘Good Farming,” he suddenly placed the
“overarching principle” of a “social bond” as the higher generalization to the physical
actions of the Dakota farmers."^ Individual physical actions were no longer judged on
their own but were interpreted in their relationship to this rather invisible “social bond,” a
bond that developed into an equally unexplained “bond with the strange, foreign land
here they settled.”"^ A bond with nature had developed in spite o f the plagues,
grasshoppers, droughts, and blizzards that had tormented the farmers. Physical events
would lead one to believe there could be no such bond. But that a bond was said to exist
meant Worster was indicating the existence of a higher level of justice and relationships
than what a simple observation of physical events appeared to show. From this deeper
level of analysis, the truth about Worster’s denial of higher generalizations (and hence
Marxism’s denial of them as well) was that he only denied them when working through a
tragic emplotment. When emplotting comically, they became standard fare in his
historical interpretation.
In short, it is impossible to get a comedic resolution solely from looking at physical
facts. Donald Worster’s reflections on the settlement outside the Friant-Kem Canal serve
as an excellent example. The physical conditions were dirty and desperate, offering little
comfort to such residents as the “old black woman sitting in isolation in the scanty
shade of a peach tree, her chickens scratching in the dust, a hand-lettered advertisement.
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‘Okra for sale,’ dangling from a stick.”"* Strictly looking at the physical circumstances
of the settlement, it would be impossible to emplot the scene comically. There was no
hope for a physical resolution to the daily life problems faced by the settlement residents.
But the scene remained a tragedy because Worster refused in this case to attach a higher
generalization to it. He wrote, “There is little peace or tidiness or care, little sense of a
rooted community.”"^ Worster did not usurp the physical conditions with the concept of
social bonding. Therefore, the situation remained a tragedy. Only by having placed the
ideal of communal bonds over physical facts could a comedic resolution be obtained. In
doing so, Worster, necessarily set up a contradiction in his works because in one instance
he was insisting that physical facts be examined independently of higher generalizations
and in another instance he freely subsumed them to higher generalizations.
In Smith’s case, the contradictions that arose from his transition into comedy are just
as apparent. Smith felt very comfortable with certain aspects in Hamlin Garland’s world
view."” As already shown earlier. Smith believed his own work mirrored much of what
Garland had already done. For Smith, Garland represented the escape from the illusory
world of “imaginative constructions.” Like Smith, Garland recognized the irony
involved in the yeoman ideal. It was a mask to hide the injustices of private speculators.
This led to a tragic emplotment because men and women at the individual physical level
were severely oppressed. Smith acknowledged that the “social theories which shaped
Garland’s stories were evident enough.”" ' For Garland, “land monopolists had blighted
the promise of the West; the single tax would eliminate the speculator and allow the
yeoman ideal to be realized.”'^^ This suggests that Garland’s work was rooted in an
idealistically materialistic anti-capitalism. A physical change, such as the single tax.
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could bring the ideal into existence (no need for “vital forces” here). That was
materialistic. But that the change for the better could happen at all was idealistic. Smith
faced one huge problem with this interpretation. What would prevent a critic from
arguing that Garland’s idealistically materialistic, anti-capitalist world view was merely
another false social construction? Why was not this world view simply another
“imaginative construction” created out of transient cultural conditions? If so, it too would
pass and prove to be unreliable. But that would have meant for Smith that Garland’s
vision was simply another failure in a long line of failures. Such an admission went
against Smith’s own beliefs that a new intellectual system had indeed been established
and that he. Smith, belonged to that system. Smith believed that a comedic resolution to
the interpretation of the West had occurred but how could he prove it if even his own
hero’s ideals could be accused of merely being one more example of “imaginative
constructions?” All Smith had to do was argue that Garland expressed an “emotion
deeper than his conscious doctrines.”"^ This emotion was “humanitarian sympathy.”""*
It supposedly allowed the interpreter to see beyond literary convention, class prejudice,
and social theory. In essence, it was the paradoxical, unchanging moral measure that
undergirded all Marxist ideology. But this was the profound contradiction in Smith’s
transition to comedy. For almost the entire book Smith had ranted against the existence of
a ground to reality that went beyond literary convention, class prejudices, or social
theory. By the close of the book, however. Smith had introduced a famous character
witness, Hamlin Garland, whom he admitted was working from a specific social theory
and yet supposedly bypassed these false constructions by adopting a particular moral
measure, or “humanitarian sympathy,” that acted as though it were a ground to reality.
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This moral measure was considered to be absolutely true-no questions asked. By holding
historical events up to that moral measure and observing them, one could accurately
determine the truth. Thus, in the tragic portion o f Virgin Land. Smith denied a ground to
reality as a function of his irony. When that tragedy shifted into comedy, a ground to
reality became an essential part of his explanation.
What differentiated Henry Nash Smith and Donald Worster from Frederick Jackson
Turner should be clear at this point. Turner put his idealism up front which meant higher
generalizations existed from the very outset o f his work. That these higher
generalizations existed from the start meant that his work was immediately emplotted as
comedy. In contrast. Smith and Worster put materialism up front which meant higher
generalizations did not exist from the very outset of the work. This materialism was
encoded in an ironic trope that initially sought to prove higher generalizations as untrue.
This resulted in a tragic emplotment. But, being human just like Turner, Smith and
Worster could not get rid of their own idealism and sought to make them part of the
historical narrative. Once that decision was made, higher generalizations became
necessary to capture that idealism. Consequently, comedic resolution emerged as the
ideals (their moral measure in this case) were conceived to be ultimate truths. Whereas
Turner began as comedy. Smith and Worster had to move through irony and tragedy in
order to get to comedy. That process of movement from irony into tragedy was
essentially a process of criticism and consciousness, or “critical intellect." The process
afforded historians the tropal language needed to analyze historical interpretations that
came before them. But once the same critical historians shifted into comedic resolutions
and higher generalizations, they were just as prone to the types of innocent contradictions
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as found in Turner’s “unconscious productiveness.’’ Comic resolution, generally working
from metaphor, metonymy, or synecdoche, did not possess the tropal tools (meaning the
ironic to tragic transition) to be critical o f its own efforts or another’s efforts.
Thus, the most important difference to be analyzed drawn from the works of Smith
and Worster as opposed to Turner is their reliance on “imaginative constructions ”which
replaced Turner’s “vital forces’’ This is because the theoretics of “imaginative
constructions ’ allowed for an ironic to tragic/comic shift whereas the theoretics of “vital
forces’’ only allowed for an immediate comedic resolution. Whether a historian chose one
form or the other served as the driving force behind that historian’s interpretation. Where
Richard White was correct was when he asserted that most New Western historians had
adopted the mode of irony with leanings towards tragedy. That meant the Western
historical field in the post-1960’s appropriated Smith’s “imaginative constructions ”
which called for the same tropal arrangement. Smith’s “imaginative constructions ”were
fundamentally the same thing as Marxist ontology. They both shared the identical tropal
form for emplotting history. This suggests that the New Western history was essentially
functioning from a Marxist theoretical position. In January 1993, Gerald D. Nash
published a short essay that brought attention to the fact that the post-1960’s, western
historical vision primarily reflected a “neo-Marxist fixation with class conflicts and
imperialism

Later in 1993, Nash expanded with a follow-up essay that criticized

those historians “who, while reflecting Marxist assumptions, failed to make their
conceptual fimnework explicit.’’"^ Nash believed that historians should reveal their
ideological positions in order to inform the reader about their approach to historical
scholarship. Nash received a backlash o f passionate responses trying to explain where he
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had gone wrong. Walter Nugent suggested that the theme of anti-imperialism which
appeared in New Western history did not solely owe its origin to the Vietnam experience
of the 1960’s .'" In a joint effort, Susan Armitage, Elizabeth Jameson, and Joan Jensen
argued that categories of race, class, and gender were part and parcel an aspect of the
social history fabric and not just a fad of New Western historians "* But none of Nash’s
critics were willing to take on his central premise; the New West historians and much of
the Western historical field were working from Marxist theoretics that pre-determined the
way they structured their historical discourse. Nash did not imply that historians should
discontinue studying race, class, or gender. Nor did he suggest that the only time anti
imperialist sentiments were expressed was in the post-Vietnam era. What he was insisting
on was that these themes had been ideologically exploited. With Henry Nash Smith, the
supposed prophet of New Western history, and Donald Worster, one of the leading New
Western historians, both employing a tropal configuration that was identical to Marxism,
Gerald Nash seems to have been on the right track.
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A NEW SYNTHESIS
In a general way, the shift away from Frederick Jackson Turner towards Henry Nash
Smith and Donald Worster was a shift from realism to nominalism. Once philosophical
nominalism had been embraced, irony became the trope of choice. What Kenneth Burke
recognized was that the “grammatical” operation for expressing a nominalist view lent
itself to one pre-determined interpretation.' It left the historian with “a world of
individuals, united only by monetary symbols and the deceptions of an idealistic
rhetoric.”^ In practice, however, Burke noted that most nominalists “tempered their
philosophies by an humanitarian afterthought advocating ‘joint action’ for some social
aim or other,” thereby creating a class nominalism as opposed to a pure nominalism and a
comedic finale as opposed to a tragic one/ What identified the emerging New Western
historians between the 1950’s and the 1980’s were these three nominalist themes for
understanding human interaction; a focus on monetary symbols, a condemnation of
idealistic rhetoric as deceptive, and a call for humanitarian social action. Marxist
ideology, being rooted in a nominalist philosophy, was driven by these three major
themes. The New Western history, also functioning from nominalism, naturally
developed correspondences with Marxism, even in cases where the historian himself may
not have been overtly Marxist. In regard to Smith and Worster, their shift to nominalism
signified that they had adopted a grammatical procedure which directed the way human
160
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relationships were described in terms of money and idealistic deception For them, these
were the unifying features beneath human interaction.
If one is to find the point at which American West historians transitioned out of
nominalism and irony back into realism and metaphor, one must look for that point in
historical writing at which an alternate unifying force (one akin to Turner’s “vital forces”
as opposed to themes of money, idealistic deception, and humanitarian social action) was
placed underneath human interaction. Such a moment occurred in William Cronon’s
Nature’s Metropolis (1991). Cronon, still working from a nominalist perspective, was
attempting to unify the concept of city and country by breaking down the economic
market relations for grain, lumber, and meat production between the two Illinois regions.
In essence, he was trying to do the impossible—to unify things while using a philosophy
that proceeded by breaking them down The inevitable happened. Amidst all the irony
and tragedy of a typical New Western historian, he slipped momentarily into metaphor.
In doing so, he placed an alternate unifying force beneath human action; “energy.” In that
moment, and only in that moment, Cronon unified city and country.
The existence of that moment where city and country became unified owed itself to
the temporary cessation o f Cronon’s otherwise typical nominalist procedures. What
emerged, even if for only a brief instant, was the metaphor of realism. On a realist level,
the concept of “energy” became the ground to reality underlying all human action. This
differed from previous nominalist conceptions of monetary symbols and idealistic
deception because, unlike them, “energy” was not created by human activity. Instead,
“energy” directed and caused human activity. On a metaphorical level, a physical object
could be described in terms of its own physical qualities or in terms of its being “energy ”
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A physical object was both abstract and concrete at the same time Cronon made no
attempt to break down the concept of “energy’ into its component parts to find out if it
was a valid historical tool. His failure to do this signified a lapse in his nominalism. The
value of “energy” as a concept was left unexplored, taken for granted. Taking this
concept for granted was the point at which “critical intellect” stopped and “unconscious
productiveness” began.
If Cronon’s short foray into metaphor had remained an isolated instance, there would
be no reason to take note of it. But the fact that subsequent leading New Western
historians, such as Richard White in The Organic Machine and Elliott West in
The Contested Plains, centered the theme o f “energy” at the core of their work suggests
there was a larger transition emerging. From a philosophical and linguistic standpoint,
that transition was taking American West history back to its Tumerian roots, the “vital
forces.” Only now the “vital forces” were labeled “energy.” That the name was changed
supposedly made the use of a noumenal force in historical explanation professionally
acceptable, but, in truth, the concept of “energy” conformed to the same philosophical
and tropal style for which Turner’s writings had been so harshly condemned. What
Cronon, White, and West ended up with was a new synthesis for the dialectic between
“unconscious productiveness” and “critical intellect,” one which took into account the
left-liberal morality of Smith’s “myth and symbol” school while at the same time shifting
into metaphorical expression that, by allowing both noumenon and phenomenon to
legitimately exist as possible explanative forms, usurped the strategic importance of the
ironic trope in defining the interpretive content of historical text.
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William Cronon
In Nature’s Metropolis. William Cronon adopted a nominalist strategy that warned
against higher generalizations, reduced events to monetary symbols and deceptions of
idealistic rhetoric, and encouraged humanitarian social action for what he considered a
viable world view Like Smith and Worster, he did this primarily through an ironic trope
and a tragic emplotment. At the same time, however, his mind also gave play to the fact
that realist abstractions deserved a place in history. They could not be entirely ignored. It
was this contradiction that gave Nature’s Metropolis its tension, served as its driving
force, and ultimately led Cronon into metaphor. The contradiction arose because Cronon
tried to merge city and country into a single region, an act which fundamentally required
the metaphor of the realists, through an examination of capital, or the monetary symbols
of the nominalists/ This conceptual framework was a complex dialectic that demanded
an essentially Tumerian resolution to the apparent contradiction.
For that resolution to have been Tumerian meant that Cronon must have come down
on the side of realism. If so, how could that be reconciled with his nominalist proofs that
refuted the validity of higher generalizations and so-called idealistic rhetoric? The answer
lies in the nature of realism itself. To understand the nature of realism better requires a
brief statement of Henri Bergson’s conclusions about how the human mind worked.
Granted, Bergson was a product of his times, writing in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries and adhering to the Vitalist principles of his period. But what he said
about how the human mind functioned has especial relevance to the topic at hand.
Bergson recognized two different mechanisms of the mind; intellect and intuition
(instinct in the animals). When the mind was confronted with a particular task to solve, it
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either proceeded through intellect or intuition. If the mind adopted the mode of intellect,
it operated by breaking down the subject matter into smaller and smaller, more and more
complex parts. Intellect could only lead to greater and greater substratums of
heterogeneous division. Each step of the way was carefully thought out and orchestrated.
On the other hand, the mode of intuition was a process o f immediate action. The mind
took a leap of faith in asserting a perceived reality to be truth. The result was
homogeneity, the reaching of a conclusion incapable of subdivision. No subdivision was
possible because the manner in which one arrived at the conclusion was by a leap of faith
and not by analytical steps. It was independent of the logical strands of thought that one
found in the intellectual mechanism/ For this reason, Bergson called intuition
“unconscious” and the intellect “conscious.”^ Therefore, the processes of the mind
traveled along two divergent tendencies that never met. Intellect was incapable of
reversing directions (it could only further subdivide) and intuition was incapable of being
analyzed as separate steps. Taking realism as Bergson’s intuition, it becomes clear why
Cronon’s nominalism, which corresponded to Bergson’s perpetually subdividing
intellect, had no effect on his metaphorical assertions drawn from that realism. Bergson’s
view of the human mind makes it clear why a realist assertion could suddenly appear in
the middle of an otherwise nominalist presentation. The reason is because there is no
point at which nominalism merges into realism. Only at the moment that nominalism
ends does realism appear. So, at the moment realism appears, there is no longer a critical
procedure available to recognize and discredit realism’s assertions. The historian’s mind
frame shifts entirely at that moment. Realism disappears just as quickly as it appeared
(since there is also no mechanism for it to gradually merge into nominalism) and the
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historian resumes his nominalist procedure as though nothing happened! Hence,
contradiction arises in the historical text. Cronon’s nominalism continually broke down
historical events into component parts. Its conclusions were driven by the ironic trope.
But nominalism was completely inappropriate as a tool for Cronon’s overriding goal—to
merge city and country into a generic nature. Nominalism, like Bergson’s intellect, could
not reverse directions; it possessed no tendency to unify. Thus, there had to be a point at
which Cronon shifted mental gears, slipped out of using Bergson’s intellect and into
using his intuition. Consequently, Cronon installed a unity underneath city and country
that unquestionably fused them together. That unity, Cronon’s leap of faith, found
expression in the metaphor o f “energy.”
The reason why Cronon’s concept of “energy” instead o f his concept of capital acted
as the real unifying source for city and country becomes clear from this Bergsonian
perspective. Cronon’s overriding goal was to merge city and country That meant a
dualism had to be resolved into a unity. As explained in Bergson’s terms, it took a
specific methodology in order to do this. That methodology did not proceed by
subdividing the subject matter into greater complexity, but by positing a subject matter
that was incapable of being subdivided. Cronon’s concept o f capital clearly failed to meet
the requirements of this methodology. Instead, it started with the mental perspective that
the flow of capital into and out o f Chicago could be broken down into more and more
detail. This perspective was based on the assumption that the details could be thought
through from step to step. In short, he utilized what Bergson classified as the intellectual
approach to history. But Cronon did confess that there was another viable approach and
even tried to use it.. From the outset, he recognized that he would have to tackle the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

166

immense problem o f “abstraction” (higher generalizations)/ On the one hand,
abstraction needed to be avoided. Things that were part of the capital flow like “prairie
soils, steel plows, grain elevators, feed lots, cattle cars, and railroad rates” could not
simply be reduced to a generalized man-made nature (what Cronon called second nature)
because it would distort individual qualities.^ This was nominalist in approach; it insisted
on breaking down the examination into smaller and smaller parts. An extreme, pure form
o f nominalism would have even required the cattle cars to be broken down into “index
figures”: cattle car #1, cattle car #2, cattle car #3, and so forth.’ On the other hand,
Cronon admitted the importance of finding larger pattems(such as in realism) in order to
make any sense of this vast, chaotic array of people and objects. Therefore, he proposed
that a study o f capital flows could also serve as a unifying source for city and country. He
argued that capital flows could contribute both to his nominalist and realist purposes.
Abstraction needed to be avoided and employed at the same time; this set up the
contradiction. The problem with Cronon’s procedure was that, as Bergson demonstrated,
the human mind could not work in two directions at the same time. The historian had to
begin his investigation either with subject matter that could be subdivided or could not
be subdivided. That choice determined whether he moved towards fragmentation or
unity. The way in which the mind worked prevented it from moving along divergent
tendencies at the same time. Since Cronon’s concept of capital was established as
something that could be subdivided (and therefore only lead to fragmentation), it could
not in fact merge the dualism of city and country into a unity. What happened in
Cronon’s case was that the concept of capital splintered the dualism into a “multitude of
overlapping market and resource regions.”'" The historical picture became more and
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more complex, more and more fractured. City and country had lost their defining
characteristics not because they had merged but because their boundaries had been made
so full of divisions that the lines smeared in the whirl of activity. This condition could not
be resolved into the simplicity o f metaphor but could only continue on its path towards
more and more subdivision. ' ' If Cronon’s metaphor of “energy” corresponded to the
methodology prescribed by Bergson for achieving unity, then that would explain why it
usurped the concept of capital as the unifying force connecting city and country.
In this case, one must take a close look at how Cronon used the idea of “energy.” In
his discussion of the capital that moved into and out of Chicago, he broke that capital
down into three main features; grain, lumber, and meat. Chicago was able to assemble
“shipments from fields, pastures, and forests” to generate monetary wealth more
efficiently and with greater “intensity” than other western cities.'^ Cronon saw value in
defining the success of Chicago in nominalist terms that interpreted capital as “nothing if
not the product of social relationships.”'^ For him, the flow of capital could not only be
broken down into these three main features, but it also had to be broken down into the
“tumultuous relationship” of human beings facing off with each other in daily life to
control monetary wealth.'^ Farmers and grain traders had to be juxtaposed with cowboys
and cattle barons, lumbeijacks and lumbermen. But Cronon also realized that the “labor
theory of value” could not by itself explain the astonishing rate of Chicago’s growth.
There had to be something else. In arriving at what was that something else, Cronon
transitioned into an entirely different methodology that did not proceed by breaking
things down but by installing an indivisible abstraction at the root of this chaos
of human events. That indivisible abstraction was “energy,” not capital. What made
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“energy” an indivisible abstraction was that “people . . . did not produce it.”'^ This made
it profoundly distinct from capital which was in fact a byproduct of human interaction.
As a byproduct of human interaction, capital lent itself to being broken down into its
component parts because human relationships existed at individual levels. From this it
can be easily seen just how much the methodology of nominalism is dependent on the
premise that people are doing the producing. What often happens when the subject matter
posited by the historian is not produced by people? What happens is exactly what
happened in Cronon’s case. The methodology changes; the subject matter escapes the
realm of analysis and assumes the role of a metaphorical absolute. It becomes the ground
to reality.
For William Cronon, “energy” came from the sun. In order to grow and thrive, all
organisms, including human beings, “finally drew their sustenance from the light o f the
nearest star.”'^ For plants, animals, and humans to act, they had to store the sun’s
“energy” in their own systems. All these organisms carried around with them pieces of
the sun as they went through their daily activities. Using Cronon’s phraseology, they
“consisted largely of stored sunshine.”'^ This was metaphor in the making. As a
conceptual tool, “energy” could be extracted from or collapsed into an organism’s
physical body at will. “Energy” and the physical organism became interchangeable terms.
They became so interchangeable that Cronon even asserted that humans could use “stored
sunshine” and “build a city from it.”*’ The implications of this statement are immense.
Take trees (a type of plant) for example. In their state of first nature (what Cronon
considered as untouched by man), trees naturally absorbed sunlight into their fibers
through photosynthesis. Poised out on the frontier edges, which Cronon labeled
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hinterland or country, these trees became beacons o f “stored sunshine.”^" Thus, “energy”
was the ground o f reality to first nature or country Nothing was placed underneath
“energy”—which meant it remained indivisible or not subdivided. Now imagine a group
of settlers marching out to those trees, chopping them down, and hauling them back to
the proposed town site where they immediately begin construction. These settlers used
the stored sunshine o f their own bodies to initiate the action of cutting down the trees and
assembling the town center. But, more importantly, they now constructed their city, or
what Cronon called second nature, fi*om the limbs and trunks of those trees—trees which
were still treasure houses of stored sunshine! Because the city was constructed from the
trees (those trees made up the physical matter of the city) and the trees were storehouses
of “energy,” the city partook of the metaphorical abstraction. The city became “energy”
itself. It had to do so. Since “energy” and physical matter were treated as interchangeable
and the physical construction of the city consisted of trees, or stored sunshine, the city
became subject to the metaphor of “energy.” Thus, “energy” was also the ground of
reality to second nature or city. City and country had become merged under the same
abstraction.
What Cronon had done with his metaphor of “energy” was return to a linguistic
construction that paralleled the notion of “vital forces” so prevalent in the late nineteenth
century. Like “vital forces,” “energy” existed behind and in everything. Like the “vital
forces,” Cronon had set “energy” up as the ground to reality. Compare Cronon’s
metaphor of “energy” to the metaphor of “vital forces” which he drew from nineteenthcentury literary descriptions. Of “energy,” Cronon wrote:
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This was the wealth of nature, and no human labor could create
the value it contained. Although people might use it, redefine it,
or even build a city fi^om it, they did not produce it.^'
In capturing the tum-of-the-century view of “vital forces,” Cronon wrote:
So attractive was the city it seemed at times to radiate an energy
that could only be superhuman. Called forth by the massed resources
of western nature, the city became almost a force of nature itself.
Mere human beings might try to manipulate or control its energy,
but never to create it.“
It does not take a tremendous amount o f imagination to admit these are the same
metaphor. Cronon became trapped in his own words. It was at this point that his
analytical logic broke down. Cronon ridiculed the metaphorical rhetoric of the boosters
and yet bought into that same rhetoric when not directly referring to them. Cronon’s
concept of “energy” essentially maintained that Chicago’s city-hinterland economy got
built because of the huge “energy” reserves in the western fi'ontier. The “vital force”
concept proposed the same tenet. The city was called forth by the vitality o f nature in the
West. In both cases, noumenon, whether “energy” or “vital force,” was allowed to
become intertwined with physical matter in a metaphorical interchange that unified their
division. When settlers brought “energy-laden” trees into the township to build a city, the
city took on those characteristics of “energy.” The situation was the same with the “vital
forces.” As the pioneers moved westwards and established their homesteads, the vitality
of the “energy-laden” trees became absorbed into their society.
Once one admits of the identical nature of the metaphors, there are implications that
follow such an admission. That is, the implications impose a revolutionary new vision on
American West historiography. If the “vital forces” functioned in the same way under the
same metaphor as “energy” and if the concept of “energy” is fundamentally scientific.
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then the Turnerian “vital forces” also have to be considered scientific. Turner’s “vital
forces” were not idealistic rhetoric at all but rather conformed to a scientific way of
speaking about histoiy which was considered acceptable to late twentieth-century and
early twenty-first century modems so long as the term was re-labeled “energy.” Some
hundred years after Turner’s frontier thesis the historical profession had come full circle
but with “energy” being the acceptable explanative form for the “vital forces.” The
paradigm that must be drawn from this is that science and metaphor can work together.
Scientific empiricism does not only have to work through the ironic trope to achieve
historical accuracy.
The issue can be made clearer with a short discussion of the scientific theories of
“energy” and sunlight. It only makes sense that if these scientific theories were
metaphorical then Cronon’s use of them in his history would make his own style
metaphorical. When dealing with such concepts as “energy” and sunlight, he would
necessarily construct history through the metaphorical trope. In this case, however,
Cronon’s speaking of a physical organism as stored sunshine would not be the idealistic
rhetoric so often associated with metaphor but it would be scientific fact. “Energy” was
scientific fact at the same time it was metaphor. How was this possible? That requires an
examination of the scientific understanding of “energy” and sunlight. Joan Solomon
acknowledged that “energy” was one of the most difficult concepts to grasp but it had all
the same re-invaded our everyday vocabulary.^ Nineteenth-century scientists found it
immensely difficult to pin down just what was “energy” and yet they undergirded entire
scientific premises with its existence. In spite of Thomas Young redefining “energy” in
the early 1800’s in terms of “work and power” (much as it is defined today) rather than
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any “mystical indwelling animism,” scientists by the close of the nineteenth century were
no closer to knowing what “energy” actually was than they were before/** Another pre
eminent scientist o f the time, Thomas Henry Huxley, confessed that no one understood
“energy” but that did not prevent it from being established as the foundation for all
scientific inquiry. This led one nineteenth century critic to speculate;
Thus the whole structure of Modem Science is built on a kind of
'mathematical abstraction,’ on a Protean 'substance which eludes the
senses,’ and on effects^ the shadowy and illusive will-o’-the wisps
of a something entirely unknown to and beyond the reach of science/^
Leading physicist Julius Robert von Mayer expressed his views on "energy” in a paper
entitled "The Motions of Organisms and their Relation to Metabolism” ( 1845). He
explained;
In truth there exists only a single force [ "force” and ""energy” were
still used interchangeably in the 1840’s]. In never-ending exchange
this circles through all dead as well as living nature. In the latter as well
as the former nothing happens without form variation o f force
The idea here was that “energy” caused all historical action to take place. As “energy ”
found itself captured in different types of physical experiences it expressed itself under
variable forms; electrical energy, mechanical energy, et al. But “energy” was still
“energy” irrespective o f its state of manifestation. No one could clarify, however, just
what that was separate from the forms it took on. For example, “energy” was redefined
by Young the “ability to do work ” So kinetic energy became the “energy” of a moving
object and potential energy became the “energy” in a stationary object. The more
“energy” something possessed, the more work it could do. Nevertheless, potential and
kinetic were unsatisfactory definitions of “energy” because they still only detailed its
forms. The term “kinetic” only provided the means to determine whether “energy” was
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present in something based on motion. The term “potential” only provided the means to
determine whether “energy” was present in something based on its mass. What actually

was “energy,” this thing that supposedly gave life to everything?
Twentieth-century science continued to cling onto the concepts of kinetic and
potential energy. In that regard, it came no closer to grasping what “energy” actually was
than in the previous century. But, in the early 1900’s, Max Planck revolutionized the
field, opening up another avenue of inquiry which eventually became scientific dictum.
What Planck proposed was that “energy” consisted o f particles. Just as physical matter
was composed of atoms, so “energy” had its own special corpuscular structure. “Energy”
was the quanta or photons that went to construct it—Almost. What Planck added was that
photons were actually “energy” multiplied by “time.”*^ That meant photons were still a
compound rather than pure “energy.” Photons were still a form of “energy” and not
“energy” itself. That is, certain photons had more “energy” in them than other photons.
Depending on where the photons were acting in the spectrum of solar radiation
determined their amount o f “energy.” Radio photons, with their long wavelengths and
low frequencies, carried less “energy” than X-ray photons with their short wavelengths
and higher frequencies.^^ A photon, tied up with solar wavelengths and considered to be
an “atom of light,” was now treated as a wave and a particle at the same.^’ Consequently,
its dual nature made it impossible to determine accurately both the position and the
momentum at any given moment. A photon was physical (or semi-physical at any rate)
and non-physical at the same time. It could be either depending on how one wanted to
describe it. In short, science posited the perfect metaphor; an object was both physical
and non-physical and yet it remained the same object. Whether speaking of that object
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literally or figuratively made no difference as to the truth o f the statements. Both were
correct. “Energy” was both phenomenal and non-phenomenal. That is what made
scientific metaphor the antithesis o f irony. Irony required either the literal or figurative
representation to be false. Science admitted of both levels.
The form of “energy” that William Cronon was dealing with was the “sun’s energy”
or “sunshine.”^" That is, he was interested in the “energy” of sunlight. From the scientific
perspective, visible light from the sun only made up a small part of the frequency
spectrum for solar radiation. “Sunshine” in fact consisted o f three components; visible
radiation or light, ultraviolet radiation, and infi-ared radiation. Each contributed in its own
way to the maintenance of life on earth. Beyond these components were the radio waves
and x-rays discussed above. Like radio waves and x-rays, these three components of
sunshine functioned under the rules of quantum mechanics. When light was absorbed or
emitted by atoms, it behaved like packages of “energy” or photons/' So light, or
“sunshine,” had to be represented as a wave and a particle even though the two appeared
incompatible. It too partook of this dance between the phenomenal and non-phenomenal.
The solution, explained Rudolf Kippenhahn, was that light simply could not be
“described in any clear-cut manner.

But he warned against allowing the vagueness to

lead to confusion. In actuality, he insisted, it all made perfect sense.
We should not allow ourselves to be confused because light
sometimes behaves like a wave, and sometimes like a handful
of seed. It seems natural to describe other things in different ways,
according to which of their properties we are concerned with
at the time.^^
What this statement essentially admitted was that light had two qualities, a physical
quality and a non-physical quality. And there was absolutely nothing wrong or
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unscientific about speaking of it in terms of either quality/^ Sunlight was a metaphor. It
was precisely that metaphor that pointed to scientific fact.
Cronon, in his attempt to unite city and country, slipped into the “unconscious
productiveness” of scientific metaphor which allowed for the interaction of noumenon
and phenomenon. His primary methodology was nominalist but this was an
inappropriate tool. Throughout his book, Cronon continued to function fi'om the premise
that nominalism was an appropriate tool and ultimately came to believe he had in fact
united city and country. But what he had actually done by this method was simply
deconstruct them into further division. To unify city and country required Cronon to
briefly slide out of the logic of “critical intellect” which was so deeply embedded into
Nature’s Metropolis and slip into an explanation totally divorced from that logic. As
already demonstrated, scientists have not yet successfully defined “energy.” And yet
Cronon embraced it wholeheartedly with no questions asked—much in the same way
that Turner embraced his “vital forces.” Cronon’s metaphor did not make him
unscientific or incorrect. It is just that, as science has shown, real life, seen through the
examples of light and “energy,” is all about an interchange between two worlds. When
Woodrow Wilson talked about the “vitality” existing in both factories and fields, it was
no different than Cronon talking about “energy” in the trees. While one could argue that
the metal of the factories did not store “energy” like trees did, one would be quite wrong
in doing so. In fact, metal can receive stored sunshine in its own right. For example, when
viewed from the perspective of the law of Conservation of Energy, metal can store that
“energy” just like any other object which is put into motion. If a man, who has absorbed
the “energy” of sunshine, pushes up on a lever that lifts a metal canister into the air.
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“energy,” the form of which was originally stored sunshine, is transferred to that canister.
The canister possesses “energy” just as the man does. Scientists do not really know what
is “energy,” but that “energy” is there in the canister is a scientific fact. The transference
of “energy” under the law of the Conservation of Energy implies that everything can be
embedded with “energy.” That is, “energy” becomes the ground of reality to everything
in the same way as Turner’s “vital forces.”
Just how much Cronon’s methodology for the concept of “energy” differed from the
more standard, anti-rhetorical fare o f Nature’s Metropolis can be measured by looking at
his discussion for how nineteenth-century Americans viewed the railroads. He found that
Americans were drawn to “two metaphors ”that would “recur endlessly in booster
rhetoric.”^* First, railroads were a part of “destiny ”(Burke’s concept of “necessity”
which Turner used so often).

That meant they were part of the natural order o f things,

thereby submerging any division between first and second nature into an ultimate ground
of reality. Metal and machine were no less part of this ground than tree or shrub. Second,
this ultimate ground of reality was in fact “supernatural. . . a mysterious creative energy
that was beyond human influence or knowledge

That the railroad was intimately tied

into this ultimate ground gave the railroad take a supernatural persona. William Cronon
objected to both metaphors on nominalist principles. His rejection of the first metaphor is
surprising because boosters had already done what he only hoped to do. Boosters had
already merged first and second nature, or city and country. What prevented him from
accepting it was that the first metaphor was so closely interwoven with the second
metaphor. The second metaphor asserted that first and second nature had been unified by
some unseen and unknown creative “energy ”which existed beyond human influence.
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This proposition was completely incompatible with nominalist principles that functioned
on the premise that humans did the producing, not some unseen force. Like a true
nominalist trying to establish a world view where the humans did the producing within a
fragmented, complex set of relationships, Cronon responded, “Those who shrouded the
railroad in the language of deep mystery, making it seem the expression of a universal
life-fbrce beyond human ken, obscured the social and economic processes that lay behind
it

Having dispensed with the metaphor of an underlying creative force, he continued

with his explanation to demolish the first metaphor. Cronon maintained that the railroads
as second nature were not indistinguishable from first nature.
Railroads did follow existing rivers and valleys to reach existing
harbors and towns—but not because o f mysterious environmental
forces. Such places usually offered the largest concentrations of
prospective customers for freight and passenger traffic. . . Nineteenth
century rhetoric might presem the railroad as "natural,” but it was
actually the most artificial transportation system yet constructed
on land.’’
Working from nominalist principles, Cronon disposed of booster rhetoric with a
methodical, consciously thought-out logic. This was “critical intellect.” But when he
employed his own metaphor of “energy,” he totally left such methodology behind and
transitioned into an emirely different way of speaking—meaning he no longer looked for
the nuances of the subject matter at hand. There was no bridge, no link connecting the
two methodologies. Nominalism could not /eat/into metaphor any more than metaphor
could /eat/back into nominalism. One or the other had to be given up at any particular
interpretive moment. Under Cronon’s metaphor, the “mysterious creative energy” that
was “beyond human influence” which had been rejected when writing from his
nominalist perspective suddenly reappeared as “stored sunshine.” The “universal life-
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force beyond human ken” which likewise had been discarded re-emerged as the “sun’s
energy ” And this “energy,” the same as the “mysterious environmental forces” which
Cronon shrugged off earlier, did unite railroad to the countryside in a rather “mysterious”
exchange of force and power which sciemists to this day do not understand. Scientists
have not claimed to have purged the world of “mysterious environmental forces.” So why
should Cronon? In fact, it was Donald Worster who so brilliantly brought out in his
essay, “Thinking Like A River,” just where science was really headed in regard to
“mysterious environmental forces.” He referred to the new scientific “Chaos” theories
which undergirded all historical action with just such “mysterious environmental forces.”
Specifically, Worster explained this direction for scientific research in terms of Edward
Lorenz’s “Butterfly Effect,” the notion that a “butterfly stirring the air today in Beijing
park can transform storm systems next month in New York City.”^ Scientists called this
phenomenon “sensitive dependence on initial conditions” where “tiny differences in input
can quickly become substantial differences in output.”**' Hamlin Garland’s booster-like
metaphor (so much like Turner’s) which asserted that the city of Chicago was like a
“magnet, projecting invisible lines of force that determined the dance of atoms” was not
deceptive idealistic rhetoric but twenty-first century scientific explanation.**’ All one
needed to change the course of history was a couple of butterflies soaring about the
“White City.”
There is no way to harmonize Cronon’s metaphor, and thus realism, with his
nominalism except to suggest that it represented a slip from “critical intellect ” into
“unconscious productiveness.” They represent the two directions in which the human
mind can work. Therefore, they represent the two ways that historians can construct their
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histories. And, in the case of Nature’s Metropolis. Cronon’s work signified the collision
point at which the metaphor of “energy,” clearly a function of “unconscious
productiveness” just like the Turnerian “vital forces,” would once again reassert itself as
the foundation of historical inquiry.

Richard White
William Cronon’s accidental excursion into metaphor ignited the emergence of a
neo-Tumerian revolution. Frederick Jackson Turner’s “vital forces” had been
reintroduced but now they went under the name of “energy. ” Over the next several years,
bits and pieces of the metaphor of “energy” surfaced in the writings of other American
West historians. This inclusion of metaphor necessarily gave their work Turnerian
overtones.
In 1992, Donald Worster published an essay, “Alaska: The Underworld Erupts,” as
part of his book. Under Western Skies. This essay, unlike most of the others, had been
specifically prepared for inclusion in the book and therefore had not been published
before. The significance o f this is that it showed Worster falling into the metaphor of
“energy ”at about the same time as Cronon, perhaps a little later. Amidst his usual tirade
against the “middle and upper classes” for celebrating ideals of self-reliance and selfdetermination, Worster dipped sporadically into the metiqihor of “energy.”**’ Worster
described the oil and coal reserves that capitalist entrepreneurs were discovering beneath
the Alaskan landscape.
Oil and coal were understood . . . to be hydrocarbons derived from
plant and animal material deposited in enormous quantities millions
of years ago. Alaska’s coal came fi’om fossilized plants, its oil from
fossilized marine life on the ocean floor that got buried by sediments.
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They represented the energy of the sun collected over long periods
of time compressed into dense, rich packages of power. To bum a
chunk of coal is to reach deeply into the past and tap the force of
the sun, not from a single moment’s radiation but from all those
millions o f years o f a rain forest’s growing, getting buried in mucky
bogs, being squeezed and concentrated by the pressures of the earth’s
crust. Tapping that fossil energy is like calling back all the protein
that fed all the dinosaurs on earth for a hundred million years and
gorging on it.*”
In the same way that Cronon described grain, lumber, and meat as stored sunshine,
Worster’s description of coal and oil conformed to the same metaphor. In both cases,
science supported the reality o f those metaphors. If Worster had dropped metaphor at this
point and returned to his usual mixture of irony and tragedy, one could disregard his
digression into metaphor as insignificant. Instead, Worster proceeded to use that
metaphor as an explanative tool for historical processes. Worster proceeded to argue that
a culture’s ideas and physical institutions depended on the amount of “energy” harnessed
by those people. For him, whites, as opposed to Eskimos, were “at once less fatalistic
toward the randomness of events and less concerned about performing their role in
nature’s cycle of renewal” because they had absorbed huge quantities of “energy” into
their society.*” An abundance o f “energy” in a particular region or community shifted the
ideas of the inhabitants away from fatalism. Once ideas had changed, it was only natural
that the physical institutions, such as the need for physical ritualistic renewal ceremonies,
would change as well. In essence, “energy” had transformed culture at the level of human
ideas and at the level of their physical institutions. That could only mean one thing. For
however temporary it was, Worster had for a short time shifted out of Henry Nash
Smith’s relativist circular model for the relationship between ideas and institutions into
Turner’s three-fold realist model which introduced a ground to reality as the third factor.
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Like “energy,” Turner’s “vital forces” transformed culture at both the level of idea and
physicality. Worster’s “energy” occupied the same place within his model as Turner’s
“vital forces.” That is, “energy,” like the “vital forces,” determined just how people
thought within a region as well as how they acted in institutionalizing a physical culture.
The function of “energy” within the metaphorical trope was to disrupt the relativist circle,
where all one could know about things was their relationship with one another, by adding
a third factor which served as a ground to reality. Ideas and physical events could no
longer merely be explored in their relationship to one another, but they now had to be
referenced back to this ground to reality.
In November 1994, the history department at the University of Washington, Seattle,
hosted a symposium entitled, “Power and Place in the North American West ”Originally,
the conference was conceived in terms of understanding why some regions came to
dominate while other regions lagged behind. The conference was to serve as the “means
of examining the power of some places over others.”**^ The initial title given to the
program was “Metropolis and Hinterland.” It sought to clarify how places had been
“affected by relations between capital and province. East and West, core and
periphery.”^’ Clearly, William Cronon’s ideas in Nature’s Metropolis inspired the
general tenor for this initial proposal. Why, for example, did Chicago outstrip its
neighbors in becoming the primary western city in the mid-nineteenth century? It was all
about “power.” The inhabitants of Chicago, when viewed as a collective whole, were
somehow able to harness enough “power” to shift human and environmental relationships
in their favor. In short, Chicago had more “power” than some other city. As Cronon
showed, by the 1890’s when Chicago’s inhabitants were no longer able to control the
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“energy” of western resources and the human relationships which directed them into the
city center, Chicago’s “power” diminished By 1893, more western areas challenged
Chicago’s supremacy as the chief city. Thus, “power” vacated Chicago and moved into
these newer regions. But the conference organizers discarded the “Metropolis and
Hinterland” title in preference to broadening the range of questions that could be asked
for how “power” and domination functioned. The organizers of the conference realized
that “power” was too ubiquitous to be confined to a narrow examination. In fact, they
recognized that “power” underscored all aspects of historical relationships/^
That “power” and ""place” were the themes of an entire conference attended by some
of the finest minds in the historical profession was highly suggestive for just how much
American West history had already begun to slide into the stylistic mode of ""unconscious
productiveness.” "Power” and ""place” were the key motifs at the conference and yet, as
Donald Meinig noticed, they had never been defined. They were acceptable scholarly
terms even though nobody knew what they were. Richard White and John Findlay agreed
that this oversight needed to be addressed. When they published the conference essays in
book form, they declared that, unlike the symposium, the book " need not suffer the same
handicap.”*’ And so they proceeded to construct tentative definitions for ""power” and
""place” following some of Meinig’s guidelines What they ended up with was very
interesting. Summarizing how the terms ""power” and ""place” had been used in the
conference dialogue. White and Findlay explained that they were " protean words.”’"
Simply stated, their meanings were versatile, extremely variable, and often changing. The
meanings of these words could not provide a clear-cut definition for what the historian
was trying to say. Togo beyond a ""starting point of a definition” would prove "difficult
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and unwieldy.”’* And yet the two terms remained as the main explanative tools for the
histoiy of the American West. Rereading James P. Ronda’s conclusion to his conference
essay, “Coboway’s Tale; A Story of Power and Places Along the Columbia,” one would
have thought Turner had done the writing if only “vital forces” had been substituted for
“power.” In Ronda’s words, “power is always unstable, unpredictable like the sudden
currents of a river in flood. And like the river, power is always in motion, sweeping from
place to place with restless energy. And as power shifts, it transforms places.”” As
Turner’s “vital forces” migrated, they too transformed places. This was the real reason
that Turner made a natural transition from frontier theory to sectional theory during the
course o f his career. Whereas frontier theory focused on how “vital forces” functioned

between places, his theory of sections focused on how “vital forces” functioned within
places. Frontier theory and sectional theory were complementary because they united
these two aspects of history. William Cronon had the intuition to realize that Turner
adopted sectional theory because he believed it could be used to ‘"explain American
history in much the same way that the frontier once had,” but what Cronon did not
recognize was that the “vital forces” allowed this to happen.” Turner’s own extensive
research into breaking down places into their component parts (Turner’s romp with
nominal ism)on sectional maps showed Turner that the fromier theory did not
accommodate for action within places. So he shifted to sectional theory because it did.
“Vital forces” were present in both theories. When the 1994 conference committee
expanded the program to broaden the usability o f the terms “power” and “place,” they
were basically replicating what Turner had realized years before. The theme of
“Metropolis and Hinterland” only accounted for relations of “power” between places.
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A Study o f “power” would be limited to city-country analysis (or frontier theory). But
“power” also was a key factor for what happened within a place “Power,” like the “vital
forces” undergirded both spectrums of historical action. And, like the “vital forces,”
“power” eluded definition. For these modem historians, they employed “power” as
though it was a ground to reality that did not need further definition. Its use signaled a
return to “unconscious productiveness.” After Turner had been hounded and reviled for
half a century for using the term “frontier” as an “elastic term” that did not require “sharp
definition,” it appeared that scholarly vagueness was now once again in vogue.’*
When Richard White and John Findlay compiled the conference essays, they
recognized that some attempt needed to be made to tentatively define the terms which
had been so prominently displayed at the heart of the symposium. The definitions they
arrived at, no matter how vague, require coimnentary. First, the term “place” did not
really refer to a place at all; it referred to a process. What is meant by this is that New
West historians, like Patricia Limerick and Richard White, had earlier criticized Turner’s
treatment of the frontier as a process rather than a place. For New West historians,
treating a physical landscape like the frontier as a process made it conceptually too fluid
and mutable to capture historical accuracy. Turner’s places, such as the frontier or the
West itself, moved or changed depending on what the people were thinking, whether
the “vital forces” still energized a region, and if western resources (including wide-open
spaces as well as thickly forested timber reserves) were scarce. For Turner, the West
might no longer be the West if the people of the region no longer demarcated their daily
lives along the lines of democratic principles and freedom. For Turner, people’s attitudes,
which were ever-changing, determined whether the West was created in any particular

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

185

place. A place changed based on how people thought within that region. In the book.
The Legacy of Conquest. Limerick opposed equating place with process. Place was to
be fixed. It could be mapped out. For her, the West comprised the present-day states of
California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado,
Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas, Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, and possibly Alaska.” The West as a place had a
“compensatory, down-to-earth clarity that the migratory, abstract fi'ontier could never
have."” Similarly, Richard White’s It’s Your Misfortune and None of Mv Own, a work
which reinforced Limerick’s overall vision as it attempted to synthesize New and Old
Western history into the textbook account of what really happened, argued in favor of
treating the West as place.”

In 1991, he wrote:

The geographical boundaries of the American West were not naturally
determined; they were politically determined. The American West is
that contiguous section of the continent west of the Missouri River
acquired by the United St^es, beginning with the Louisiana Purchase
of 1803; continuing through the acquisition of Texas, the Oregon Territory,
and the Mexican Cession in the 1840’s; and ending with the 1854 Gadsden
Purchase of the lands between the Gila River and the present Mexican
Boundary ”
In this statement. White viewed the West as a succession of places rather than a
succession of states of mind in successively more western areas. True, the West was
“gradually created’’ as White asserted but, for him, it was gradually created as a place.”
By 1854 with the acquisition o f its last territory, the West was stationary, easily defined
by its political boundaries. The significance of White and Findlay’s starting definition for
place in regard to the 1994 forum was that it reverted back to treating place as human
process. Place became dynamic rather than static. Following Meinig’s suggestions, place
was now primarily seen as a “spatial reality constructed by people.”^ Place was a
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“human creation,” a creation of “sense perceptions,” and a “mental imposition of order”
all at the same time that it was a “parcelization of the earth’s surface.”^' That is, place
became abstract and non-abstract, seen and yet not seen. As Meinig noted, place was a
“transformation of space—an abstraction—into something more specific and limited. ”^’
This definition clearly was a return to a trope where there was a metaphorical extension
back fi'om the intangible into a tangible equivalent. This definition neutralized the ironic
trope by allowing both the figurative and the literal to make up historical activity. In fact,
historical truth was this relationship between noumenal and phenomenal. Place became
process again because it was the relationship between people’s ideas and the physical
landscape that defined a region. As these relationships changed, place changed. While the
New West historians’ view of place may have differed on certain details fi'om Frederick
Jackson Turner, the main point to be stressed is that, once again, emphasis was being
given to fluid processes rather than static places in explaining western history.
In regard to the term “power,” White and Findlay offered the “provisional idea that
power was the ability of an agent—be it a person, a corporation, the state or some other
entity—to influence either people or natural forces to act according to that agent’s desire
or will.’” ’ This definition implied two things. First, “power” was essentially the
transference of “energy” or “energy” in motion. Something had to possess “energy ”to be
powerful. In reference to the previous example of the human being pressing the lever to
raise the metal canister, the human, as an agent, had to exert “energy” to press down the
lever. The lever, as an agent, subsequently used “energy” to raise the canister. The
canister, having been influenced by both the “energy” of the person and the lever, now
possessed additional “energy” o f its own. It had been influenced by the “power” of the
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agents. Therefore, the first implication of the definition for “power” was that “power”
and “energy” were the same thing. To have “power” was to have “energy.” Richard
White admitted as much when he later wrote in The Organic Machine (1995), “In English
the words ‘energy’ and ‘power’ have become virtually interchangeable .. To be
powerful is to be able to accomplish things, to be able to turn the energy and work of
nature and humans to your own purposes. ”^ If “power” was indeed “energy, ”that meant
it was prone to the same metaphors and uncertainties as the latter term. Second,
something could only possess “power” if it possessed “desire” or “will.”"’ This worked
fine if one only took into account the human as an agent, but what about the
lever? It clearly influenced “energy,” a “natural force” as White’s and Findlay’s
definition declared, to act on the metal canister. Did White and Findlay mean to assert
that the lever as an agent also possessed desire or will? Or, just as illogical, was the lever
to be considered as devoid of “power” because it had no desire or will? And, if that was
the case, how did the lever raise the metal canister if it had no “power?” The entire issue
was problematic. One could argue that the lever did not qualify as an entity. On the
surface, this is fair enough. On deeper examination, it is just as problematic. One needs to
turn to White’s example of a river, the main subject of The Organic Machine. For White,
a river is clearly an entity; something existing complete in itself, in its own right, a
subject having existence. Of course, a river really involves a complex set of relationships
with the surrounding environment. In that sense, it could be said not to be complete in
itself. But, using that argument, one could also insist that the human organism does not
qualify as an entity. So far, so good; the river is an entity. A river influences human
beings to act in certain ways. If the river’s current is strongest at its center, humans
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rowing in a canoe will be forced to skirt the periphery where water meets land The
center of a river’s flow possesses too much “energy” to be successfully (meaning
safely in this case) transferred to the humans and the canoe. But if they paddle near the
shore, the “energy” is less and can be successfully utilized. Thus, the river possesses
more “power” at its center that at its edges. This analysis brings to light a problem. White
and Findlay’s definition of “power” state that for an agent, which would be the river in
this example, to possess “power” it must have desire or will. For the river to have
“power,” it must therefore have desire or will. Stated simply, the river must have purpose,
the desire to obtain a result and which is kept in mind in performing an action. If a river is
denied purpose, as White later tried to do in The Organic Machine, then that implies that
the river lacks “power.” Yet it had already been established by the first part of the
definition that the river was powerful. To be sure, to tread the waters o f White’s and
Findlay’s definition of “power” and still remain afloat requires more skill and ingenuity
than to tread the currents of the Columbia River itself. The reason for pointing out the
difficulties in which White and Findlay got themselves into over defining concepts of
“power” and “energy” is to show that these terms were no more rational in the way they
were used than Turner’s “vital forces. ” Like Turner’s “vital forces,” they were used only
because the historian was comfortable with them, not because the historians who used
them actually understood how they impacted their writings. When historians used these
terms, critical analysis ceased to function and they became hopelessly lost in the
“paradox of substance.” In regard to the terms “power,” “energy,” “purpose,” “desire,”
and “will,” what did they really know of any of these things?
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Turning attention to the Columbia River is appropriate because no book, subsequent to
the conference proceedings, more embraced the concept of “power” than did Richard
White’s The Organic Machine. He substituted the term “energy” for “power” and used
the term as the primary tool for understanding human beings in relation to their
environment. William Cronon’s brief metaphor of “energy” had been developed into a
key mechanism for elucidating historical processes. What White intended to do was
“examine the river as an organic machine, as an energy system which, although modified
by human interventions, maintains its natural, its ‘unmade' qualities.”"" This meant
White was going to try to find a way to unite the artificial division between Cronon’s first
and second nature. And the way he would unite them, just as Cronon had briefly united
them, was through the metaphor of “energy.” He wrote, “What I have stressed are
qualities that humans and the Columbia River share; energy and work.”"’ For White, that
“energy” was behind both first and second nature suggested that man-made inventions
and intrusions could impact first nature and yet not transform that first nature into second
nature. That is, second nature disappeared; “energy” made everything seem natural. This
was precisely the Chicago booster’s view in the late nineteenth century; the railroad as a
man-made invention could natural. For the boosters, there was no second nature. Except
for his brief excursion into “unconscious productiveness,” William Cronon could not
come to terms with this view. In fact, Cronon mocked it with his irony. Little did he
know that, while that mockery was intended for the boosters, it would also have to extend
to the identical views expressed by his colleague, Richard White, four years later.
Richard White stressed “energy” and “work” as the unifying factors for human and
environmental relationships. As to “energy,” White accepted and embraced “energy’s”
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elusive quality, ‘T emphasize energy because energy is such a protean and useful
concept.’”* In short. White adopted “energy” precisely because it could not be defined.
The fact that it could not be defined meant it was an extremely useful tool since it could
be applied in so many ways. There was no need to pin it down in definition or limit its
application in historical situations. Turner’s “vital forces” were no more or no less
protean and useful than White’s “energy.” “Energy,” like Turner’s “vital forces,” was
fundamentally a metaphorical relationship between the unseen forces and the physical
world. The physical world could be abstracted into the invisible world through the
metaphorical trope. The invisible world could then be collapsed back into the tangible
world through the metonymical trope. Neither world was unreal, as irony suggested, but
each possessed its valid place in historical inquiry. White explained;
The flow o f the river is energy, so is the electricity that comes
from the dams that block that flow. Human labor is energy; so are
the calories stored as fat by salmon for their journey upstream.
Seen one way, energy is an abstraction; seen another it is as concrete
as salmon, human bodies, and the Grand Coulee Dam."’
As to “work,” “work” is to “energy” what “power” is to “energy.” Like “power,” “work”
can be described as having two aspects. First, “work ”is the transference o f “energy,”
which means it has the same dimensions of “energy ” Second, “work” is to engage in
activity designed to achieve a particular purpose and requiring an expenditure of
considerable effort. By employing the term “work,” what White implied was that “work,”
as the transference o f “energy” to achieve a purpose, undergirded all human and
environmental activity. But his use of the term “work” led White into the same problem
he faced when using the word “power.” If something did “work,” it had to have
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“purpose.” At this point, the logic for using the term “work” broke down for White. The
appropriateness of the term broke down because White did not “attribute either a
consciousness or a purpose to nature.”^" Yet, in complete contradiction to that statement,
he continually demonstrated nature, the river in this case, at “work” with purpose.
For example;
As we now understand rivers, they seek [emphasis added] the most
efficient and uniform expenditure of energy possible. Rivers constantly
adjust; they compensate for events that affect them. Where obstacles
slow rivers, rivers try [italics added] to restore an even velocity; where
the gradient increases or the channel constricts, rivers try [emphasis added]
to widen or build up their bed.^'
If one speaks of a river trying to do something and seeking to achieve something, that
language attributes purpose to a river. Rivers “seek” and “try” to achieve certain ends.
And, if a river has purpose, it, by definition, has to have consciousness. At the simplest
level, consciousness can be defined as being aware of one’s surroundings. Using White’s
expressions, the river is aware of its surroundings. Why else would it attempt to alter
them? Granted, that awareness may be significantly different fi'om what human beings
experience. That awareness may be severely limited. It may not be “socially organized,”
but it is nevertheless an awareness.^^ This awareness or consciousness is embedded in
the term “work.” Once again, one is confi’onted with a paradox. For something to “work,”
it must have a purpose. If purpose is denied to something, then the subject “working” is
no longer considered to be at “work.” If it is not at “work,” the what accounts for the
transference of “energy” that is going on?
There is no way to resolve these contradictions in White’s work except to contrast the
terms he was using with the world view he was using. Richard White was the product of
the 1960’s, 1970’s, and 1980’s cultural context. His world view was shaped by this
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context. As regards the historical profession, these were years of intense materialism. The
essence of materialism, as Kenneth Burke explained, was the elimination of “purpose” as
a historical tool.^ In general, late twentieth-century historians ridiculed cycles,
periodicity, stages of progress and recapitulation, teleology, and a purpose in nature
towards which all life was supposed to advance. Refusing to admit of the validity o f
these terms suggested that historians had virtually eliminated necessity and purpose from
nature as well as from their historical accounts. This was in sharp contrast to Frederick
Jackson Turner’s world view which accepted the reality of cycles, recapitulation, stages
o f progress, and ultimate teleological ends/^ The driving force behind White’s world
view led him to conclude that there was no consciousness or purpose to nature despite the
fact that his methodology and his terminology pointed to the exact opposite conclusion.
His terms of “energy” and “work” that underpinned The Organic Machine were more
akin to nineteenth-century Vitalist thought than they were to late twentieth-century
materialism. In that case, what The Organic Machine represented was the tension
between a late twentieth-century world view and a methodology, one which reverted
back to late nineteenth-century linguistic expressions, that did not allow for a
materialistic world view. Hence, the contradictions arose. White’s return to the mode o f
“unconscious productiveness ”placed him the midst o f this contradiction between his
Tumerian metaphor and his contemporary world view.
Once again, one must turn to Kenneth Burke’s penetrating insight to understand just
what is meant by a return to “unconscious productiveness.” Burke argued that there was a
point where materialism merged into mysticism. The point at which they merged was at
the concept of purpose. That is, materialism and mysticism were both reductionist when
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it came to “purpose” because they involved a “narrowing of motivational
circumference.”^^ The manner in which they achieved that reductionism differed, but the
result was the same. Materialism accomplished the reductionism by a “deliberate
elimination of purpose as a term.”^^ In contrast, mysticism unintentionally arrived at the
same result by “making purpose absolute, and thereby in effect transforming it into a
fatality.”^ Ironically, what Burke noticed was that those materialist schemes that
attempted to de-emphasize purpose actually accentuated it. Therefore, it was the
accidental emergence o f purpose in materialism that signified the return to “unconscious
productiveness” because the emergence of purpose was the point at which the historian
lost track of his logical, thought-out consistency. Gene Wise would have construed this
return as a “strain” in the “explanation form.”^ In his view, there was a point at which
what the author intended to do and what he did diverged. Therefore, the rationale of the
premise and ensuing argument disintegrated. In the case of Richard White’s “explanation
form,” his logic became strained when he claimed that the examination of nature and
“energy” did not imply a consciousness or purpose to nature but he nevertheless
continued to embed such implications for a purpose into his text. White’s materialist
attitude hoped to eliminate purpose, but it surfaced throughout the text all the same. This
represented a break down in “critical intellect” because his original premise made it
impossible for him to follow through on those leads pointing to purpose. Certain
implications pointing to a purpose in nature were left unaddressed by him, leaving them
dangling unchallenged in the body o f the text. These implications were given no analysis
and no serio& examination. His materialist world view merged into mysticism as
purpose became more and more unknowingly featured within the actions of the Columbia
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River. The close of the book had a very different ending than the beginning. In his next to
last paragraph. White wrote, “The river has purposes of its own which do not readily
yield to desires to maximize profit..”^ How significantly different this closure was when
compared to his initial declaration, “I do not attribute either a consciousness or a purpose
to nature.”^ The shift into viewing the Columbia River as having purpose was clearly
part of the transition into “unconscious productiveness."
What the concept o f purpose reveals is the fatal flaw in Richard White’s logic. White
wanted to find a way to unify man with his environment. Man was considered to be a
conscious, purpose driven creature. But nature supposedly was devoid of consciousness
and purpose. That meant man could never in fact become indistinguishable from nature
because their a priori definitions were irreconcilable. If man was ever truly merged with
nature, nature would no longer be nature because it now possessed consciousness and
purpose—as displayed in the form of man’s actions. Man, as nature, was conscious and
therefore he represented nature’s consciousness. To have admitted this would have been
the death knell for White’s contemporary world view. If man as a physical organism
pointed to the consciousness of nature, then all those things which went to make up the
New West historian’s first nature, such as salmon, cattle, trees, and plants, would also
point to the consciousness of nature. These four subjects all manipulated "energy "to
fulfill certain purposes. How then could nature be said to be devoid of consciousness and
purpose? In regard to the structure of his logic, Richard White clearly was not aware of
what he was actually doing. He wanted to unify man and nature yet he tried to work from
a preconceived world view that made them incompatible by definition. His world view
separated them into first and second nature without providing a mechanism for them to be
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unified. Faced with this insurmountable difficulty in uniting man and nature, it was
convenient for White to slip out of that modem world view and into a nineteenth-century
metaphorical trope that allowed him to do what the logic of his “critical intellect” could
not do. White drew on metaphor to unify man and nature. He wrote, “Wave, water, and
and wind—and human labor—can be represented in ways beyond the immediacy o f actual
experience. We can abstract them to a single entity: energy.”**
With White embracing a metaphorical trope in which “energy” was at once both
abstract and concrete, his statements took on a double meaning. Simple statements that
would have seemed straightforward in any other circumstance now had to be examined
cautiously. Metaphor encodes subtle meanings into a text in a way that irony does not.
Once White had adopted metaphor, these additional meanings were necessarily encoded
into his text, whether he wanted them there or not. A very basic statement like, “It was,
after all, the salmon that brought thousands of Indians to the Cascades, to the Dalles and
Celilo Falls, the Priest Rapids and Kettle Falls,” now took on extraordinary, almost
supernatural meanings.*^ In White’s mind, salmon was a metaphor for “energy.” Salmon
equaled “energy ”With salmon having to be treated abstractly as “energy, ”that meant
“energy” was the cause of Indians moving to new regions. “Energy” was the pull tugging
people about the countryside. If “energy” was in a region, that region would prosper. If
that “energy” vacated a region, that region would decline. White realized that the
relationship between people and the environment created “maps of energy ”that could
be read historically.*^ It was precisely those maps that Turner was trying to understand.
One only had to follow where “energy” was and how it got there to decode the historical
past. Seen this way. White’s “energy” was little different than Turner’s “vital forces.”
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Both pushed people to new regions and created vibrant cultures in those regions. Turner's
“vital forces” could be mapped just like White’s “energy.” The details may have differed
for White and Turner, but the metaphor was identical.
In the same way that Donald Worster and William Cronon became neo-Tumerians of
a sort when they integrated the metaphor of “energy” into their interpretations, so too did
Richard White. But White was more significant because he allowed the metaphor of
“energy” to drive the entire discourse and methodology of what is considered a solid
piece of historical scholarship. Whereas Cronon had only briefly slipped out o f the ironic
trope to embrace metaphor. White rooted The Orpanic Machine in the metaphorical
trope. Hayden White’s prediction for the emergence of an age of metaphor from an age of
irony showed signs of coming true. Richard White’s The Organic Machine, the product
o f a leading New Western historian, provided the first, full-fledged indication that
Hayden White was correct.

Elliott West
Elliott West took Richard White’s metaphor o f “energy” and more fully developed it
within a Tumerian framework. When Richard White employed the metaphor of “energy”
to explain history in terms of an interaction between noumenon and phenomenon, he re
legitimized the metaphorical trope and its realist ground to reality. The qualities o f a
physical organism could be described in terms o f its “energy” or its actual physical traits.
The characteristics of a region could be traced by following “energy” flows within its
borders. If someone had a lot of “energy,” he was powerful. If someplace had a lot of
“energy,” it was prosperous. And “energy” could leave a region. If it did, that region
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changed, oftentimes becoming but a shadow of its former self. At its most basic level,
this metaphor was little different than Turner’s “vital forces.” In re-legitimizing the
metaphorical trope. West and White legitimized Turner.
The legitimization o f Turner received support in Elliott West’s The Contested Plains:
Indians. Goldseekers. and the Rush to Colorado (1998). West borrowed White’s
metaphor of “energy ”and extended it to the world of ideas, underpinning ideas
themselves with “energy ” He expanded White’s dualism of “energy” and physical matter
to include a third factor: ideas. These ideas served as the medium through which
“energy” would transform the landscape. With this addition, “energy” behaved more and
more like Turner’s “vital forces.” In feet, the concept of “energy” found itself edging
closer and closer to a fully Tumerian model. It was now a tri-fold interaction of “energy, ”
ideas, and physical matter. Where Tumer’s “vital forces” had stimulated ideas before,
now “energy” was the equivalent. When Patricia Limerick praised West’s book for the
“discovery of the ties between events in the human mind and events in material reality,”
she overlooked part of West’s equation.*^ If he had merely related material events to
ideas, that would have been nothing new. Henry Nash Smith had shown fifty years earlier
how human perception interacted with physical reality. West advanced beyond Smith by
embedding a ground to reality, or “energy,” beneath both ideas and physical action. This
was his version of realism. By doing this. West brought Tumer’s metaphor for “vital
forces” up to date. In going forwards, one actually went backwards.
What West emphasized was the intermediary level between “energy” and physical
action. That intermediary level was human imagination. The translation of “energy” into
act could only happen if imagination bridged the gap separating the abstract and concrete
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worlds.*^ The best example of this was in West’s reference to the unclothed man
standing out in the winter cold. The man saw a bear and it occurred to him that he could
be warmer if only he had the bear’s hair. He proceeded to kill the bear and make himself
clothing. In this example, the crucial event for White was not the “killing of the bear, or
the fashioning of a garment, but the first picturing [by the man] of himself, bear-robed,
inside his own head, as he stood shivering and wondering.”*^ As such, the man’s
imagination gave him an “enormous manipulative influence” over his surroundings.*^
Imagination gave him the ability to translate and harness “energy” into physical act. The
result was that this man became extremely powerful.
The reason that West’s metaphor of “energy ” differed so much from Smith’s
“imaginative constructions” was because West identified “energy ”with an “effective”
environment.** West, influenced by the biological sciences, distinguished between
“perceived” and “effective” environments.*’ A perceived environment included
everything that an animal, including the human animal, was “aware of in its
surroundings.”’" The perceived environment often missed much of what was actually
happening and often included things that were not really there. Much of the perceived
environment did not in fact exist. West’s example was that of a dog barking at its own
echo, “apparently deep in conversation with a perceived canine neighbor that was, in fact,
the far side of the gully.”’* O f course, much o f what was perceived was not an illusion.
The same dog might also notice rain in the sky, birds in the air, and his owner setting out
water for the morning These things were really there. In comparison, an effective
environment included everything that actually influenced a person or animal irregardless
of whether they perceived this reality or not. For example, antelopes and bison were
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probably unaware o f the nitrogen cycle and yet it was an absolutely essential fact in the
perpetuation of their existence. The effective environment was real; it was the ground to
reality. In certain ways, human beings held a vastly greater perceived environment than
the animals. As the extent of the perceived environment grew, human perception came
closer and closer to capturing an effective environment. Human perception, as
imagination captured “energy,” replicated an effective environment or the ground to
reality. This was significantly at variance with Smith’s “imaginative constructions ”For
the most part. Smith adopted the concept that ideas could only reflect physical culture
and therefore they were inherently flawed. Ideas could never replicate an effective
environment. In contrast. West asserted that ideas possessed degrees of “energy” and that
“energy” was part o f an effective environment. He wrote, “Part o f an effective
environment is the energy that moves continuously around us. All organisms draw on that
energy, convert it [through imagination], and use it in order to live.”’^ “Energy” was
very real for West. It accounted for “all true animation and allowed every human event; a
sacred dance, paddling a boat, burning a village, sipping tea

A sacred dance may

have been a combination of human perception and physical ritual, but this combination
possessed an intimate connection to an “effective” environment, or ground to reality,
through the “energy ”that stimulated the imaginative process of the American Indians.
Elliott West’s basic metaphors for “power” and “energy” were drawn from Richard
White. West reiterated, “As energy is captured and set to a purpose, it becomes power.
The application of energy is power in its widest meaning.”®"*But whereas White had left
purpose noticeably vague and underdeveloped, it was clear that for West purpose was
“imagination” or “awareness.”’’ Not that West overtly referenced purpose back to
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imagination or awareness, but his treatment of the three terms was identical. By
definition, purpose implied some sort of consciousness which deliberately and
intentionally desired to achieve some specific action. In comparison, imagination was an
intuitive understanding of what needed to be done in order to achieve something.
Awareness was an informed consciousness for how to go about some particular task.
While it is not precisely clear just how far West would have gone in imbuing a river with
imagination or awareness, it is clear that the implications involved in these terms would
have come closer, even if unintentionally, to giving sentience to first nature. Rivers were
certainly aware of how to utilize their “energy.” If that awareness did not arise from some
degree of imagination, no matter how small, then just how did the river possess the
intuitive understanding for howto go about its peculiar task of removing obstacles?
Irregardless, the main point to be remembered is that West equated imagination and
awareness back to purpose. Something’s imagination and awareness defined its purpose.
Consequently, imagination and awareness, like purpose, led directly to “power.” What
this additional correlation did for West was allow him to take the metaphor of “energy”
one step closer to Turner.
This additional correlation took West’s metaphor one step closer to Turner because it
firmly established the same unseen forces at the root of all physical worldly “power.” The
combination of “energy” and awareness were the causes of historical action. In the case
of “energy,” West utilized the metaphor of stored sunshine which Cronon had introduced
and White had adopted. Just as Cronon’s forests were imbued with the sun’s force and
White’s salmon were stored sunshine on the run, so too West continued the pattern in his
own work. He wrote, “Every expression of plains power drew originally from the sun. . .
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An Indian on a horse was literally harnessing, more directly and reliably, the energy
poured out by the sun in unimaginable generosity

Later, he continued, “We are

surrounded by energy. It pours down on our heads and sits waiting in all organic matter,
in tree bark, centipedes, cattle bull snakes, and grass. Each life-form is constantly
converting a tiny part of that abundance into an ability to do something

The

conversion process of “energy” into action was entirely dependent upon how aware an
organism was in regard to the possible implementations of that “energy.” Living things
could only apply “energy” in a “few o f many available ways” based on their degree of
awareness and imagination.’* Animals suffered much more than humans in absorbing and
utilizing “energy” because their sense of awareness was so limited. Humans, on the other
hand, possessed a tremendous imaginative force to re-envision the landscape, notice how
it could be changed, and then to change it. In short, what differentiated the amount of
“energy” that an organism could absorb and apply corresponded to their level of
awareness. This mixture of “energy” and awareness gave human beings “power.” It gave
them “power” to conquer the animal world. If it could do that, it could also allow certain
people to be able to conquer in the human world as well. By using the imagination to
manipulate the environment and capture more “energy,” one group of people could
thrive and subsequently dominate another group of people who had captured less
“energy.” For example, the concept of national character is supposed to express how one
group of people think as opposed to what another group is thinking and doing. In essence,
human character is nothing other than West’s imagination and awareness. Two people
could go to the same forested area and yet they would each think about it differently. One
might imagine a paper mill constructed next to the river stream and would therefore begin
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to chop down the necessary timber and begin to construct it The second person might not
imagine in that way at all. He might imagine nothing different for the area other than
hunting a few deer. In comparison, the habit of thought o f these two men would be
radically different. Subsequently, their actions would be different. Looking at these
differences, the historian could safely state that the characters of these two men differed.
They imagined or were aware in different ways. The significance of linking West’s
imagination and awareness to character was that it bridged the metaphor of “energy” to
Tumer’s metaphor of “vital forces.” If a physical organism was dependent on capturing
“energy” based on the quality or type of its imagination, then that was analogous to
Tumer’s physical actors being dependent on capturing “vital forces” based on the quality
or type of their character. In West, human agents could capture “energy” only if they
could imagine in certain ways. In Tumer, human agents could capture “vital forces” only
if they were thinking in certain ways. Since “energy” represented “power” to West and
“vital forces” represented “power” to Tumer, and because imagination or character
allowed “energy” and “vital forces” to manifest, that meant the rise or fall of a
civilization was now wholly dependent on how people thought. If the way people thought
was able to capture “energy,” these people gained “power.” If the way people thought
was able to capture “vital forces,” those people gained “power ”Simply stated, if two
groups of people met at a city’s frontier hinterland for the first time, the more powerful
group would emerge victorious because of the capacity of their character to hamess more
“energy.” West’s logic implied that the Native Americans were conquered because they
hamessed less “energy” than the white invaders. But West’s own world view, which
stressed sensitivity to the plight of Native Americans, blinded him to the implications of
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his own logic. These implications were never recognized or, if they were, they were
never explicitly stated.
By bridging the two metaphors of “energy” and “vital forces,” West transported
Tumer’s concept of the frontier into the contemporary world. For West, frontiers were
“waves of new experience.”” Experience was nothing other than innovations in the way
people imagined as they moved into new areas, the way that imagination captured
“energy,” and the way that “energy” was subsequently expended to alter the physical
landscape. West’s frontier was a synonym for “energy.” For Tumer, his frontier began
when a “new environment was suddenly entered, freedom o f opportunity was opened, the
cake of custom was broken, and new activities, new lines o f growth, new institutions and
new ideals, were brought into existence.”*” What was behind all this activity driving it
forwards were Tumer’s “vital forces.” For West and Tumer, “energy” and “vital forces”
were the real frontiers. The frontier existed wherever “energy” and “vital forces” could
be found. Patricia Limerick was right when she remarked that the “familiar dispute ”
whether Tumer was correct about the frontier had become “trivial and arcane,” but she
was wrong about the reason why.*"* The familiar dispute was becoming trivial because
the emerging metaphor of “energy” was gradually transforming the frontier concept into
what Tumer originally meant it to be. Rather than being about whether two people or four
people or eight people lived in a region, it was about a massive collision and localization
o f “energy” or “vital forces” within a specific region. The frontier concept was really so
much bigger than what historians had been willing to credit it with. In light o f this
grander picture, what historians had been doing with the frontier thesis did indeed look
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trivial. The frontier thesis was in fact an overarching thesis that depicted the inner
workings for the relationship between unseen forces and the physical world.
In 1988, Gerald Nash expressed doubt that contemporary historians would be able to
arrive at an overarching thesis, like Tumer had done in the nineteenth century, to explain
the West. Nash reminisced;
It is perhaps questionable to expect an equivalent o f the Tumer Thesis
to be formulated in the remaining years of the twentieth century Not
only has the historical profession undergone major changes in the years
since 1893, but the complexities o f westem history after 1890 . . . vastly
increased.*”
Without a doubt, things must have looked especially grim for Nash in light of the recent
publication of Patricia Limerick’s The Legacv o f Conquest in 1987. As her book
received enthusiastic accolades from a historical profession which recognized value in
the fact that her work supported the virtues o f its own entrenched neo-Marxist ideology,
the situation could have only looked that much gloomier. With Limerick’s book, it finally
appeared as though Tumer’s coffin might have been nailed shut. Was Limerick’s
conquest theory the foundation stone for the next generation of American West history?
In fact, the answer was no. The Legacy of Conquest was exactly what she said it was; a
compilation “pulling the pieces together to combine two or three decades of thriving
scholarship with a decade of thriving journalism in Westem American subjects.”*”
Limerick admitted that much of the most “interesting work in Westem history had been
done by individuals who considered themselves first and foremost urban, social business,
labor, Chicano, Indian, or environmental historians—not Westem historians.”*” That is,
Limerick openly acknowledged that her own work was merely a restatement of what had
already been done in social history decades before.*” As such. The Leeacv of Conquest
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actually belonged to the past, not the future. It was the culmination of what scholars like
Henry Nash Smith, Earl Pomeroy, and Howard Lamar had begun. But, in 1988,
Limerick’s conquest theory was the closest thing to being a substitute for the Tumer
thesis. The 1990’s would change that because, in fact, contemporary historians did arrive
at an overarching thesis, like Tumer had done in the nineteenth century, to explain the
American West.
Using hindsight, it is easy to see why Gerald Nash underestimated the plausibility of
achieving a modem ‘Tumer Thesis” in the last twelve years of the twentieth century.'”
Nash supposed that the increased complexities that had taken place in westem history
after the 1890’s would prevent such an all-inclusive thesis. What he did not realize was
that all these complexities, or the nominalist aspect o f westem history, possessed no
bearing on whether a new rendering for an overarching thesis could be established. If the
new thesis functioned under the metaphorical trope, it would be able to operate entirely
independent of nominalist procedures. This is because at no point does metaphor’s
driving philosophy of realism ever merge into nominalism. Metaphor is therefore
independent of nominalism. This was something Nash did not grasp. Nash imagined that
a new equivalent of the Tumer thesis would have to be carefully formulated, strategically
taking into account endless, manifold intricacies. That is, Nash anticipated that the new
thesis would continue to operate under the property o f “critical intellect.” As such, it
would require an extraordinary amount of time to work out the details. But if the
equivalent of a Tumer thesis was not something that had to be meticulously crafted but
merely something that historiansfe ll into, that would change the situation completely. It
would eliminate the time factor altogether. If history is a creative act rather than an

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

206

analytical one, change could take place rapidly And, if historiansfell into metaphor, it
would eliminate the need to account for countless details Metaphor ignores details.
With these two fectors in mind, a modem Turner thesis could be developed rather
quickly. Historians could be “unconsciously productive "
Of course, this view that an overarching thesis had been established in the 1990’s
requires one to interpret Tumer in ways very much different than how traditional
historians had interpreted him. At its core, the frontier thesis was about the interaction of
human character and “vital forces.” Differences in human character, in terms of ideals,
values, and culture, allowed myriad groups o f people to capture variant levels of the
“vital forces” and subsequently transform the landscape in diverse ways. The frontier
thesis was actually a proposition that affirmed a special relationship between unseen
forces and the physical world in American history. That was Tumer’s overarching thesis.
When one examines Elliott West’s The Contested Plains, one finds the same overarching
thesis in place. Only West substituted “energy” for “vital forces” and imagination for
character. If Elliott West had stood alone in developing and using these altemate terms,
one could shrug him off as the aberration of the historical profession. But, in fact. West,
like Tumer, simply assimilated ideas that had already been floating about in the
intellectual atmosphere for some time and adapted them to his own work. The result was
that the themes of conquest, race, and gender became secondary to the overriding
metaphor detailing the relationship of noumenon and phenomenon in a historical world.
A new synthesis had been established.
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indicative of James’ style. May, on her deathbed, revealed to John that the beast had
already struck them both, but he had missed it. John went through all the details o f his
past life but could not uncover that tragic moment. Then May told him she had loved him
all those years. In that moment when compassion for his comrade and the unrequited love
she had gone through all those years flooded into Marcher’s heart, the beast sprang, the
“moment o f danger” arose, and John Marcher saw the truth behind the unfolded history
of his life. It was too much for him, he crumpled to the ground, and never saw it again.
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” Ibid.
” Kippenhahn, like many scientists who are not completely prepared to accept the
consequences involved in the duality of quantum mechanics, proceeded to contradict
himself on this point. He continued, T t is actually a physical concept .” And more, “We
have learned a lot about light, but despite this, we still do not know what light really is.”
And why not? “The problem lies in the fact that it does not correspond to anything that
we encounter in our everyday experience.” But if it was a “physical concept,” then it
should correspond to our daily experiences. And, if it was a “physical concept,” it should
also not consist of two incompatible components such as being a wave and a particle at
the same time.
Scientists are still struggling to accept where their field has led them—right into the
middle of an unseen world that does not fit into concepts of physical reality Niels Bohr
knew that quantum mechanics was taking science into the realms of the unseen worlds
and was supposed to have stated, “Anyone who is not shocked by quantum theory has not
understood it.” See Virginia Hanson, H P Blavatskv and the Secret Doctrine (Wheaton;
The Theosophical Publishing House, 1988), 163. Finally, see Gottfried de Purucker’s
statements «Août the direction o f science and quantum mechanics in the I930’s, “Modem
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and indeed as mystical as anything of its kind that the Theosophical Movement [a
metaphysical, spiritual, and brotherhood movement founded in 1875] has uttered speaks
of these units of energy as quanta of energy or photons—which is an exceedingly good
description for the quasi-astral [non-physical] and quasi-material plane where these
energy quanta or photons are placed by scientific thought. See Purucker, The Esoteric
Tradition. Vol. 1, 218.
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

211

” In his acknowledgments for It’s Your Misfortune and None of Mv Own. Richard
White wrote, T t was John [Drayton] who suggested that the new literature on the
American West, particularly the new minority histories and the literature on gender and
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history of the American West really was by utilizing both the Old and New Westem
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” White, The Organic Machine. 12.
Ibid., 13.
” Burke, A Grammar o f Motives. 291.
As for modem scholarship, there are, fortunately, exceptions to every rule. 1 refer to
two contemporary essays that develop excellent arguments in support of cycles and
periodicity. First, Carville Earle and Changyong Cao’s article, “Frontier Closure and the
Involution of American Society, 1840-1890, Journal of the Earlv Republic 13 (1993):
163-179. Second, Carville Earle’s essay, “The Periodic Structure o f the American Past:
Rhythms, Phases, and Geographic Conditions,” in his book. Geographical Inquirv and
American Historical Problems (Stanford. Stanford University Press, 1992).
For clarification, there is no inherent contradiction in placing stages of progress within
cycles. Turner believed in stages of progress, but these stages repeated themselves.
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Intelligible World,” American Historical Review 100 (1995): 715.
Gerald Nash and Richard Etulain, eds.. The Twentieth-Centurv West: Historical
Interpretations (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1989), 409.
Limerick, The Legacv of Conquest. 30.
•” Ibid
•” Patricia Limerick divided The Legacv o f Conquest into two parts: “The
Conquerors” and “The Conquerors Meet their Match.” The idea was that the persistence
o f minorities in the United States to resist whites from conquering them meant that they
had never really been conquered at all. The same basic idea is found in earlier works,
such as Robert Laxalt’s 1977 essay, “The Melting Pot.” This piece detailed how
minorities in Nevada, ranging from American Indians, Chinese, blacks, and even Eastern
and Central Europeans, persisted against white conquest until they had themselves
become successful. See Wilbur S. Shepperson, ed.. East of Eden. West of Zion: Essavs
on Nevada (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1989), 30-40.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION
Hayden White argued in Metahistorv that metaphor and irony successively followed
on the heels o f one another through chronological time. For him, metaphor was naively
embedded into historical texts because the historian had no way o f verifying the accuracy
of its representations. Irony emerged from metaphor as metaphor’s conscience. While
metaphor lacked the mechanism to recognize the problematical nature of its language,
irony possessed just such a mechanism. Irony was “metatropological” in that, while itself
a trope, it could be used to critically analyze the misrepresentations of another trope. • Just
as nominalism neutralized the catholicity in realism, so irony cautioned against the over
generalizations in metaphor. For this reason, irony appeared negative and pessimistic. But
since irony was the trope of conscience and self-consciousness, it also had to confront
and destroy itself. As White wrote, Tronic consciousness” had to be turned against
“Irony itself.”’ This could be done by demonstrating that “skepticism ”and “pessimism,”
which make up “so much of contemporary historical thinking,” had their origins in an
“Ironic frame of mind” which was “merely one of a number of possible postures that one
may assume before the historical record

Irony could criticize but not from a secure,

absolute position. It too, in a phrase, could not “hold the truth.”"* Irony had to admit the
flaws in its own methodology. White asserted that what came from this self-analysis was
a “reconstitution of history as a form of intellectual activity which was at once poetic,
214
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scientific, and philosophical.”’ That is, history returned to metaphor which was, for
White, the “next appropriate stage in the cycle.”^

Patricia Limerick and “Tumerians All”
All that is needed to do now to bring Hayden White’s model for the re-emergence o f
metaphor in line with the developments of westem history is to show the point at which,
in the midst of this transition into metaphor, the ironic consciousness tumed on itself.
Patricia Limerick’s work best illustrates the point at which irony confronted itself. Her
writings represent the harbinger for the new age o f metaphor.
In strong contrast to Limerick’s The Legacv o f Conquest in which she perceived
herself as one of the last “messengers” who would finally nail shut the lid to Tumer’s
coffin, her later essays reflected an open-ness to the idea o f metaphor.’ Whereas in
Legacy Limerick identified Tumer as the bad guy, herself as the good guy, and then
initiated a shoot-out, her two essays, “The Adventures of the Frontier in the Twentieth
Century” and “Tumerians All: The Dream of a Helpful History in an Intelligible World”
revealed a much more complex perspective. Not that her treatment of Tumer was any
kinder than before, but she had matured to the degree where she could confess the flaws
of her own historical era. This maturation was evident in her 1994 essay, “The
Adventures of the Frontier” In this piece, she acknowledged that David Wrobel’s
definition for the fi*ontier was being accepted by many historians as well as by popular
American culture. Wrobel explained that, in contemporary culture, the frontier was a
a metaphor for “promise, progress, and ingenuity.”* That was pretty much what it had
stood for in Tumer’s time as well. Rather than denigrating the frontier metaphor on this
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ground, she admitted that it had become a “mental artifact” demonstrating such an
“astonishing stickiness and persistence” that it had virtually become the “flypaper” for
popular American culture.^ Whether or not it suited her personal preference, the concept
worked as a “cultural glue—a mental and emotional fastener that, in some very curious
and unexpected ways, works to hold us together.”'" What Limerick had done in this
confession was revolutionary. For the past fifty years, irony had been employed by
western historians in an attempt to include all the different human races, classes, and
genders within one common history where all felt comfortable. Irony’s criticism of
metaphor had been that it excluded certain people with its over-generalizations With one
brilliant stroke of the pen, Limerick negated the ironic methodology of all those years. At
this point in her career, Limerick concluded that irony had not succeeded as a unifying
source. Instead, metaphor had achieved this goal. In a surprising twist, metaphor had
achieved in the end what irony originally set out to do. If so, what was the further
purpose of irony? Had it outlived its usefulness?
By the time Limerick’s article “Tumerians All” appeared in 1995, she realized that
The Legacy of Conquest was not meant to stand for the ages. Like Turner’s contribution
to western history, she recognized that her own particular contribution was in grave
danger of outliving its “period of usefulness.”' ' She believed that undue deference to
Turner’s model in the years following his frontier thesis had cramped developments in
western history and narrowed his own writing style. Limerick did not wish for her own
work to limit the intellectual freedom of contemporary historians. She only wanted
The Legacy to become a “stimulant, a provocation, the equivalent to the side of a
swimming pool from which friture inquirers could push off to gain momentum.”'^
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In this case, Limerick’s ironic consciousness was seeing itself, seeing the necessity
of not crystallizing into dogma, and seeing the eventuality of its own demise. Instead of
separating herself and her historical genre from Turner’s shortcomings, she confessed
that she shared his shortcomings. She acknowledged that her historical methodology had
not led to an understanding of the past that could accurately elucidate the present. Her
historical methodology possessed blind spots brought about by the limitations of
contemporary world views that had been accepted as dogma rather than theory. Once
those world views became dogma, they blinded the historian. Like Turner, Limerick
knew she had to fight against the conformist degeneration that crept into popular theories
once they had gained support. Turner had struggled against conformist tendencies.
Limerick found her own generation confronting the same tendencies. She believed
Turner’s generation had failed. Would her generation fail as well? Clearly, irony had
begun to see its own limitations as a viable historical tool. Irony had caught a glimpse of
its own impermanence.
In the 1980’s, a small group o f American West historians banded together to launch an
all-out assault against Frederick Jackson Turner. They compared notes, exchanged ideas,
and generally discussed how they wanted to reshape American West history. The assault

planned and it was intended to be deadly. But what happened instead sturmed
everyone involved, especially the leaders of the bloody coup. In "Tumerians All,”
Limerick marveled at the unexpected outcome of the anti-Tumer showdown; “The New
Western History’s campaign to declare Turner irrelevant revitalized Turner’s reputation
. . . It restored his celebrity.”'^ In this instance, Limerick admitted there was a campaign
to make Turner irrelevant. And that was the real reason why Richard White left Turner
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out of his synthesis. It’s Your Misfortune and None of mv Own. More importantly,
however, Limerick and the historical profession were now faced with confronting a
revitalized Turner. Limerick noted that she had to “rethink” her assumptions and
“reexamine” the patriarch o f American West history

In that re-examination, what she

recognized was of tremendous import. Scholars who opposed the New Western history
had been arguing for years that Turner did in fact take into account many of the issues
that interested historians of the post-1950’s. Limerick finally agreed. She acknowledged
that there was a “frontier antithesis” scattered about in the writings surrounding his
frontier thesis.'^ As part of that fromier antithesis, he really did take into account such
issues as Native Americans, irrigation networks, cooperative activity. Eastern capital, and
government loans. What Limerick could not completely figure out was the mystery of
why “if Turner had, on his own, identified many of the principal flaws in his earlier
position he did not say so directly.”'" She digressed into some speculative psychological
character analysis on Turner which suggested he was reluctant to identify his own
mistakes in order to maintain respectability and position. To a certain extent, she may
have been correct. But there is a deeper explanation, a metahistorical element, for the
complexity of a frontier thesis and antithesis in Turner’s work. 1 suggest that Turner’s
frontier thesis and antithesis was a dialectic, a tension between two competing tropal
styles; metaphor and irony. Only one of these styles can be dominant at any given time.
The other style perpetually exists, but it is subsumed in importance to the dominant style.
I have show that Turner was working through metaphor. Since metaphor possesses no
inherent mechanism from which to analyze, it was impossible for him to do as Limerick
wished. The trope of metaphor inherently lacked the self-reflective quality that was
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necessary to develop the critical aspect o f the frontier antithesis. When Henry Nash Smith
came onto the scene, metaphor became subdued and irony became dominant. Metaphor
still existed in Smith’s work but on a secondary level. Smith had his own sort of thesis
and antithesis. But he only developed a portion of it, the portion that corresponded to his
historical times. Finally, Richard White, who transitioned back into metaphor while
attempting to retain a 1960’s cultural framework in his book The Organic Machine, found
himself confronted with all sorts of difficulties in logic as his own thesis and antithesis
fought to gain the upper hand. With the concept of “energy,” White came down on the
side of metaphor. But, in adopting metaphor, he was stripped of his analytical tools for
understanding the intricacies o f the concept o f “energy” and how he was embedding the
concept into his text. In a similar fashion, Frederick Jackson Turner did not develop his
frontier antithesis because to have done so would have meant going against the world
view of his entire historical period as well as his own character. Whether Turner, Smith,
or White, an author generally remains in step with his times. Togo against the norm of
one’s own historical period is extremely difficult. To go against the norm on a
professional level is—suicide. Even today, the historical profession, and American West
historians, do not take well to innovation that challenges their authority. For Turner to
have contradicted his own frontier thesis may well have led to his own demise and
alienated him from his contemporary western historians and the surrounding popular
culture. Like historians of today, he maintained sterile dogmas to retain professional
standing.
According to Limerick, Turner’s choice not to have developed his own antithesis “set
a precedent from which the profession has never fully broken free.”'^ Limerick realized
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that her own New Western history was in danger of becoming “familiar doctrine” that
masked the truth instead of exposing it.

She wrote, “I wanted Western American

history to have many historians offering, as Turner had, forceful statements and
interpretations.”'" Limerick wanted students who would “show a little more willingness
to declare their independence of the matriarchs and patriarchs of the field.”^" The
problem is that aspiring students who do show independence of the matriarchs and
patriarchs of the profession and subsequently make their own strong and forceful
statements often face overwhelming disapproval from within the profession itself. Strong
and forceful statements threaten the legitimacy of the status quo from both a historical
and a political standpoint. The conformist nature of the historical profession is so strong
that even Kerwin Klein had to apologize up front for his forceful interpretive
statements.^' Limerick was right in her fears about “familiar doctrine” becoming too
commonplace. For her own historical period, she prodded, “What are our blind spots?
What are the elements of our social identity that limit our vision as sternly as racial
assumptions limited Turner’s vision?”^ One of those blind spots emerged with the
publication of Smith’s Virgin Land. Its division between ideas and physical action has
become such a “familiar doctrine” that our contemporary historical notion for how
historians embed the relationship between noumenon and phenomenon into their texts
has been blunted. One need only mention the term “culture” and the modem historian
immediately thinks o f this division; ideas and physical action. But Turner’s “vital forces”
and White’s “energy” go beyond the simple doctrine of ideas and physical action. In fact,
they function on an entirely different structure. As a result o f Smith’s “familiar doctrine,”
it is difficult for historians to think o f noumenon as anything other than ideas. Thus,
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historians still often use the concept of ideas and physical action without any real
understanding of what they are doing much in the same way that Turner did not have any
real understanding for what he was doing This simplistic dualism between ideas and
physical action became our dogma, our late twentieth-century blind spot Contemporary
historians have taken ideas for granted and implanted them into their narratives without
having any clear-cut notion of what they are. Patricia Limerick wrote;
Historians of the late twentieth century have not reached a plateau
of comfortable self-understanding from which we can look down
smugly on Turner’s struggles. In truth, a confession of solidarity—
‘Tumerians All”—is the place where this explanation begins and ends.^^
‘Tumerians All” is the place where this explanation begins and ends, wrote
Limerick.^^ I agree with Limerick that ‘Tumerians All” is a well-chosen phrase. 1 have
attempted to demonstrate that the major western historians have made certain
assumptions in constructing their histories about how the unseen world intersects with the
seen world. Use of the metaphorical trope emplots those assumptions one way; irony
emplots them another. At times, those assumptions may have been consciously
constructed and at other times unconsciously constructed. Tumer himself realized this
dual process, “By unconscious inheritance, and by conscious striving after the past as part
of the present, history has acquired continuity.”^* History acquires continuity precisely
because there is an age of great inspiration followed by an age of criticism. To some
extent, all western historians have made assumptions and built their histories on them. It
has been the attempt of the present work to challenge the assumption of many
contemporary westem historians that Tumer alone wrote in some sort of mystical
rhetoric. I have tried to show that any historian who emplots tropally necessarily adopts
his own brand of mystical rhetoric.
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Carl Becker and the “Heavenly City”
Patricia Limerick’s call for the theme of “Tumerians All” is a fitting conclusion for
the work at hand. It is nothing new for one historical age to believe that it has surpassed
the merits of the previous historical age. That the New Westem historians felt that they
had exceeded Turner’s generation should come as no surprise. Stretching back hundreds
of years, each successive generation o f historians has maintained that its scholarship
represented a viable “Age of Reason” while its predecessors represented nothing more
than a fool’s paradise in an “Age of Faith ” Limerick was insightful enough to see
through this facade. Over time, she became aggressively consensus-oriented, positioning
herself as the bridge to create harmony in a historical profession where before she had
only stirred discord. But Limerick was not the only historian to see through this facade
In 1932, Carl Becker published his book. The Heavenlv Citv of the Eighteenth-Centurv
Philosophers and dedicated it to his famous teacher, Frederick Jackson Tumer. Becker
argued in The Heavenlv Citv that, contrary to popular historical opinion, the
Enlightenment thinkers of eighteenth-century Europe were just as much “men of faith” as
were the thirteenth-century Medieval scholastics.^" Popular historical opinion maintained
that the eighteenth century was an “Age of Reason” and that its chief proponents,
including Francois Voltaire, David Hume, Denis Diderot, and John Locke, all shared a
“critical spirit” for “rational inquiry” and “primacy o f reason.”^’ But Becker gracefully
countered this dogma by demonstrating the fallacy o f distinguishing between Medieval
and Enlightenment thought based on distinctions of faith and reason. Becker explained
that it could be said of the eighteenth century “that it was an age of faith as well as
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reason, and o f the thirteenth century that it was an age of reason as well as faith.”^'' He
asserted that Medievalists, ranging from St. Augustine of Hippo to Dante Alighieri and
St. Thomas Aquinas, were just as much “men of reason” in their own way. What
distinguished the two eras, the Medieval and the Enlightenment, was not the lack of
reason in one age as opposed to the other but the differences in the “unconscious
preconceptions” which each group of scholars brought to the drawing table when shaping
their respective historical visons.^"
What renders Dante’s argument or St. Thomas’ definition meaningless
to us is not bad logic or want of intelligence, but the medieval climate
o f opinion—those instinctively held preconceptions in the broad sense,
that Weltanschauung or world pattern—which imposed upon Dante or
St. Thomas a peculiar use of intelligence and a special type of logic.*"
The issue for Becker was not that the Medievalists lacked reason, but that their sense of
reason was rooted in alternative cultural preconceptions. Cultural preconceptions,
whether Medieval or Enlightenment, were matters of faith. It was these cultural
preconceptions that primarily determined how one composed history. Thus, Becker
insisted that the eighteenth-century philosophers, who had defined their history in terms
of cultural preconceptions as much as any Medievalist, were men o f faith who, like the
Medievalists, used reason to defend their faith. In the end, however, the conclusions that
they were bound to find were the very ones with which they started.
The eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers pretended to have dismissed the
preconceptions o f a Medieval Christian faith from their analytical discourse. Yet at every
turn Becker noticed their indebtedness to Christian faith even though they remained
unaware of it.
In spite of their rationalism and their humane sympathies, in spite of
their aversion to hocus-pocus and enthusiasm and dim perspectives.
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in spite of their eager skepticism, their engaging cynicism, their brave
youthful blasphemies and talk o f hanging the last king in the entrails
of the last priest—in spite of all of it, there is more Christian philosophy
in the writings o f the Philosophes than has yet been dreamt of in
our histories.**
What Becker noticed was that, on the surface, the Enlightenment philosophy declared
that there was no distinction between good and evil, morality and immorality, but, at a
deeper level, it had established its own moral measure for viewing justice and injustice,
the amelioration of society’s ills, and the constitution of a man of virtue. The Christian
“ideal of service” and the “humanitarian impulse to set things right” motivated Voltaire,
Hume, Diderot, and Locke.** When these philosophers demolished St. Augustine’s
“picture of salvation” for a “Heavenly City ” founded on earth, they immediately rebuilt it
with a “vague impressionistic image” of the virtues o f a “future state.”** When these
philosophers discarded the ideal for the perfection and immortality of the soul, they
replaced it with a “more generalized earthly and social félicité or perfectibilité du genre

humain.'"^ The concept of divine “grace ”was translated into human “virtue.”** To be
esteemed a “man of virtue” was sufficiently “efficacious” to be given “social
justification” and, for the Enlightenment philosophers themselves, “complete
sanctification.”*" With wit, Becker remarked, T suppose that Hume and Franklin, when
they were in France . . . must have had this assurance [of complete sanctification] as fully
as any saint of the church ever had.”** The directing impulse of the Enlightenment
philosophers, as it previously had been for the Medieval scholastics, was to demonstrate
that “mankind had been corrupted and betrayed by false doctrines.”*^ Their task was to
destroy these false doctrines. But the very determination that these doctrines were false
was purely a matter of faith. They based that determination on their own moral
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humanistic preconceptions for how they viewed the world. Like the Christian apologists,
the Enlightenment philosophers functioned from common themes of virtue, nobility, and
the perfectibility of man. For Becker, St. Augustine’s “Heavenly City ” still existed at the
root of eighteenth-century thought, but it had simply been shifted to “more earthly
foundations.”*" Nevertheless, these “earthly foundations ”remained a matter of faith. The
historical story propounded by the Enlightenment philosophers became popular not
because of facts in themselves, but because these facts were applied to events in
accordance with the humanistic morality o f the new faith.
In hindsight, Carl Becker’s book The Heavenlv City played out the “Tumerians All”
theme but in relation to the Medieval and Enlightenment centuries. When one penetrated
to the heart of the matter, the differences between Medieval and Enlightenment thinkers
were superficial. If used to explain the changes in twentieth-century American West
historiography, it illuminates our historical perspective of that era. Like the Medieval
scholastics, Tumer was accused by his successors for being a “man of faith.” Like the
Enlightenment philosophers, his successors, the New Westem historians, believed they
were “men of reason.” As the New Westem historians talked of “hanging the last king
[Tumer] in the entrails of the last priest [his faith in a triumphant westem democracy],
they merely supplanted his cultural preconceptions with their own cultural
preconceptions for a slightly altered view of justice and injustice, virtue and greed, and
the perfectibility of man and society in the American West. The New Westem historians
had not destroyed Tumer’s “picture o f salvation” for a “Heavenly City” in the American
West but had only rebuilt its foundations so that it conformed to their own faith in the
morality of a left-liberal and Marxist world view. Tumer was reproved for characterizing
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the West in utopian terms, but, once his view had been denounced as fanciful, his critics
proceeded to project their own intimations of a golden age onto the historical picture
Henry Nash Smith initiated the revision In truth. Smith did not so much destroy Tumer’s
“ideal of yeoman society” as supplant it with an alternative moral view/*" Whereas
Tumer had envisioned yeoman society as a triumphant success. Smith introduced the
concept of “suffering humanity” into the equation/*' Smith’s own vision of utopia,
carefully veiled behind allusions to Hamlin Garland’s social theory, still idolized “the
plowman ” as the perfected westemer, but now the plowman was idolized for maintaining
his “dignity” amidst failure and financial ruin/** Smith could not allow the plowman to
triumph. If the plowman triumphed in the American West as Tumer had depicted, that
left no room for Smith’s personal indictment o f the capitalist system. Tumer’s utopian
vision of triumph had to be dismantled. Otherwise, such an indictment was unnecessary.
Smith’s utopian vision for restoring “dignity” to westemers led to Patricia Limerick’s
own conceptualization of history in terms o f failure rather than triumph. She too wanted
to restore “full human dignity to westemers

Like Smith, Limerick could not allow

Tumer’s triumphant westem democracy into her narrative. The West had to be a failure.
It had to be a failure so that her own utopian vision—that of restoring full human dignity
to westemers—would have a place in the new history. In particular, Limerick wanted to
restore full human dignity to minorities and women. In their fight against capitalist greed,
the new westem actors and actresses, unlike Tumer’s old actors, were portrayed to
represent her ideal of virtue. They became the new perfected'we&xexnets. For Limerick,
their inclusion in the New Western history was a matter of moral justice. Richard White
went a step further. Now that minorities and women were included in this New Westem
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Utopian vision, fish also needed to be included. White argued that, if the historical
conversation about the Columbia River was not about “fish and justice,” then “we have
not come to terms with our history o f this river.”^ It was at this point that environmental
history intersected New Westem history. The revised concept of moral justice for the
New Westem historians stretched beyond human beings. For them, capitalist greed had
impacted the environment and the environment needed to be restored to full dignity as
well.
In his book. Rivers of Empire. Donald Worster reflected on his utopian vision for the
American West:
Approached deliberately as an environment latent with possibilities
for fi^eedom and democracy rather than for wealth and empire, the
unredeemed desert West might be an unrealized national resource.
It might be valued as a place for inspiration and training for a différent
kind of life. Relieved fi’om some of its burdens of growing crops, eaming
foreign exchange, and supporting immense cities, it might encourage
a new sequence o f history, an incipient America of simplicity, discipline,
and spiritual exploration, an America in which people are wont to sit long
hours doing nothing, eaming nothing, going nowhere, on the bank of some
river running through a spare, lean land. They would come then to the river
to see a reflection o f their own liberated minds, running free and easy.
They would want little, enjoy much. Now and then they would dip their
hands into the current and drink a little. They would irrigate their spirit
more than their ego. In the midst of what had once been regarded as the
bleakest scarcity they would find abundance. Is it a fable, this alternative,
a idyll from an inaccessible yesterday, or is it a real possibility, one being
pushed along to fulfillment by the currents of history? The West will let
us know.^*
For Worster, this idyllic scene symbolized a very real possibility. In Worster’s view, this
new moral faith, unlike Tumer’s old moral faith, could create real progress and a real
advance in civilization out in the American West. In response, Carl Becker’s words are
apropos:
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A hundred years is a long time, and it is possible that within a
hundred years a regulated economy (call it communism or collective
planning as you like) may be recognized throughout the westem
world as the indispensable foundation of social order, peace, and
prosperity, the welfare of mankind. If that should by any chance be
what fortune has in store for us, it is not too fanciful to suppose that
‘posterity,’ in the year 2032, will be celebrating the events of
November, 1917, as a happy turning point in the history of human
freedom, much as we celebrate the events of July, 1789. What, then,
are we to think of all these great days,’ these intimations of utopia?
Are we to suppose that the Russian Revolution of the twentieth century,
like the French Revolution o f the eighteenth, is but another stage
in the progress of mankind toward perfection? Or should we think,
with Marcus Aurelius, that ‘the man of forty years, if he have a
grain of sense, in view of this sameness has seen all that has been
and shall be?”^
In moving beyond Tumer’s “agrarian myth,” Donald Worster only succeeded in
re-establishing the trails toward yet another “Heavenly City.” Among many New Western
historians, this new “Heavenly City” was idealized from a left-liberal and Marxist
perspective that was considered superior to Tumer’s Progressive view of the West. It
became popular only because it was in keeping with the latest trends in American
thought. What the New Westem historians failed to realize was that they too had created
a view of the West that was no more objectively based nor any less utopian than was
Tumer’s West. Their moral vision shaped their historical story. Like Tumer, they were
“men of faith.” Their faith, like the “faith by which any age lives,” was “bora of their
experience and their needs.”^* Starting out under the “banner of objectivity and with a
flourish of scholarly tmmpets, as if on a voyage of discovery in unknown lands,” the
New Western historians never “really entered the country of the past” because they could
not “afford to leave the battlefield o f the present.”^* As Turner so aptly wrote and
Limerick reiterated, “Each age writes the history of the past anew with reference to the
conditions uppermost in its own time.”^" If so, Tumer’s faults are our own.
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late to decorate one’s prose with a host of disclaimers professing one’s own special
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